At 08:55 AM 3/29/2002 -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote: >I've been thinking about noncentralized self-organizing network >topologies since George >posted his query. First, there are several problems that any P2P >network faces in the future >hostile world: > > 1. ISPs blocking its ports > > 2. The "entry points" to P2P are vulnerable ---web sites that point >to dynamic list of *tella > servents, or the Kazaa site that points to active Kazaa supernode >servents. Simply sue > any of the sites with lists of *tella hosts. Even better, get the >ISPs to drop host lists > as fast as they drop stuff under DMCA. >[...] >To resist 2. you have to be able to randomly probe IP addresses to find >a node.
This sounds like a bad assumption to me - both because it seems unworkable given the size of the IPv4 address space (without even thinking about IPv6), and because randomly probing other machines isn't likely to be allowed (or successful) in a more security-aware environment, which is what the DMCA and its ilk are creating. Also, from an inbound perspective, it's not sensible to respond to incoming queries from unknown users with potentially incriminating information - e.g., "If he's connected to my port 31337, he's here for my warez, I'll give him a full list!" - because what looks like an inbound "random probe" may be a sweep performed by hostile actors, e.g., <http://www.mediaenforcer.com> or <http://www.baytsp.com>. Naive "self-organization" is not a reasonable approach for a hostile environment. P2P content networks exist (and have always existed) in a hostile environment. Designs which depend on friendly behavior on the part of unknown counterparties are doomed. Eliminate the "friendly" assumption, or eliminate the "unknown" aspect of the counterparties before transacting with them. -- Greg Broiles -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- PGP 0x26E4488c or 0x94245961
