-Caveat Lector- http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2002/08/16-08-02/Ethnicity.htm
Ethnicity and Globalization By Messay Kebede A few weeks ago, I wrote an article debating the difference between ethnicity and democracy. This article is a follow-up: it tries to situate the ethnicization of Ethiopian politics in the contemporary context with the view of emphasizing the convergence between the Ethiopian ethnic slide and the policy of globalization. When Ethiopian actors uphold ethnicity, they do so with the firm conviction that they are tackling the major problem of modern Ethiopia since its inception under the Amhara hegemony following Menelik's conquests. Most of them do not even suspect that their analyses of the Ethiopian reality as well as the solution they propose are strongly influenced by the needs and thinking of external hegemonic forces. A major outcome of globalization, many theoreticians believe, is the gradual and inevitable decline of the nation-state. (For additional information on the decline of the state, see Tseggai Mebrahtu's interesting article, "Some Reflections on the Dominant Ideology of Globalism and the Current African Dilemma," posted by Ben's Page.) If so, it is no mere coincidence if the process of nation-building in Africa experiences severe hardships, not to say a virtual halt. That Africa is plagued with ethnic conflicts, latent or explicit, points to the presence of a movement counter to the colonial process. Everything appears as though this reverse process is undoing the colonial policy to lump together ethnic groups in enlarged states. The reason for this is that the emergence of a hegemonic global economy no longer requires enlarged and competitive units. So long as there existed a French national bourgeoisie competing against an English or German bourgeoisie, when therefore capital had a national seat and command, colonialism and neo-colonial order needed nation-states to demarcate the respective influence of each national bourgeoisie. In such a context, African national demarcations indicated the contours of reserved territories, and any revival of past identities was stigmatized as tribalism. With the rise of a transnational capitalist class--heralded by the growing prominence of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the IMF, and the World Bank--these national demarcations lost all utility. The promotion of ethnic identities became the perfect instrument for weakening the idea of nation-state and its corollary, the national integration of ethnic groups. In the eyes of globalist forces, the proliferation of national units comes up against the rise of a truly global economy. Because nation-states target economic self-sufficiency and are accountable to the people, the state plays a major economic role both as owner of important sectors of production and protector of the national interest and labor rights through protectionism, planning, social welfare, etc. By contrast, global markets operate under conditions that are not state centered but market centered. Public policy should be confined to the provision of legal framework for contracts and defense of law and order and to the liberation of the economy from social constraints. To the extent that globalization pushes for the privatization of public enterprise, the deregulation of economic life, the liberalization of trade and industry, and the reduction of public expenditures, it sees the traditional protective functions of the state as obstacles to the development of global economy and, by extension, to the modernization of Third World countries. Nothing could please more globalist strategists than to hear local forces denounce centralization and homogenization in the name of ethnic identities and stigmatize African nation-building efforts as a remain of colonial legacy. To undo these newly born states, what else is required but the revival of tribal mentality? The task is all the easier as the process of nation-building in Africa, in addition to being recent, is fraught with difficulties due to mistakes committed by authoritarian rulers and their resounding economic failures. The conclusion that the idea of nation-state had not taken root in the thinking of African peoples was thus easily reached. Scholarly studies began to appear describing ethnicity as a legitimate democratic aspiration and African states as artificial gatherings imposed by colonial masters. Moreover, the proliferation of ethnic identities and states takes away the idea of self-sufficiency and generates units naturally open to the idea of trade. What is being used as a lure here is the model of the little tigers of East Asia through the suggestion that the ethnicization of Africa is liable to replace the cumbersome African states by smaller units whose integration makes them dynamic. Indeed, a major argument of globalists is the successful and rapid economic success of East Asian countries. For them, if we look at just the post-war period, it is clear that a steady economic growth is associated with openness to world trade and unrestricted acceptance of foreign investment. The net result of all this is the loss of legitimacy of the nation-state inherited from colonialism in favor of the ethnic state. But there is more to the matter than this. The promotion of ethnic state or of ethnonatianalism fulfills another crucial requirement of globalization. In view of the fact that the larger, the multiethnic states have lost legitimacy, the only way by which social consensus could be reinstated between ruling elites and the people is through the generation of a political system that works under the assumption that elites have organic solidarity with the working masses. Since the impersonal state has become dysfunctional, solidarity, the very one suggested by common ethnic belonging, is a viable substitute. According to the globalist thinking, modernization by means of authoritarian rule has not only failed, but has also become obsolete. Under the working of a global economy, modernization amounts to being attractive to transnational capital so as to be integrated into the global economy. The basic condition for attracting capital is an elite rule supported by popular consensus. This explains the association of globalization with democratization and its misleading outcome, given that the enthronement of an elite little warrants the respect of democratic rules and rights. What globalization wants is not the sovereignty of the people, but the rule of elites regularly sanctioned by popular votes. In this way, the people themselves give their consent to globalist interests. For the task of the local elite is to create, in competition with other local and national elites, the social and political conditions that maximize profit for foreign investors through the availability of cheap labor, the protection of private property, the promotion of open market, the suppression of protectionism, etc. These conditions require the stifling of social welfare and the acquiescence to heavy human sufferings related to mass displacements and to the acceptance of a sudden plunge into extreme poverty of a large number of people while a small minority enriches itself. No other power can justify the enrichment of a local elite and the subsequent expanding gap between rich and poor than the aureole of ethnic liberators. Unlike the discredited multiethnic state, the banner of solidarity gives the state and the local elite the legitimacy to demand the necessary sacrifices. In other words, the promotion of ethnicity squares well with the political and ideological requirements of globalization: it enriches a local elite in the name of a solidarity that divides peoples along ethnic lines and keeps them docile by turning them into consenting actors through the process fraudulently baptized "democratization." So long as the rulers are identified as kin allegedly showing solidarity with the masses, they have all the legitimacy to rule without restrictions, and so integrate the country into the global economy. The perfect place where this globalist scenario has been unfolding since the 80s is Ethiopia. One reason for this is that if there is one state in Black Africa that does not trace its origin back to colonialism is the Ethiopian state. Besides this symbolic value, the Ethiopian state was fighting against the Eritrean secessionist trend and other anti-centralist movements. Though at first look such a state seemed difficult to dismantle, the fact that it appeared as a besieged state made the task much easier. Moreover, its international patron, namely, the former Soviet Union, was going through a similar process of disintegration unleashed by the demise of a contested and failed ideology. Ethiopia thus appeared as the weakest link of the chain. The recognition of the secessionist movement sent the clear message that African national borders can be done and undone while the support for the TPLF announced the launching of a new political experience of ethnic federalism which, if successful, could become a model. Various testimonies indicate that the leaders of both the TPLF and EPLF were cheered by Western powers as the new leaders of Africa. This belief largely originated from the perception of an affinity between their ethnic ideology and the needs of globalization. From the start, by opting for secession, Eritrean leaders had clearly sided with the globalist strategy. Did they not boast time and again about their project of turning very soon Eritrea into a Singapore of Africa? In effect, Eritreans have always consider themselves as very resourceful and advanced, especially with manufacturing skills, which, they believed, compensate for the lack of richness of their country in raw materials. This association of smallness with dynamism and skillfulness exactly fits the globalist strategy. As to the TPLF, globalist forces appreciated its active contribution to Eritrea's accession to independence; they also valued its narrow ethnic ideology and its ability to spread the sentiment to other Ethiopian ethnic groups, especially the Oromo. An ethnically federated Ethiopia has the advantages of creating the basis for an alliance between ethnic elites that enjoy legitimacy. Such a federation has no longer any national ambition, any attempt toward further integration. It will be a sum of distinct and self-contained ethnic groups whose sole purpose will be to rival for foreign investments. In case the ethnic federation fails, the existing ethnic territories will serve as a viable alternative. This experimental role of Ethiopia perfectly explains why Meles still enjoys the support of globalist forces. Many Ethiopians are dismayed by the lenience of international forces toward Meles when arbitrary imprisonments, massacres of students, and harassment of the opposition forces have become a defining feature of his regime. Worse yet, despite these flagrant violations of human rights, the World Peace Prize Awarding Council just recently honored him with a peace prize for his contributions to global peace and the Hannam University gave him an honorary doctoral degree in political science. The authoritative voice of Jonathan Dimbleby speaks of Meles' leadership as having "made a difference" through the institution of a "programme of radical reform." (The Observer, Sunday July 28, 2002) At the same time, however, the United Nations Development Programme releases a report stating that "Ethiopians are as poor now as they were 20 years ago." No sooner a reporter of the BBC, David Lyon, under the title "Ethiopia's New-Found Plenty," revealed that "parts of northern Ethiopia, which were badly hit by famine a generation ago, are now exporting a food surplus and are confident that they can survive a year without rain" than another reporter of the same agency broke the news of a looming famine through the revelation that "more than eight million people are in need of food aid after failed rains." Ethiopians have reason to be angered by these contradictory and confusing accounts. Interestingly, in his analysis of the Ethiopian reality, Dimbleby notes that "Ethiopia has met all the demands of the IMF and the World Bank but is still getting poorer and poorer. He adds: "the truth is that Ethiopia is at the mercy of a system which, so far, has enriched the rich by impoverishing the poor. And that is simply not sustainable." (The Observer, Sunday July 28, 2002) Meles too is quite aware of these drawbacks of globalization. For example, in his speech at the opening of the Africa Development Bank annual meeting, "he accused the west of hypocrisy by calling on African countries to open up their markets, while imposing tariffs and handing out enormous subsidies to farmers." This practice, he contended, "serves to drastically reduce the global cake for us all." (All Africa.com, May 28, 2002). But these contradictions and complaints do not trouble globalists. They like Meles as a reliable agent of globalist policy, a reliability confirmed not only by his attachment to ethnicization, but also by his uncommon decision to stop the victorious march of the Ethiopian Army towards Asmara and Assab. Who knows what the collapse of Issayas' regime would have entailed? Obviously, the inclusion of Assab in Ethiopia would have created a situation of bitter conflicts fraught with unpredictable consequences. Meles stopped all these uncertainties and put everything back into the globalist strategy. Not long ago I wrote an article in this same newspaper asking Ethiopians to let Assab go for the sake of peace and long-term interests of Ethiopia. My position has unnecessarily and unjustly angered many Ethiopians. As I see it, these angry Ethiopians do not exactly realize the kind of adverse forces that the incorporation of Assab will muster beyond the Eritrean mobilization. My feeling is that, weakened by internal wars and, above all, contested in its legitimacy by ethnic resurgence, the Ethiopian state is in no position to sustain another prolonged war. If anything, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea reflects the competitive tension running in the Horn. To be sure, globalist strategists never expected that a war would break out between the two countries. Even if the alliance between the leaders of the TPLF and Eritrean elites looked shaky at times, they thought that common interests would prevail. On the other hand, however, the vision of becoming the Singapore of Africa easily convinced Issayas that Eritrea cannot become attractive to foreign capital unless it secures a privileged access to Ethiopia's vast markets and raw materials, and this is not possible unless the Tigrean elite accepts the Eritrean hegemony. This means that the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia must be seen in the context of globalization: Eritrea cannot play the major role of privileged interlocutor of global capital in the Horn in the face of a more powerful and united Ethiopia. As BBC's analyst, Patrick Gilkes, puts it, "Eritrea, with virtually no resources has talked of trying to emulate Singapore, processing goods for export. This puts it on a collision course with Ethiopia . . . concerned about being relegated to the status of supplying cheap labour for Eritrea." In case the projected political ascendancy over the ruling elite of Ethiopia through the control of the TPLF leadership fails, the Eritrean leadership had the option of either establishing a more compliant government through the defeat of the TPLF or paving the way for the disintegration of Ethiopia by supporting secessionist groups, such as the OLF. No globalist strategy, however powerful and omniscient, can fully control local deviations. The outbreak of the war was one such local escapade, mostly due to the erratic behavior of Issayas. By contrast, Meles appears as a more reliable local partner; we just saw that he believes that a global cake awaits the peoples of the world. Unfortunately, he is besieged by opposition forces and even lost the full support of his Tigrean basis. Though the ethnic paradigm he defends agrees with the globalist view, he seems to be unable to generate the required consensus. In a word, uncertainty prevails, which is not to the liking of globalist forces. Meles has the choice of moving toward a more traditional role of the Ethiopian state by rising beyond the ethnic paradigm through a renewal of Ethiopian identity. Some of his recent statements seem to convey, although in a very contradictory form, a slight inclination to revalue certain implications of ethnicization. This is not surprising: by now Meles must have noticed that he remains the leader of Ethiopia because he inhabits Menelik's palace, not because he is Tigrean. Another option is to seek to re-ignite the Eritrean connection, but with the increasing risk of being even more alienated from his Ethiopian supports, not to mention the nasty prospect of dealing with the unpredictable behavior of Issayas. One thing is clear: Meles is frenetically in search of a new legitimacy, as illustrated by his attempts to pass for a theoretician of the "new" ideology of "revolutionary democracy." He knows that, without a new legitimacy, he cannot have enough authority to demand the sacrifices required to integrate the Ethiopian economy into the global market, as he is expected to do. The ethnic ideology now works against him by favoring secessionist forces. If the globalist strategy goes along with the secessionist analysis, Ethiopia will be heading for the Yugoslavia scenario. The only way of averting this gruesome outcome is to have a clear idea of the dominating forces at work and the general direction they impose to favor their interests. Most of all, seeing the dwindling strategy of globalist forces, peoples must rally, more than ever before, behind the common front of the national state. To the dispersing and dwindling policy of globalization, "the Wretched of the Earth" must oppose the strength of their recovered unity. The epoch demands the resurgence of grand nationalism, not the retreat into ethnic narrowness. <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance�not soap-boxing�please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'�with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds�is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html";>Archives of [EMAIL PROTECTED]</A> http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/";>ctrl</A> ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
