From: SADW, [EMAIL PROTECTED] I can't remain silent any longer on Land Warrior. The article below is something I wrote for SADW a little while back. I think it more than amply counters the hoopla which this system is generating elsewhere. Nick Steadman -- GAO READS THE RIOT ACT ON LAND WARRIOR PROJECT: a mid-Dec 99 US General Accounting Office report (GAO/NSIAD-00-28) on Battlefield Automation, which we have carefully studied, was highly critical of the US army/USMC $2.1 billion Land Warrior project, led by the army, which was embarked upon in Jan 96. The equipment was originally scheduled to be fielded by Sep 2000. As readers will recall, Land Warrior (aka 21st Century Soldier, Future Soldier or Soldier 21) is the suite of new weapon accessories (gun videos, laser rangefinders, thermal weapon sights, close combat optics, digital compasses, laser aiming pointers etc), a helmet-mounted head-up display (with image intensifiers and laser detectors), protective clothing (including body armour), load-carrying equipment, radio communications, GPS, battlefield personal computers (with touch-screen panels) & associated software. It's all planned eventually to accompany the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW), but in the short term would be deployed in conjunction with the M16A2 with the Modular Weapon System upgrade, allowing a 'mix & match' selection of the new sighting systems and 'black boxes' to be clamped above the receiver or around the handguard. The basic project cost has already increased by $700m from an initial estimate of $1.4 billion, and Land Warrior will now not be adopted on time because the necessary technologies have not yet been fully perfected; the new fielding forecast is for FY 2004, 'at the earliest'. GAO said that, in view of the size of the budget for Land Warrior, oversight of the project has been inadequate. Land Warrior will reportedly not yet inter-operate with the army's Force XXI digitised battlefield system for brigade & lower formations, and army staff have obtained a waiver deferring the date by which this should be resolved until well after Land Warrior may eventually be fielded. So, for the time being, data cannot be transmitted between the two systems, since the necessary software has yet to be developed. This means, for example, that troops with Land Warrior would be unable to report enemy sightings or call in air or artillery strikes using their digitally-enhanced equipment. And it would be unlikely to improve their 'situational awareness' in any way. Furthermore, GAO said, unresolved technical and 'human factor' problems may make Land Warrior ineffective. The equipment is overweight, poorly designed and uncomfortable, battery power is inadequate, battery logistics 'uncertain' and there are problems of electromagnetic interference. The load-carrying harness attracted special criticism, with GAO saying that troops had difficulty raising their heads high enough in the prone position to fire their weapons, since their backpacks rode up and forced their helmets forward. In fact, we recall this was a specific criticism that arose from the very first trials of Land Warrior. Even worse, when troops rolled on their backs, the new equipment held their bodies too far off the ground, temporarily producing a 'stranded turtle' effect, ie troops were stuck there! As far back as Sep 96, GAO says, it warned that Land Warrior was an expensive, high risk project, that inter-operability had yet to be demonstrated and that technical and ergonomic problems were unresolved, citing (for example) the fact that the battery for the computer & radio only ran for under two instead of the planned 12 hours, and that the equipment was so heavy & uncomfortable that it impeded troops' movement. At that time it recommended purchase be deferred pending clarification of the requirement and resolution of technical shortcomings. It also wanted the army to ensure that troops with Land Warrior equipment could 'outperform' those with existing equipment. GAO said all the army had done since then was to clarify the requirement at 34,000 systems, and that so far the project had not yielded any 'workable prototypes'. One reason may be that the army had increasingly opted to develop new technologies instead of using tried & tested ideas. In detail, GAO commented that:- - Land Warrior prototype systems delivered for testing in Apr 98 failed airborne certification because the computer/radio system could not be worn beneath a parachute and instead had to be placed in a jump bag attached to the soldier and tossed out first. It also took up too much space on a plane. When jumping, some troops got entangled in the equipment and when the jump bag finally hit the ground, the equipment was damaged. - There were interference problems with this equipment when elements were used in close proximity to each other, and electronic emissions exceeded military standards. - In a water immersion test on 30 Apr 98, the prototype systems failed, with 'substantial leakage' into the guts of the helmet system, radio and computer. Since Aug 98 the army has suggested or examined two new strategies to reduce Land Warrior's dependance on new technologies, and is now revising the equipment (though so far without official approval), adopting 'commercially-available' technologies such as Windows-based software - though the Force XXI digitised battlefield control system with which Land Warrior needs to inter-operate would be unable to use Windows until 2002 or later. It's also intended to integrate the army's standard Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment (which is suitable for parachuting) and to develop a new computer/radio system, though the computer casing and other elements will have to be redesigned to mate with the pack frame. The waist belt will also need to be modified. The army, GAO said, cut around $340m from the $2.1 billion Nov 98 Land Warrior budget in Aug 99, partly due to development problems, but has since been unable to give GAO a realistic estimate of the final total costs involved. In fact, over and above the $2.1 billion basic cost, another $1.4 billion is budgeted for Land Warrior operating & maintenance costs, over half related to batteries, making the full project cost at least $3.5 billion, though Congress cut $50m from FY 2000 funding, presumably (since this sum is a pinprick) as a token wrist-slap. Because of its lack of inter-operability, Land Warrior was excluded from the army's Mar & Nov 97 Advanced Warfighting Experiments, and the army was unsure whether it would be possible to include it in the Sep 2000 Joint Contingency Force trials either. The new Operational Requirement for Land Warrior will not, GAO said, give a specific weight for the soldier's load, but it's claimed this will remain at the latest agreed figure of 91 pounds, up from 80 pounds. Land Warrior items currently total around 90.5 pounds, which rather suggests the weight limit has simply been re-written around the realities. According to GAO, the best battery performance so far has been four to five hours of continuous performance, still well short of the 12-hour target. Lithium-manganese batteries which will theoretically run for 12 hours have been developed, but not yet tested in field conditions. The army also believes improvements can be made to connectors and shielding to reduce electromagnetic emission problems. But GAO is still concerned as to how the army will be adequately resupplied with batteries, how they will be stored and finally disposed of, since they are considered 'hazardous material' - though in a battle zone this last point is hardly something most armies would worry too much about. Scathingly, GAO has concluded that Land Warrior is no closer to fielding today that when the project started in Jan 96, it has not been adequately supervised and without proper inter-operability it's full value can't be realised. GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army should be directed to 'return the Land Warrior program to the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase' until the army (which disagrees with this idea, citing likely further delays) can come up with workable prototypes. Land Warrior should furthermore be reclassified as a Category I system to ensure it is properly monitored, it must be inter-operable with the Force XXI digitisation project (the army also disagrees on this point) and pass airborne, water and interference tests before fielding. Most significantly, GAO also suggests to Congress that it might now want to withhold further funding until the army decides what it is actually going to develop, and provides a detailed, realistic and properly costed plan. Undoubtedly GAO has reached the right conclusions - a project as expensive as Land Warrior cannot be allowed to roll blindly on without achieving worthwhile results, and tight new controls clearly need to be applied. However, this case is, in many ways, classically symptomatic of the extent to which the army and its R&D agencies have dropped the ball on almost everything related to future infantry operations, the Objective Individual Combat Weapon being just another example. One could harp on again about the lack of problem definition, but suffice it to say that Land Warrior - another programme still based on obsolete 'big war' thinking, should have been preceded by a realistic, hard-nosed look at what is actually required of future ground troops, and the practicality of any new proposals. In fact, let's underscore that word 'practicality', since this is the main element lacking in deliberations over many of these grand schemes, with the latest Picatinny study of weaponry for the US 'Army After Next' the most bizarre yet. The acid test, in fact the only test of Land Warrior or any similar project is whether, at the end of the day, it works as claimed, and if it substantially improves overall effectiveness, without any obvious downside. We're a very long way from that yet. (end) This message is from Nick Steadman Features Not for recirculation without originator's consent, obtainable from: UK Tel: 01273-773362, International +44-1273-773362 UK Fax: 01273-822078, International +44-1273-822078 Cybershooters website: http://www.cybershooters.org List admin: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ T O P I C A The Email You Want. http://www.topica.com/t/16 Newsletters, Tips and Discussions on Your Favorite Topics
