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-Caveat Lector-
Lt Vreeland has stated that ONI should take over intelligence for the
US and I agree. One advantage is that any wrong doing by military
intel personnel ends up before a courts-martial and if convicted,
they get sent to hard labour here:
http://www.lvarea.com/mavica/usdb_new.jpg instead of Club-Fed.
Is it a coincidence that when ONI was the main source of intel,
America never lost one war, till the CIA showed up? Then we had Korea
and VietNam and countless others, including W's Children Crusade.
And wasn't the State Department originally created by the Founding
Fathers to gather foreign intelligence? What do the people at State
do all day? Macrame?
Time to dust off Senator Moynihan's bill.
MacNamara
http://www.csun.edu/CommunicationStudies/ben/news/cia/
(Senate - January 04, 1995)
By Mr. MOYNIHAN:
S. 126. A bill to unify the formulation and execution of United
States diplomacy; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ABOLITION ACT OF 1995
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, it is no secret that a serious re-
examination of our intelligence needs is in order. Since 1991, when I
introduced the End of the Cold War Act, I have endeavored to bring
the shortcomings of the intelligence community to public light. Not
to denigrate our intelligence efforts, but to improve them. Despite
resistance to change, much of the End of the Cold War Act has been
implemented. We have eliminated `Lookout Lists,' which excluded
persons who merely expressed `unacceptable' opinions from entry into
the United States. One aspect of the bill yet to be implemented
brings me to the floor today: the transfer of the functions of the
Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of State.
The scrutiny that has now visited the intelligence community in the
aftermath of the exposure of Aldrich Ames, the man whose treason
caused the deaths of at least 10 American agents, increases the
likelihood that some long needed reassessments will be made. I do not
relish these circumstances, for to a great extent the Ames case
merely distracts from some of the most fundamental defects of the
CIA. While the Ames affair brings attention to the Directorate of
Operations, it takes scrutiny away from the Directorate of
Intelligence.
What of operations? Speaking before the Boston Bar Association in
1993, John le Carre, the man who provided us with a window into the
world of a spy, questioned the contributions of spies to the winning
of the cold war. In his remarks he stated:
You see, it wasn't the spies who won the cold war. I don't believe
that in the end the spies mattered very much at all. Their capsuled
isolation and their remote theorizing actually prevented them from
seeing, as late as 1987 or 8, what anybody in the streets could have
told them:
`It's over. We've won. The Iron Curtain is crashing down! The
monolith we fought is a bag of bones! Come out of your trenches and
smile!'
Even the victory, for them, was a cunning Bolshevik Trick.
And anyway, what had they got to smile about? It was a victory
achieved by openness, not secrecy. By frankness, not intrigue.
The Soviet Empire did not fall apart because the spooks had bugged
the men's room in the Kremlin or put broken glass in Mrs. Brezhnev's
bath, but because running a huge closed repressive society in the
1980s had become--economically, socially and militarily, and
technologically--impossible.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was therefore the very denial of
secrecy. Mr. le Carre is not alone. Recently William Pfaff in an
article in the International Herald Tribune posed the question, `what
positive things do [spies] accomplish?' He reached much the same
conclusion as le Carre and added that `the useful information today
is that supplied by area specialists, historians and ethnologists,
and through conventional diplomatic observation and journalism.'
If covert operations failed to have an impact as suggested by le
Carre and Pfaff, what of our intelligence analysis? How did that
serve us in the cold war? I believe I have fully laid out to the
Senate on previous occasions my assessment and those of numerous
respected individuals on the performance of the CIA in this regard.
The defining failure of the CIA was their inability to predict the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
In 1975, along with my daughter Maura, I visited China as a guest of
George Bush, who was then Chief of our U.S. Liaison Office of Peking.
By this time, I was persuaded the Soviet Union would break up along
ethnic lines. In a `Letter From Peking' dated January 26, 1975, which
I wrote and submitted to The New Yorker, the closing passage reads:
While it is agreed that few Marxist-Leninist predictions have come
true in the twentieth century, it is perhaps not sufficiently noticed
that certain predictions about Marxist-Leninist regimes have proved
durable enough. Lincoln Steffens returned from Moscow in the early
years, pronouncing that he had seen the future, and it worked. Well,
it was one future, and it has worked for a half century, and may have
considerable time left before ethnicity breaks it up. Red China
works, too, and is likely to last even longer.
I believe this is the first time in my writing that I stated the
belief then forming that the Soviet Union would not conquer the
world, but rather, would one day break up along ethnic lines. A no
longer brief acquaintance with Central Asia and its history had about
convinced me. I thought then, at mid-decade, that this might require
considerable time. By the end of the decade, I had decided it would
be upon us sooner. In 1979, in an issue of Newsweek devoted to
predictions of what would happen in the eighties, I submitted it was
likely that the Soviet Union would break up.
Former Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner,
writing in Foreign Affairs in 1991, confirms that such a possibility
had not penetrated the intelligence community when he stated.
Today we hear some revisionist rumblings that the CIA did in fact see
the Soviet collapse emerging after all. If some individual CIA
analyst were more prescient than the corporate view, their ideas were
filtered out in the bureaucratic process; and it is the corporate
view that counts because that is what reaches the president and his
advisers. On this one, the corporate view missed by a mile.
And there were others. Several months ago, the Deputy Director for
Intelligence [DDI] at the Central Intelligence Agency, Douglas
MacEachin, released a report entitled `The Tradecraft of Analysis:
Challenge and Change in the CIA.' In this report he outlines what he
regards as some of the major known failures of the intelligence
community. He attributes these failures to analysis which rested on
faulty assumptions--he called these assumptions `linchpins.' In the
report he states:
A review of the record of famous wrong forecasts nearly always
reveals at least one `linchpin' that did not hold up: the Soviets
will not invade Czechoslovakia because they will not want to pay the
political costs, especially after having signed the Rejkavik
Declaration the previous year; the Soviets will not invade
Afghanistan because they do not want to sink SALT-II which at that
moment is being debated by the U.S. Senate; Saddam Hussein needs
about two years to refurbish his military forces after the
debilitating war with Iran and, therefore, will not, despite evidence
of motives for doing so, invade Kuwait in the foreseeable future.
He concludes, `In each case, the sin was less in the fact that the
linchpins did not hold than in the failure of the intelligence
products to highlight the extent to which they were assumptions.'
Surely intelligence products could benefit from highlighting
assumptions. However, a more rigorous scrutiny provided by greater
openness would give an opportunity for facts, assumptions, and
conclusions to be challenged.
Scientists have long understood that secrecy keeps mistakes secret.
In the early 1960's, Jack Ruina, an MIT professor who had been head
of the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency at the Department of
Defense during the Kennedy administration, told me after visiting the
Soviet Union that it was plain it just wasn't working. In particular
he noticed something which someone without scientific training might
not have. The Soviets did not know who their best people were.
Promising young scientists in Russia were locked in a room and had no
knowledge about the activities of their colleagues around the
country. As anyone who has visited the fine research hospitals of New
York can tell you, the free flow of ideas is vital to advancement.
Openness of information is essential for great science.
This is no secret. Indeed, in 1970 a Task Force organized by the
Defense Science Board and headed by Dr. Frederick Seitz concluded
that `more might be gained that lost if our nation were to adopt--
unilaterally, if necessary--a policy of complete openness in all
areas of information.'
Yet the secrecy system is still in place. The information Security
Oversight Office keeps a tally of the number of secrets classified
each year. They reported that in 1993 the United States created
6,408,688 secrets. Absurd. While each agency has different procedures
and criteria for classifying documents, all seem to operate under the
assumption that classification is preferable to disclosure.
Secrecy is a disease. It causes hardening of the arteries of the
mind. It hinders true scholarship and hides mistakes. William Pfaff
has suggested that we ought not rely on spies, but rather on
journalists, historians, ethnologists; those who do not operate under
the cloak of secrecy but publish their work for all to read and
comment upon.
After World War II, it was originally intended that intelligence
would be coordinated by the Secretary of State. The maneuvering of
some of the more powerful Assistant Secretaries in the State
Department at the time prevented that from being implemented and the
independent Central Intelligence Agency was soon formed. Dean
Acheson, who was present at the creation, doubted the wisdom of such
a move. `I had the gravest forebodings about this organization and
warned the President that as set up neither he, the National Security
Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know what it was
doing or to control it.' The State Department must function as the
primary agency in formulating and conducting foreign policy. Any
other arrangement invites confusion.
In the last 4 years, this proposal has generated considerable debate--
some positive, some negative. Reform of United States foreign policy
institutions will continue to occupy the attentions of Congress, and
if for nothing else, this proposal contributes to the debate. So I am
today introducing the Abolition of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
Abolition of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1995 (Introduced
in the Senate)
S 126 IS
104th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 126
To unify the formulation and execution of United States diplomacy.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
January 4, 1995
Mr. MOYNIHAN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence
----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
A BILL
To unify the formulation and execution of United States diplomacy.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I--SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. This Act may be cited as the `Abolition of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1995'.
TITLE II--ABOLITION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 201. PURPOSE- It is the purpose of this title to unify the
formulation and execution of United States foreign policy by
providing overall authority over intelligence activities to the
Secretary of State.
SEC. 202. FINDINGS- The Congress finds that--
(1) the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency as a separate
entity during the Cold War undermined the role of the Department of
State as the primary agency of the United States Government in
formulating and conducting foreign policy and providing information
to the President concerning the state of world affairs; and
(2) it is desirable for the Secretary of State to serve as the
official primarily responsible for coordinating and managing the
gathering of intelligence.
SEC. 203. Transfer of Intelligence Functions-
(a) Not later than two years after the effective date of this Act
there shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of State
all of the functions, powers and duties of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and any
officer or component of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Not later than one year after the effective date of this Act, the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and other relevant officials, shall
transmit to the Congress a plan for (1) effecting the transfer of
functions under this section and (2) administering those functions.
In designing the plan the Secretary shall also consult with the
Congress, other relevant federal agencies and the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
(c) The Secretary of State is authorized to conduct the functions
transferred by subsection (a).
(d) The transfer of a function or office from an officer or agency to
the Secretary of State includes any aspects of such function or
office vested in a subordinate of such officer or in a component of
such agency.
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