--- Begin Message ---
-Caveat Lector-
Yes, Mr. Berlet is correct, it is a long book. I do not find it boring, and
when one investigates what Mr. Quigley says in dusty tomes, my experience is
to find confirmation, more questions and the picture has actually gotten a
bit clearer on some things.
MHO
Om
Kris Millegan
-----
an excerpt from:
Tragedy and Hope - A History of The World in Our Time
Carroll Quigley@1966
Angriff Press
Box 2726
Hollywood, CA 90078
ISBN 0913022-14-4
1348 pages
-----
The most sensational evidence from the HUAC was released in the late summer
of 1948 just in time to influence the presidential election in November.
Apparently it did not have the influence expected, since Truman was elected.
The controversy from its revelations continued for years, and the charges,
both from HUAC and from other sources, increased in violence. Few of the
revelations after 1948 were ever sustained in court. For example, two
separate "atomic espionage" cases involving Clarence F. Hiskey at Argonne
Laboratory in Chicago and Joseph W. Weinberg at Berkeley Radiation Laboratory
were played up by HUAC in 1949. Eventually Hiskey refused to answer questions
before HUAC, was prosecuted for contempt, and was acquitted in 1951.
Weinberg, accused by HUAC of giving "atomic secrets" to a well-known
Communist, Steven Nelson, eventually was prosecuted for perjury at the
committee's insistence, and was acquitted in 1953. Both scientists found
their careers injured by the committee's charges. There were many similar
cases.
The revelation of Communist influence in the United States was undoubtedly
valuable, but the cost, in damage to the reputations of innocent persons and
in the total confusion of the American people, was a very high and largely
unnecessary cost. Eventually some agencies of the government, such as the
Bureau of Standards, the army and, above all, the State Department were
severely injured by loss of morale, disruption of work, and refusal of
valuable personnel to work for the government under such conditions.
Much of this damage came from the efforts of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,
Republican, of Wisconsin to prove that the State Department and the army were
widely infiltrated with Communists and from the efforts of the
neo-isolationists and the "China lobby" to demonstrate that the Mao conquest
of China was entirely due to the treasonable acts of Communists and fellow
travelers in the State Department and the White House.
McCarthy was not a conservative, still less a reactionary. He was a fragment
of elemental force, a throwback to primeval chaos. He was the enemy of all
order and of all authority, with no respect, or even understanding, for
principles, laws, regulations, or rules. As such, he had nothing to do with
rationality or generality. Concepts, logic, distinctions of categories were
completely outside his world. It is, for example, perfectly clear that he did
not have any idea of what a Communist was, still less of Communism itself,
and he did not care. This was simply a term he used in his game of personal
power. Most of the terms which have been applied to him, such as "truculent,�
�brutal," "ignorant," �sadistic,� �foul-mouthed," "brash," are quite correct
but not quite in the sense that his enemies applied them, because they
assumed that these qualities and distinctions had meaning in his world as
they did in their own. They did not, because his behavior was all an act, the
things he did to gain the experience he wanted, that is, the feeling of
power, of creating fear, of destroying the rules, and of winning attention
and admiration for doing so. His act was that of Peck's Bad Boy, but on a
colossal scale, as the total rejection of everything he had come from in his
first twenty years of life. He sought fame and acclaim by showing an admiring
world of schoolmates what a tough guy he was, defying all the rules, even the
rules of decency and ordinary civilized behavior.
But like the bad boy of the schoolyard, he had no conception of time or
anything established, and once he had found his act, it was necessary to
demonstrate it every day.. His thirst for power, the power of mass acclaim
and of publicity, reached the public scene at the same moment as television,
and he was the first to realize what could be done by using the new
instrument for reaching millions.
His thirst for power was insatiable because, like hunger, it was a daily
need. It had nothing to do with the power of authority or regulated
discipline, but the personal power of a sadist. All his destructive instincts
were against anything established, the wealthy, the educated, the well
mannered, the rules of the Senate, the American party system, the rules of
fair play. As such, he had no conception of truth or the distinction between
it and falsehood, just as he had no conception of yesterday, today, tomorrow
as distinct entities. He simply said whatever would satisfy, momentarily, his
yearning to be the center of the stage surrounded by admiring, fearful,
shocked, amazed people. He did not even care if their reaction was
admiration, fear, shock, or amazement, and he did not care if they, as
persons, had the same reaction or a different one the next day or even a
moment later. He was exactly like an actor in a drama, one in which he made
the script as he went along, full of falsehoods and inconsistencies, and he
was genuinely surprised and hurt if a person whom he had abused and insulted
for hours at a hearing did not walk out with him to a bar or even to dinner
the moment the hearing session was over. He knew it was an act; he ex-pected
you to know it was an act. There really was no hypocrisy about it, no
cynicism, no falsehood, as far as he was concerned, because he was convinced
that this was the way the world was. Everyone, he was convinced, had a
racket; this just happened to be his, and he expected people to realize this
and to understand it.
Of course, to the observant outsider who did not share his total amorality,
it was all false, invented as he went along, and constantly changed,
everything substantiated by documents pulled from his bulging briefcase and
waved about too rapidly to be read. Mostly these documents had nothing to do
with what he was saying; mostly he had never looked at them himself; they
were merely props for the performance, and, to him, it was as silly for his
audience to expect such documents to be relevant as it would be for the
audience in a theater to expect the food that is being eaten, the whiskey
that is being drunk, or the documents which are read in that play to be
relevant to what the actor is saying.
Like any actor who might be charged with inconsistency or with lying because
what he says in one play is not compatible with what he says in another play,
McCarthy was puzzled, offended, hurt, or amused. With him every day, every
hour, was a different play. As a result, to the audience nothing was
consistent with anything else He gave several different dates for his birth,
and after 1945, never the correct one (November 14, 1908). Every time he
spoke or wrote of his war experiences, the story was a different one, and
with each version he became a larger, more nonchalant hero. Eventually, in
1952, when his power in Washington was at its height, and most of the
government feared to draw his wrath (or even his attention), he intimidated
the Air Force into awarding him the Distinguished Flying Cross (given for
twenty-five combat missions), although he had been a grounded intelligence
officer, who took occasional rides in planes.
Since laws and regulations were, for McCarthy, nonexistent, his business and
financial affairs are, like his life, a chaos of illegalities. From 1935 to
1942 his gross income was less than $25,000, yet during the seven years he
put more than twice that into the stock market. When he was elected judge in
1939, one of his earliest decisions 'was appealed by the state to its supreme
court, where it was found that McCarthy had destroyed those portions of the
record in which he had justified dismissing the state's complaints. Shortly
after he arrived in Washington, as a new senator in 1947, he heard of
Pepsi-Cola's difficulties with sugar rationing, accepted a $10,000 unsecured
loan from Pepsi-Cola's lobbyist, and, the next day, opened an attack on sugar
rationing. When this attack was successful, the same lobbyist endorsed a note
for $20,000 which McCarthy used to cover his overextended bank account in
Wisconsin. A year later, as the most active member of a joint congressional
committee on housing, he gutted the public housing features out of the
Taft-Ellender-Waggoner housing bill in return for thousands of dollars in
favors from the private housing lobby. One of these favors was $10,000 from
Lustron Corporation in return for putting his name, as author, on one of its
publicity releases. And so it went, most of his ill-gotten gains being
dissipated on horse-racing bets, gambling, or parties for his friends. When
the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, late in 195 1, began to
study one of his bank accounts, it found unexplained deposits of almost
$173,000 and others of almost $97,000 funneled through the administrative
assistant in his office.
Until early 1950, Communism meant little to McCarthy. He had been elected to
the Senate over the incumbent, La Follette, in 1946, as a result of
Communist-controlled votes in the labor unions of Milwaukee. As senator he
collaborated in a joint Nazi and Communist plot to injure the United States
and its army by reversing the convictions of German S.S. troops for
atrocities committed on American prisoners of war captured in the Battle of
the Bulge. But by January 1950, McCarthy was looking for an issue to be used
for his reelection in 1952. At dinner with three men, two of them associates
of mine, in the Colony Restaurant in Washington (January 7, 1950) he asked
what issue he should use. After several suggestions, he seized upon
Communism: "That's it," he said. "The government is full of Communists. We
can hammer away at them."
To obtain an audience for this hammering, he requested bookings for
Lincoln's Birthday speeches from the Senate Republican Campaign Committee and
was given assignments at Wheeling, West Virginia, Salt Lake City, and Reno.
Without a I any real conception of what he was doing, and without any
research or knowledge of the subject, at Wheel-ing on February 9th, McCarthy
waved a piece of paper (copy of a four-year-old letter from Byrnes to
Representative Adolph Sabath) and said, "While I cannot take the time to name
all of the men in the State Department who have been named as members of the
Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list Of
205 that were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the
Commu-nist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the
policy of the State Department.'' The letter in fact named no names, had
nothing to do with spying or even with Communists, but simply re-ported that
3,000 employees of abolished war agencies, who were being shifted to the
State Department budget, had been screened and 284 had been listed as
undesirable (of which 79 had been already separated from service, 26 of these
because they were aliens). Every time McCarthy repeated the charge, the
numbers and the categories changed; for ex-ample, the following night, he
told his Salt Lake City audience, "Last night ... I stated that I had the
names of 57 card-carrying members of the Communist Party."
Out of the controversy raised by these charges emerged McCarthy the accuser,
known to every American and praised or reviled by mil-lions. He loved it. On
Febriiary 20th, in an incoherent speech of more than six hours in the Senate,
he announced that he had penetrated "Truman's iron curtain of secrecy" and
that he was going to give 8, cases, identified by numbers without names. What
ensued in the next six hours was bedlam, as case after case was presented,
filled with contra-dictions and irrelevancies. There were 81 numbers but only
66 cases, for cases were left out, some were repeated with different numbers,
many had never been employed by the State Department or even by the
government, and one, "primarily a morals case," had been discharged from it
because he was "anti-Communist," while another, Case 72, was "a high type of
man, a Democratic American who opposed Com-munism." It was, according to the
Senate Republican leader, Senator Taft, "a perfectly reckless performance."
Nevertheless, Taft and his colleagues determined to accept and support these
charges, since they would injure the Administration. Accordingly, 'raft told
McCarthv, "If one case doesn't work, try another." The public, informed only
of the charges, without the cynical details, gathered from the newspaper
headlines that the State Department was full of Communist spies. Even today
few people realize that McCarthy, in five years of accusations, never turned
up a Communist in the State Department, although un-doubtedly there must have
been some there.
McCarthy repeated this performance before a Senate subcommittee chaired by
Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, a few weeks later. From March 7th
through early July, this subcoimmittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee took 1,500 printed pages of testimony plus more than 1,000 pages of
documentation. McCarthy's testimony, it soon developed, was based entirely on
evidence turned up by House of Representative committees of the previous
Congress. He gave names to the 66 cases (he called it 8 1 cases) he had
mentioned in his Senate speech and 35 new names. In few cases was there any
evidence. When asked for evidence, he airily told Senator Tydings that that
was his job: the evidence was in the State Department, and it was up to the
committee to get it. After the files in question were obtained by the
committee and found to contain no evidence to support McCarthy's charges,
McCarthy called them "phony files" and insisted they had been "raped and
rifled" of the FBI reports which had been in them. J. Edgar Hoover was called
in, had the files examined, and reported that "the State Department files
were intact."
McCarthy ignored this rebuff. New charges followed. Eventually he announced
that he would base his whole reputation on one case. For more than a week he
tantalized the world and the committee by withholding the name: "the top
Russian espionage agent" in the United States, "Alger Hiss's boss in the
espionage ring in the State Department,"
"the chief architect of our Far Eastern policy." At last the name was
released: Professor Owen Lattimore, of the Johns Hopkins University, the
English-speaking world's greatest authority on Mongolia. The only trouble was
that Lattimore was not a Communist, not a spy, and not employed by the State
Department.
The Tydings subcommittee report, issued in July, condemned McCarthy for
"a fraud and a hoax" on the Senate:
"Starting with nothing, Senator McCarthy plunged headlong forward,
desperately seeking to develop some information." McCarthy should have been
finished. He was not. And for a very simple reason: in politics truth is not
so important as power, an McCarthy soon showed that he had the power- the
power of an inflamed and misled public opinion. In the election of November
1950, several members of the Senate who had been most outspoken against
McCarthy, including some of the most influential leaders of that august body,
were defeated�by McCarthyism, if not by McCarthy. Tydings was beaten in
Maryland in 1950, and Scott Lucas, the Democratic leader in the Senate, who
had harassed McCarthy during his performance on February 20th, went down with
him. William Benton, senator from Connecticut, who introduced a resolution to
expel McCarthy from the Senate in 1951 and whose charges were fully supported
by the Senate's investigation of McCarthy's private finances, was defeated in
1952. With him went down to defeat Lucas's successor as Democratic leader,
Senator McFarland of Arizona. From 1950 to 1954 most of his fellow senators,
and many in the executive branch, were terrorized by McCarthy's power with
the electorate, and opposed him on nothing they could possibly concede.
During this period he violated more laws and regulations than any previous
senator in history. Thou-sands of his secret supporters in the Administration
sent him information and misinformation, classified secrets, spite letters,
anonymous notes. The Eisenhower Administration at one time considered
charging McCarthy himself with espionage but did not have the courage. Much
of this material was read by McCarthy over nationwide television broadcasts.
When a reporter once said to him, "Isn't that a classified document?"
McCarthy said, "It was. I just declassified it."
It may be doubted that McCarthy's power to defeat his enemies *as as great as
they thought, but he encouraged these thoughts. Certainly he defeated Tydings.
Senator Tydings, from an old and wealthy Maryland family, with a brilliant
combat record in World War 1, was too conservative for Franklin Roosevelt,
who tried to "purge" him in the primary campaign of 1938, but had been
soundly rebuffed. McCarthy did it differently.
Using the large sums of money which came to him from real anti--Communists
throughout the country, McCarthy hired a group of shady characters, led by an
ex-FBI agent (fired for immorality during enforce-ment of the Mann
"white-slave" Law), and sent them, well equipped with funds, into Maryland to
fight Tydings as a "pro-Communist." The state election laws were violated on
a wholesale basis, including excess expenditures, forgery, use of
out-of-state paid campaigners, and numerous other violations. The coup de
grace was administered to Tydings by wide circulation of a faked photograph
of Tydings and Communist leader Earl Browder cozily together, a concoction of
McCarthy's staff. After Tydings was defeated, several of his victorious
opponent's staff, including his campaign manager, were tried and sentenced to
jail or to pay fines, for electoral-law violations, but that did not change
the result of the election, and few other senators wanted to risk the same
ordeal by opposing McCarthy in the Senate.
The Republicans were as scared as the Democrats, and with good reason, for
party lines, like all other distinctions, meant nothing to McCarthy, and he
continued his charges in 1953-1954 with his own party in control of both
houses of Congress and Eisenhower in the White House. The chief change was
that he stopped talking of "twenty years of treason" in the White House and
talked of "twenty-one years of treason." The new President, in an effort to
divert these attacks, continued to yield to him, as he had yielded to him
during the campaign. The Administration was soon boasting that 1,456 Federal
workers had been "separated" in the first four months of the "Eisenhower
security program." At the end of the first year the President raised this
total to 2,200. It took some weeks for the Democrats to discover that these
figures did not apply to subversives or even to security risks, but to anyone
who left the government service. By the end of its first year, the new
Administration adopted completely McCarthy's refusal to be hampered by
categories. Vice-President Nixon said, "We're kicking the Communists and
fellow travelers and security risks out of the Government . . . by the
thousands." It was soon clear that no known Communists were kicked out and
that "security risks" included all kinds of persons, such as those who
imbibed too freely at Washington's endless cocktail parties. A Communist in
the State Department would have been a prize among this motley group, but
none was announced.
For a while, the new Administration tried to outdo McCarthy, chiefly by
demonstrating in committee hearings that China had been "lost" to the
Communists because of the careful planning and intrigue of Communists in the
State Department. The chief effort in this direction was done by a
well-organized and well-financed "China Lobby" radiating from tile activities
of Alfred Kohlberg, a wealthy exporter who had had business interests in
China. This group, with its allies, such as McCarthy, mobilized a good deal
of evidence that Communists had infiltrated into various academic,
journalistic, and research groups concerned with tile Far East. But they
failed to prove their contention that a conspiracy of these Communists and
fellow travelers, acting through the State Department, had given China to
Mao. Mao won out in China because of the incompetence and corruption of the
Chiang Kai-shek regime, and he won out in spite of any aid the United States
gave, or could give, to Chiang, because the latter's regime was incapable of
holding out against Mao, without drastic reforms, whatever the scale of
American aid (without American military intervention to make war on Mao,
which very few desired). The China Lobby's version was based on two
contentions: (1) that there were Communists in significant positions close to
the agencies which helped to form American academic and public opinion on the
Far East and (2) that there were frequent agreements between known Communists
and known formulators of American policy and opinion on China. This whole
subject is too complex for adequate discussion here, but the situation must
be outlined.
There is considerable truth in the China Lobby's contention that the American
experts on China were organized into a single interlocking group which had a
general consensus of a Leftish character. It is also true that this group,
from its control of funds, academic recommendations, and research or
publication opportunities, could favor persons who accepted the established
consensus and could injure, financially or in professional advancement,
persons who did not accept it. It is also true that the established group, by
its influence on book reviewing in The New York Times, the Herald Tribune,
the Saturday Review, a few magazines, including the "liberal weeklies," and
in the professional journals, could advance or hamper any specialist's
career. It is also true that these things were done in the United States in
regard to the Far East by the Institute of Pacific Relations, that this
organization had been infiltrated by Communists, and by Communist
sympathizers, and that much of this group's influence arose from its access
to and control over the flow of funds from financial foundations to scholarly
activities. All these things were true, but they would have been true of many
other areas of American scholarly research and academic administration in the
United States, such as Near East studies or anthropology or educational
theory or political science. They were more obvious in regard to the Far East
because of the few persons and the bigger issues involved in that area.
On the other hand, the charges of the China Lobby, accepted and proliferated
by the neo-isolationists in the 1950's and by the radical Right in the 1960's
that China was "lost" because of this group, or that the members of this
group were disloyal to the United States, or engaged in espionage, or were
participants in a conscious plot, or that the whole group was controlled by
Soviet agents or even by Communists, is not true. Yet the whole subject is of
major importance in understanding the twentieth century.
In the first place, because of language barriers, the number of people who
could be "experts" on the Far East was limited. Most of these, like Pearl
Buck, Professor Fairbank of Harvard, or Professors Latourette and Rowe of
Yale, and many others, were children or relatives of people who originally
became concerned with China as missionaries. This gave them a double,
character: they learned the language and they had a feeling of spiritual
mission about China. When we add to this that they were, until after 1950,
few in numbers and had access, because of the commercial importance of the
Far East, to relatively large amounts of research, travel, and publication
funds on Far East matters, they almost inevitably came to form a small group
who knew each other personally, met fairly regularly, had a fairly
established consensus (based on conversations and reading each other's books)
on Far East questions, and generally had certain characteristics of a clique.
Lattimore, for example, because he knew Mongolian and the others did not,
tended to become everybody's expert on Mongolia, was rarely challenged on
Mongolia or northwest interior China, and inevitably became rather
opinionated, if not conceited, on the subject. Moreover, many of these
experts, and those the ones which were favored by the Far East
"establishment" in the Institute of Pacific Relations, were captured by
Communist ideology. Under its influence they propagandized, as experts,
erroneous ideas and sought to influence policy in mistaken directions. For
example, they sought to establish, in 1943-1950, that the Chinese Communists
were simple agrarian reformers, rather like the third-party groups of tile
American Mid-west, or that Japan was evil and must be totally crushed, the
monarchy removed, and (later) that American policy in Japan, under General
MacArthur, was a failure; they even accepted, on occasion, the Stalinist line
that Communist regimes were "democratic and peace-loving," while capitalist
ones were "warlike and aggressive." For example, as late as 1951 the John Day
Company (Richard J. Walsh, president) published an indictment of MacArthur's
policies in Japan by Robert Textor. The book, called Failure in Japan, had an
introduction by Lattimore and sought to show that our occupation policy led
to "failure for democratic values in Japan and a situation of strategic
weakness for the West." This childish libel was propagated by the IPR, which
mailed out 2,300 postcards advertising the book.
Behind this unfortunate situation lies another, more profound, relationship,
which influences matters much broader than Far Eastern policy. It involves
the organization of tax-exempt fortunes of international financiers into
foundations to be used for educational, scientific, "and other public
purposes." Sixty or more years ago, public life in the West was dominated by
the influence of "Wall Street." This term has nothing to do with its use by
the Communists to mean monopolistic industrialism, but, on the contrary,
refers to international financial capitalism deeply involved in the gold
standard, foreign-exchange fluctuations, floating of fixed-interest
securities and, to a lesser extent, flotation of industrial shares for
stock-exchange markets. This group, which in the United States, was
completely dominated by J. P. Morgan and Company from the 1880's to the
1930's was cosmopolitan, Anglophile, internationalist, Ivy League, eastern
seaboard, high Episcopalian, and European-culture conscious. Their connection
with the Ivy League colleges tested on the fact that the large endowments of
these institutions required constant consultation with the financiers of Wall
Street (or its lesser branches on State Street, Boston, and elsewhere) and
was reflected in the fact that these endowments, even in 1930, were largely
in bonds rather than in real estate or common stocks. As a consequence of
these influences, as late as the 1930's, J. P. Morgan and his associates were
the most significant figures in policy making at Harvard, Columbia, and to a
lesser extent Yale, while the Whitneys were significant at Yale, and the
Prudentlal Insurance Company (through Edward D. Duffield) dominated Princeton.
The names of these Wall Street luminaries still adorn these Ivy League
campuses, with Harkness colleges and a Payne Whitney gymnasium at Yale, a
Pyne dormitory at Princeton, a Dillon Field House and Lamont Library at
Harvard. The chief officials of these universities were beholden to these
financial powers and usually owed their jobs to them. Morgan himself helped
make Nicholas Murray Butler president of Columbia; his chief Boston agent,
Thomas Nelson Perkins of the First National Bank of that city, gave Conant
his boost from the chemical laboratory to University Hall at Harvard;
Duffield of Prudential, caught unprepared when the incumbent president of
Princeton was killed in an automobile in 1932, made himself president for a
year before he chose Harold Dodds for the post in 1933. At Yale, Thomas
Lamont, managing partner of the Morgan firm, was able to swing Charles
Seymour into the presidency of that university in 1937.
The significant influence of "Wall Street" (meaning Morgan) both in the Ivy
League and in Washington, in the period of sixty or more years following
1880, explains the constant interchange between the Ivy League and the
Federal government, an interchange which undoubtedly aroused a good deal of
resentment in less-favored circles, who were more than satiated with the
accents, tweeds, and High Episcopal Anglophilia of these peoples. Poor Dean
Acheson, in spite of (or perhaps because of) his remarkable qualities of
intellect and character, took the full brunt of this resentment from McCarthy
and his allies in 1948-1954. The same feeling did no good to pseudo-Ivy
League figures like Alger Hiss.
Because of its dominant position in Wall Street, the Morgan firm came also to
dominate other Wall Street powers, such as Carnegie, Whitney, Vanderbilt,
Brown-Harriman, or Dillon-Reed. Close alliances were made with Rockefeller,
Mellon, and Duke interests but not nearly so intimate ones with the great
industrial powers like du Pont and Ford. In spite of the great influence of
this "Wall Street" alignment, an influence great enough to merit the name of
the "American Establishment," this group could not control the Federal
government and, in consequence, had to adjust to a good many government
actions thoroughly distasteful to the group. The chief of these were in
taxation law, beginning with the graduated income tax in 1913, but
culminating, above all else, in the inheritance tax. These tax laws drove the
great private fortunes dominated by Wall Street into tax-exempt foundations,
which became a major link in the Establishment network between Wall Street,
the Ivy League, and the Federal government. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
after 1961, formerly president of the Rockefeller Foundation and Rhodes
Scholar at Oxford (1931-1933), is as much a member of this nexus as Alger
Hiss, the Dulles brothers, Jerome Greene, James T. Shotwell, John W. Davis,
Elihu Root, or Philip Jessup.
pps. 928-938
-----
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
All My Relations.
Omnia Bona Bonis,
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
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