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http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,249997,00.html
Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller
An edited version of the agent's 13-page letter
May 21, 2002
FBI Director Robert Mueller
FBI Headquarters Washington, D.C.
Dear Director Mueller:
I feel at this point that I have to put my concerns in writing concerning the
important topic of the FBI's response to evidence of terrorist activity in the United
States prior to September 11th. The issues are fundamentally ones of INTEGRITY and go
to the heart of the FBI's law enforcement mission and mandate. Moreover, at this
critical juncture in fashioning future policy to promote the most effective handling
of ongoing and future threats to United States citizens' security, it is of absolute
importance that an unbiased, completely accurate picture emerge of the FBI's current
investigative and management strengths and failures.
To get to the point, I have deep concerns that a delicate and subtle
shading/skewing of facts by you and others at the highest levels of FBI management has
occurred and is occurring. The term "cover up" would be too strong a characterization
which is why I am attempting to carefully (and perhaps over laboriously) choose my
words here. I base my concerns on my relatively small, peripheral but unique role in
the Moussaoui investigation in the Minneapolis Division prior to, during and after
September 11th and my analysis of the comments I have heard both inside the FBI
(originating, I believe, from you and other high levels of management) as well as your
Congressional testimony and public comments.
I feel that certain facts, including the following, have, up to now, been
omitted, downplayed, glossed over and/or mis-characterized in an effort to avoid or
minimize personal and/or institutional embarrassment on the part of the FBI and/or
perhaps even for improper political reasons:
1) The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about Moussaoui's flight
training identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early point. The decision to
take him into custody on August 15, 2001, on the INS "overstay" charge was a
deliberate one to counter that threat and was based on the agents' reasonable
suspicions. While it can be said that Moussaoui's overstay status was fortuitous,
because it allowed for him to be taken into immediate custody and prevented him
receiving any more flight training, it was certainly not something the INS
coincidentally undertook of their own volition. I base this on the conversation I had
when the agents called me at home late on the evening Moussaoui was taken into custody
to confer and ask for legal advice about their next course of action. The INS agents
was assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and was therefore working in
tandem with FBI agents.
2) As the Minneapolis agents' reasonable suspicions quickly ripened into
probable cause, which, at the latest, occurred within days of Moussaoui's arrest when
the French Intelligence Service confirmed his affiliations with radical fundamentalist
Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden, they became desperate to
search the computer lap top that had been taken from Moussaoui as well as conduct a
more thorough search of his personal effects. The agents in particular believed that
Moussaoui signaled he had something to hide in the way he refused to allow them to
search his computer.
3) The Minneapolis agents' initial thought was to obtain a criminal search
warrant, but in order to do so, they needed to get FBI Headquarters' (FBIHQ's)
approval in order to ask for DOJ OIPR's approval to contact the United States
Attorney's Office in Minnesota. Prior to and even after receipt of information
provided by the French, FBIHQ personnel disputed with the Minneapolis agents the
existence of probable cause to believe that a criminal violation had occurred/was
occurring. As such, FBIHQ personnel refused to contact OIPR to attempt to get the
authority. While reasonable minds may differ as to whether probable cause existed
prior to receipt of the French intelligence information, it was certainly established
after that point and became even greater with successive, more detailed information
from the French and other intelligence sources. The two possible criminal violations
initially identified by Minneapolis Agents were violations of Title 18 United States
Code Section 2332b (Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, which,
notably, includes "creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other
person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal
property within the United States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage
any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United
States") and Section 32 (Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities). It is
important to note that the actual search warrant obtained on September 11th was based
on probable cause of a violation of Section 32.1 Notably also, the actual search
warrant obtained on September 11th did not include the French intelligence
information. Therefore, the only main difference between the information being
submitted to FBIHQ from an early date which HQ personnel continued to deem
insufficient and the actual criminal search warrant which a federal district judge
signed and approved on September 11th, was the fact that, by the time the actual
warrant was obtained, suspected terrorists were known to have highjacked planes which
they then deliberately crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. To say
then, as has been iterated numerous times, that probable cause did not exist until
after the disasterous event occurred, is really to acknowledge that the missing piece
of probable cause was only the FBI's (FBIHQ's) failure to appreciate that such an
event could occur. The probable cause did not otherwise improve or change. When we
went to the United States Attorney's Office that morning of September 11th, in the
first hour after the attack, we used a disk containing the same information that had
already been provided to FBIHQ; then we quickly added Paragraph 19 which was the
little we knew from news reports of the actual attacks that morning. The problem with
chalking this all up to the "20-20 hindsight is perfect" problem, (which I, as all
attorneys who have been involved in deadly force training or the defense of various
lawsuits are fully appreciative of), is that this is not a case of everyone in the FBI
failing to appreciate the potential consequences. It is obvious, from my firsthand
knowledge of the events and the detailed documentation that exists, that the agents in
Minneapolis who were closest to the action and in the best position to gauge the
situation locally, did fully appreciate the terrorist risk/danger posed by Moussaoui
and his possible co-conspirators even prior to September 11th. Even without knowledge
of the Phoenix communication (and any number of other additional intelligence
communications that FBIHQ personnel were privy to in their central coordination
roles), the Minneapolis agents appreciated the risk. So I think it's very hard for the
FBI to offer the "20-20 hindsight" justification for its failure to act! Also
intertwined with my reluctance in this case to accept the "20-20 hindsight" rationale
is first-hand knowledge that I have of statements made on September 11th, after the
first attacks on the World Trade Center had already occurred, made telephonically by
the FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who was the one most involved in the Moussaoui
matter and who, up to that point, seemed to have been consistently, almost
deliberately thwarting the Minneapolis FBI agents' efforts (see number 5). Even after
the attacks had begun, the SSA in question was still attempting to block the search of
Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere
coincidence with Misseapolis' prior suspicions about Moussaoui.2
4) In one of my peripheral roles on the Moussaoui matter, I answered an e-mail
message on August 22, 2001, from an attorney at the National Security Law Unit (NSLU).
Of course, with (ever important!) 20-20 hindsight, I now wish I had taken more time
and care to compose my response. When asked by NSLU for my "assessment of (our)
chances of getting a criminal warrant to search Moussaoui's computer", I answered,
"Although I think there's a decent chance of being able to get a judge to sign a
criminal search warrant, our USAO seems to have an even higher standard much of the
time, so rather than risk it, I advised that they should try the other route." Leaked
news accounts which said the Minneapolis Legal Counsel (referring to me) concurred
with the FBIHQ that probable cause was lacking to search Moussaoui's computer are in
error. (or possibly the leak was deliberately skewed in this fashion?) What I meant by
this pithy e-mail response, was that although I thought probable cause existed
("probable cause" meaning that the proposition has to be more likely than not, or if
quantified, a 51% likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney's Office, (for a
lot of reasons including just to play it safe) in regularly requiring much more than
probable cause before approving affidavits, (maybe, if quantified, 75%-80% probability
and sometimes even higher), and depending on the actual AUSA who would be assigned,
might turn us down. As a tactical choice, I therefore thought it would be better to
pursue the "other route" (the FISA search warrant) first, the reason being that there
is a common perception, which for lack of a better term, I'll call the "smell test"
which has arisen that if the FBI can't do something through straight-up criminal
methods, it will then resort to using less-demanding intelligence methods. Of course
this isn't true, but I think the perception still exists. So, by this line of
reasoning, I was afraid that if we first attempted to go criminal and failed to
convinced an AUSA, we wouldn't pass the "smell test" in subsequently seeking a FISA. I
thought our best chances therefore lay in first seeking the FISA. Both of the factors
that influenced my thinking are areas arguably in need of improvement: requiring an
excessively high standard of probable cause in terrorism cases and getting rid of the
"smell test" perception. It could even be argued that FBI agents, especially in
terrorism cases where time is of the essence, should be allowed ot go directly to
federal judges to have their probable cause reviewed for arrests or searches without
having to gain the USAO's approval.4
5) The fact is that key FBIHQ personnel whose jobs it was to assist and
coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations and the obtaining
and use of FISA searches (and who theoretically were privy to many more sources of
intelligence information than field division agents), continued to, almost
inexplicably,5 throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis' by-now desperate efforts
to obtain a FISA search warrant, long after the French intelligence service provided
its information and probable cause became clear. HQ personnel brought up almost
ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause.6 In
all of their conversations and correspondence, HQ personnel never disclosed to the
Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had, only approximately three weeks
earlier, warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools seeking flight training for
terrorist purposes!
Nor did FBIHQ personnel do much to disseminate the information about Moussaoui
to other appropriate intelligence/law enforcement authorities. When, in a desperate
11th hour measure to bypass the FBIHQ roadblock, the Minneapolis Division undertook to
directly notify the CIA's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), FBIHQ personnel actually
chastised the Minneapolis agents for making the direct notification without their
approval!
6 ) Eventually on august 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between Minneapolis
and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately further undercut the FISA
effort by not adding the further intelligence information which he had promised to add
that supported Moussaoui's foreign power connection and making several changes in the
wording of the information that had been provided by the Minneapolis Agent, the
Minneapolis agents were notified that the NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was
sufficient evidence of Moussaoui's connection to a foreign power. Minneapolis
personnel are, to this date, unaware of the specifics of the verbal presentations by
the FBIHQ SSA to NSLU or whether anyone in NSLU ever was afforded the opportunity to
actually read for him/herself all of the information on Moussaoui that had been
gathered by the Minneapolis Division and the French intelligence service. Obviously
verbal presentations are far more susceptible to mis-characterization and error. The
e-mail communications between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, however, speak for themselves and
there are far better witnesses than me who can provide their first hand knowledge of
these events characterized in one Minneapolis agent's e-mail as FBIHQ is "setting this
up for failure." My only comment is that the process of allowing the FBI supervisors
to make changes in affidavits is itself fundamentally wrong, just as, in the follow-up
to FBI Laboratory Whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst's allegations, this process was
revealed to be wrong in the context of writing up laboratory results. With the
Whitehurst allegations, this process of allowing supervisors to re-write portions of
laboratory reports, was found to provide opportunities for over-zealous supervisors to
skew the results in favor of the prosecution. In the Moussaoui case, it was the
opposite -- the process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the
significance of the information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of
having to see the FISA application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may
have perceived as an unnecessary career risk.7 I understand that the failures of the
FBIHQ personnel involved in the Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused
because they were too busy with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other
important terrorism matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time to read each word
of the information submitted by Minneapolis and then substitute his own choice of
wording belies to some extent the notion that he was too busy. As an FBI division
legal advisor for 12 years (and an FBI agent for over 21 years), I can state that an
affidavit is better and will tend to be more accurate when the affiant has first hand
information of all the information he/she must attest to. Of necessity, agents must
continually rely upon information from confidential sources, third parties and other
law enforcement officers in drafting affidavits, but the repeating of information from
others greatly adds to the opportunities for factual discrepancies and errors to
arise. To the extent that we can minimize the opportunity for this type of error to
arise by simply not allowing unnecessary re-writes by supervisory staff, it ought to
be done. (I'm not talking, of course, about mere grammatical corrections, but changes
of some substance as apparently occurred with the Moussaoui information which had to
be, for lack of a better term, "filtered" through FBIHQ before any action, whether to
seek a criminal or a FISA warrant, could be taken.) Even after September 11th, the
fear was great on the part of Minneapolis Division personnel that the same FBIHQ
personnel would continue their "filtering" with respect to the Moussaoui
investigation, and now with the added incentive of preventing their prior mistakes
from coming to light. For this reason, for weeks, Minneapolis prefaced all outgoing
communications (ECs) in the PENTTBOM investigation with a summary of the information
about Moussaoui. We just wanted to make sure the information got to the proper
prosecutive authorities and was not further suppressed! This fear was probably
irrational but was nonetheless understandable in light of the Minneapolis agents'
prior experiences and frustrations involving FBIHQ. (The redundant preface information
regarding Moussaoui on otherwise unrelative PENTTBOM communications has ended up
adding to criminal discovery issues, but this is the reason it was done.)
7) Although the last thing the FBI or the country needs now is a witch hunt, I
do find it odd that (to my knowledge) no inquiry whatsoever was launched of the
relevant FBIHQ personnel's actions a long time ago. Despite FBI leaders' full
knowledge of all the items mentioned herein (and probably more that I'm unaware of),
the SSA, his unit chief, and other involved HQ personnel were allowed to stay in their
positions and, what's worse, occupy critical positions in the FBI's SIOC Command
Center post September 11th. (The SSA in question actually received a promotion some
months afterward!) It's true we all make mistakes and I'm not suggesting that HQ
personnel in question ought to be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be held
accountable for serious mistakes. I'm relatively certain that if it appeared that a
lowly field office agent had committed such errors of judgment, the FBI's OPR would
have been notified to investigate and the agent would have, at the least, been quickly
reassigned. I'm afraid the FBI's failure to submit this matter to OPR (and to the IOB)
gives further impetus to the notion (raised previously by many in the FBI) of a double
standard which results in those of lower rank being investigated more aggressively and
dealt with more harshly for misconduct while the misconduct of those at the top is
often overlooked or results in minor disciplinary action. From all appearances, this
double standard may also apply between those at FBIHQ and those in the field.
8) The last official "fact" that I take issue with is not really a fact, but an
opinion, and a completely unsupported opinion at that. In the day or two following
September 11th, you, Director Mueller, made the statement to the effect that if the
FBI had only had any advance warning of the attacks, we (meaning the FBI), may have
been able to take some action to prevent the tragedy. Fearing that this statement
could easily come back to haunt the FBI upon revelation of the information that had
been developed pre-September 11th about Moussaoui, I and others in the Minneapolis
Office, immediately sought to reach your office through an assortment of higher level
FBIHQ contacts, in order to quickly make you aware of the background of the Moussaoui
investigation and forewarn you so that your public statements could be accordingly
modified. When such statements from you and other FBI officials continued, we thought
that somehow you had not received the message and we made further efforts. Finally
when similar comments were made weeks later, in Assistant Director Caruso's
congressional testimony in response to the first public leaks about Moussaoui we faced
the sad realization that the remarks indicated someone, possibly with your approval,
had decided to circle the wagons at FBIHQ in an apparent effort to protect the FBI
from embarrassment and the relevant FBI officials from scrutiny. Everything I have
seen and heard about the FBI's official stance and the FBI's internal preparations in
anticipation of further congressional inquiry, had, unfortunately, confirmed my worst
suspicions in this regard. After the details began to emerge concerning the
pre-September 11th investigation of Moussaoui, and subsequently with the recent
release of the information about the Phoenix EC, your statement has changed. The
official statement is now to the effect that even if the FBI had followed up on the
Phoenix lead to conduct checks of flight schools and the Minneapolis request to search
Moussaoui's personal effects and laptop, nothing would have changed and such actions
certainly could not have prevented the terrorist attacks and resulting loss of life.
With all due respect, this statement is as bad as the first! It is also quite at odds
with the earlier statement (which I'm surprised has not already been pointed out by
those in the media!) I don't know how you or anyone at FBI Headquarters, no matter how
much genius or prescience you may possess, could so blithely make this affirmation
without anything to back the opinion up than your stature as FBI Director. The truth
is, as with most predictions into the future, no one will ever know what impact, if
any, the FBI's following up on those requests, would have had. Although I agree that
it's very doubtful that the full scope of the tragedy could have been prevented, it's
at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the
terrorists in flight training prior to September 11th, just as Moussaoui was
discovered, after making contact with his flight instructors. If is certainly not
beyond the realm of imagination to hypothesize that Moussaoui's fortuitous arrest
alone, even if he merely was the 20th hijacker, allowed the hero passengers of Flight
93 to overcome their terrorist hijackers and thus spare more lives on the ground. And
even greater casualties, possibly of our Nation's highest government officials, may
have been prevented if Al Qaeda intended for Moussaoui to pilot an entirely different
aircraft. There is, therefore at least some chance that discovery of other terrorist
pilots prior to September 11th may have limited the September 11th attacks and
resulting loss of life. Although your conclusion otherwise has to be very reassuring
for some in the FBI to hear being repeated so often (as if saying it's so may make it
so), I think your statements demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all
costs. I think the only fair response to this type of question would be that no one
can pretend to know one way or another.
Mr. Director, I hope my observations can be taken in a constructive vein. They
are from the heart and intended to be completely apolitical. Hopefully, with our
nation's security on the line, you and our nation's other elected and appointed
officials can rise above the petty politics that often plague other discussions and do
the right thing. You do have some good ideas for change in the FBI but I think you
have also not been completely honest about some of the true reasons for the FBI's
pre-September 11th failures. Until we come clean and deal with the root causes, the
Department of Justice will continue to experience problems fighting terrorism and
fighting crime in general.
I have used the "we" term repeatedly herin to indicate facts about others in the
Minneapolis Office at critical times, but none of the opinions expressed herin can be
attributed to anyone but myself. I know that those who know me would probably describe
me as, by nature, overly opinionated and sometimes not as discreet as I should be.
Certainly some of the above remarks may be interpreted as falling into that category,
but I really do not intend anything as a personal criticism of you or anyone else in
the FBI, to include the FBIHQ personnel who I believe were remiss and mishandled their
duties with regard to the Moussaoui investigation. Truly my only purpose is to try to
provide the facts within my purview so that an accurate assessment can be obtained and
we can learn from our mistakes. I have pointed out a few of the things that I think
should be looked at but there are many, many more.8 An honest acknowledgment of the
FBI's mistakes in this and other cases should not lead to increasing the Headquarters
bureaucracy and approval levels of investigative actions as the answer. Most often,
field office agents and field office management on the scene will be better suited to
the timely and effective solution of crimes and, in some lucky instances, to the
effective prevention of crimes, including terrorism incidents. The relatively quick
solving of the recent mailbox pipe-bombing incidents which resulted in no serious
injuries to anyone are a good example of effective field office work (actually several
field offices working together) and there are hundreds of other examples. Although
FBIHQ personnel have, no doubt, been of immeasurable assistance to the field over the
years, I'm hard pressed to think of any case which has been solved by FBIHQ personnel
and I can name several that have been screwed up! Decision-making is inherently more
effective and timely when decentralized instead of concentrated.
Your plans for an FBI Headquarters' "Super Squad" simply fly in the face of an
honest appraisal of the FBI's pre-September 11th failures. The Phoenix, Minneapolis
and Paris Legal Attache Offices reacted remarkably exhibiting keen perception and
prioritization skills regarding the terrorist threats they uncovered or were made
aware of pre-September 11th. The same cannot be said for the FBI Headquarters'
bureaucracy and you want to expand that?! Should we put the counterterrorism unit
chief and SSA who previously handled the Moussaoui matter in charge of the new "Super
Squad"?! You are also apparently disregarding the fact the Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs), operating out of field divisions for years, (the first and chief one being
New York City's JTTF), have successfully handled numerous terrorism investigations
and, in some instances, successfully prevented acts of terrorism. There's no denying
the need for more and better intelligence and intelligence management, but you should
think carefully about how much gate keeping power should be entrusted with any HQ
entity. If we are indeed in a "war", shouldn't the Generals be on the battlefield
instead of sitting in a spot removed from the action while still attempting to call
the shots?
I have been an FBI agent for over 21 years and, for what it's worth, have never
received any form of disciplinary action throughout my career. From the 5th grade,
when I first wrote the FBI and received the "100 Facts about the FBI" pamphlet, this
job has been my dream. I feel that my career in the FBI has been somewhat exemplary,
having entered on duty at a time when there was only a small percentage of female
Special Agents. I have also been lucky to have had four children during my time in the
FBI and am the sole breadwinner of a family of six. Due to the frankness with which I
have expressed myself and my deep feelings on these issues, (which is only because I
feel I have a somewhat unique, inside perspective of the Moussaoui matter, the gravity
of the events of September 11th and the current seriousness of the FBI's and United
States' ongoing efforts in the "war against terrorism"), I hope my continued
employment with the FBI is not somehow placed in jeopardy. I have never written to an
FBI Director in my life before on any topic. Although I would hope it is not
necessary, I would therefore wish to take advantage of the federal "Whistleblower
Protection" provisions by so characterizing my remarks.
Sincerely
Coleen M. Rowley
Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Division Counsel
NOTES
1) And both of the violations originally cited in vain by the Minneapolis agents
disputing the issue with FBIHQ personnel are among those on which Moussaoui is
currently indicted.
2) Just minutes after I saw the first news of the World Trade Center attack(s),
I was standing outside the office of Minneapolis ASAC M. Chris Briesse waiting for him
to finish with a phone call, when he received a call on another line from this SSA.
Since I figured I knew what the call may be about and wanted to ask, in light of the
unfolding events and the apparent urgency of the situation, if we should now
immediately attempt to obtain a criminal search warrant for Moussaoui's laptop and
personal property, I took the call. I said something to the effect that, in light of
what had just happened in New York, it would have to be the "hugest coincidence" at
this point if Moussaoui was not involved with the terrorists. The SSA stated something
to the effect that I had used the right term, "coincidence" and that this was probably
all just a coincidence and we were to do nothing in Minneapolis until we got their
(HQ's) permission because we might "screw up" something else going on elsewhere in the
country.
4) Certainly Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which begins,
"Upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the
government" does not contain this requirement. Although the practice that has evolved
is that FBI agents must secure prior approval for any search or arrest from the United
States Attorneys Office, the Federal Rule governing Search and Seizure clearly
envisions law enforcement officers applying, on their own, for search warrants.
5) During the early aftermath of September 11th, when I happened to be
recounting the pre-September 11th events concerning the Moussaoui investigation to
other FBI personnel in other divisions or in FBIHQ, almost everyone's first question
was "Why?--Why would an FBI agent(s) deliberately sabotage a case? (I know I shouldn't
be flippant about this, but jokes were actually made that the key FBIHQ personnel had
to be spies or moles, like Robert Hansen, who were actually working for Osama Bin
Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis' effort.) Our best real guess, however, is that,
in most cases avoidance of all "unnecessary" actions/decisions by FBIHQ managers (and
maybe to some extent field managers as well) has, in recent years, been seen as the
safest FBI career course. Numerous high-ranking FBI officials who have made decisions
or have taken actions which, in hindsight, turned out to be mistaken or just turned
out badly (i.e. Ruby Ridge, Waco, etc.) have seen their careers plummet and end. This
has in turn resulted in a climate of fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law
enforcement action/decisions. In a large hierarchal bureaucracy such as the FBI, with
the requirement for numerous superiors approvals/oversight, the premium on
career-enhancement, and interjecting a chilling factor brought on by recent extreme
public and congressional criticism/oversight, and I think you will see at least the
makings of the most likely explanation. Another factor not to be underestimated
probably explains the SSA and other FBIHQ personnel's reluctance to act. And so far, I
have heard no FBI official even allude to this problem-- which is that FBI
Headquarters is staffed with a number of short term careerists* who, like the SSA in
question, must only serve an 18 month-just-time-to-get-your-ticket-punched minimum.
It's no wonder why very little expertise can be acquired by a Headquarters unit! (And
no wonder why FBIHQ is mired in mediocrity! -- that maybe a little strong, but it
would definitely be fair to say that there is unevenness in competency among
Headquarters personnel.) (It's also a well known fact that the FBI Agents Association
has complained for years about the disincentives facing those entering the FBI
management career path which results in very few of the FBI's best and brightest
choosing to go into management. Instead the ranks of FBI management are filled with
many who were failures as street agents. Along these lines, let me ask the question,
why has it suddenly become necessary for the Director to "handpick" the FBI
management?) It's quite conceivable that many of the HQ personnel who so vigorously
disputed Moussaoui's ability/predisposition to fly a plane into a building were simply
unaware of all the various incidents and reports worldwide of Al Qaeda terrorists
attempting or plotting to do so.
*By the way, just in the event you did not know, let me furnish you the
Webster's definition of "careerism" - - the policy or practice of advancing one's
career often at the cost of one's integrity". Maybe that sums up the whole problem!
6) For example, at one point, the Supervisory Special Agent at FBIHQ posited
that the French information could be worthless because it only identified Zacarias
Moussaoui by name and he, the SSA, didn't know how many people by that name existed in
France. A Minneapolis agent attempted to surmount that problem by quickly phoning the
FBI's legal Attache (Legat) in Paris, France, so that a check could be made of the
French telephone directories. Although the Legat in France did not have access to all
of the French telephone directories, he was able to quickly ascertain that there was
only one listed in the Paris directory. It is not known if this sufficiently answered
the question, for the SSA continued to find new reasons to stall.
7) Another factor that cannot be underestimated as to the HQ Supervisor's
apparent reluctance to do anything was/is the ever present risk of being "written up"
for an Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) "error." In the year(s) preceding the
September 11th acts of terrorism, numerous alleged IOB violations on the part of FBI
personnel had to be submitted to the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
as well as the IOB. I believe the chilling effect upon all levels of FBI agents
assigned to intelligence matters and their manager hampered us from aggressive
investigation of terrorists. Since one generally only runs the risk of IOB violations
when one does something, the safer course is to do nothing. Ironically, in this case,
a potentially huge IOB violation arguably occurred due to FBIHQ's failure to act, that
is, FBIHQ's failure to inform the Department of Justice Criminal Division of
Moussaoui's potential criminal violations (which, as I've already said, were quickly
identified in Minneapolis as violations of Title 18 United States Code Section 2332b
[Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries] and Section 32 [Destruction of
aircraft or aircraft facilities]). This failure would seem to run clearly afoul of the
Attorney General directive contained in the "1995 Procedures for Contacts Between the
FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations" which mandatorily require the FBI to notify the
Criminal Division when "facts or circumstances are developed" in an FI or FCI
investigation "that reasonably indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is
being, or may be committed." I believe that Minneapolis agents actually brought this
point to FBIHQ's attention on August 22, 2001, but HQ personnel apparently ignored the
directive, ostensibly due to their opinion of the lack of probably cause. But the
issue of whether HQ personnel deliberately undercut the probable cause can be
sidestepped at this point because the Directive does not require probable cause. It
requires only a "reasonable indication" which is defined as "substantially lower than
probable cause." Given that the Minneapolis Division had accumulated far more than "a
mere hunch" (which the directive would deem as insufficient), the information ought to
have, at least, been passed on to the "Core Group" created to assess whether the
information needed to be further disseminated to the Criminal Division. However, (and
I don't know for sure), but to date, I have never heard that any potential violation
of this directive has been submitted to the IOB or to the FBI's OPR. It should also be
noted that when making determinations of whether items need to be submitted to the
IOB, it is my understanding that NSLU normally used/uses a broad approach, erring,
when in doubt, on the side of submitting potential violations.
8) For starters, if prevention rather than prosecution is to be our new main
goal, (an objective I totally agree with), we need more guidance on when we can apply
the Quarles "public safety" exception to Miranda's 5 Amendment requirements. We were
prevented from even attempting to question Moussaoui on the day of the attacks when,
in theory, he could have possessed further information about other co-conspirators.
(Apparently no government attorney believes there is a "public safety" exception in a
situation like this?!)
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