http://www.eet.com/at/news/OEG20020408S0058

Encryption scales to fit smaller RF ID tags

By Chappell Brown
EE Times
April 9, 2002 (8:42 a.m. EST)
 
BURLINGTON, Mass. ? Armed with a simplified mathematical approach to 
public-key encryption, NTRU Cryptosystems Inc. here is introducing 
intellectual property that can add security to virtually any circuit. The 
most recent product based on the approach is a circuit block that can be 
added to small wireless products such as smart cards and point-of-sale ID 
tags. NTRU claims the approach is as secure as the popular RSA public-key 
encryption system but is computationally much simpler.

"Public-key cryptography is necessary in systems of high scale or high 
security. Their primary advantage is that they allow for encryption keys 
to be widely distributed without fear of compromise," said Scott Crenshaw, 
chief executive officer of NTRU. "NTRU's core technology solves a 
fundamental problem for public-key cryptography." Until now, Crenshaw 
said, "public-key systems required very large numbers of gates ? 50,000 
gates, 100,000 gates ? or in software, it required a Pentium-class 
machine. NTRU's system, on the other hand, fits into a very small number 
of gates and can run on a low-end microcontroller."

Two approaches

The company's product line, GenuID, is segmented into two areas: software 
running on low-end microcontrollers and a processor core that can be 
inserted into designs. "We run the software implementation faster than RSA 
can run on a Pentium," claimed Crenshaw, referring to the most popular 
form of public-key encryption, RSA (named for its inventors: Ron Rivest, 
Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman). Tool kits both for implementing readers 
and for the back-end system are also available.

RSA's contactless smart cards sell for $3 to $5, Crenshaw said, while 
GenuID chips sell for 50 cents to $1. "This is significant for 
manufacturers ? it opens up new application areas that require security," 
he said.

The different approach to encryption began with a group of math professors 
at Brown University. They realized that a more computationally efficient 
version would open a huge market for low-end security. Jeffrey Hoffstein, 
Joseph Silverman, Jill Pipher and Daniel Lieman ? who co-founded NTRU ? 
studied the conventional approach and realized that the basic strategy, 
based on integer arithmetic, took a toll computationally. While integer 
math is well-understood and relatively easy to implement in software, the 
underlying computer models are complex in terms of the conventional 
structure of digital CPUs.

Modular math

The RSA uses numbers with 1,024 bits. In contrast, the NTRU algorithm is 
based on byte boundaries that even an 8-bit microprocessor can handle. The 
algorithm is based on modular arithmetic, which operates on arrays of 
bytes.

Public-key cryptography depends on an algorithm that is easy to run in one 
direction only. For example, multiplying two large prime numbers is easier 
computationally than finding the two prime factors of some number that has 
been generated in this way. Thus, if an encryption system is based on 
prime-number computational asymmetry, it will be tough for a code cracker 
to take a brute-force approach to deducing the original two numbers. Using 
known benchmarks for computer systems, a cryptologist simply needs to 
determine two prime numbers that are large enough to make the prime 
factoring algorithm impossible to execute in a reasonable amount of time. 
Other hard-to-solve mathematical problems have also been used to create 
computationally asymmetrical algorithms.

With the NTRU approach, the basic computational context goes from integer 
arithmetic to polynomial algebra.

Rather than encode information as digits representing numbers, NTRU uses 
sequences of integers that form the coefficients of a polynomial. That 
simplifies computation. "The NTRU system only uses adds and shifts, which 
are easier to perform than full integer arithmetic," Crenshaw said. The 
security algorithms are 2,000 times faster and 50 times smaller than other 
public-key methods, he said.

The system can attach a secure digital "signature" to a document that can 
be verified as valid using only a public key. The private key is 
represented by two small polynomials, which generate a very large system 
of polynomials. The public key is derived from the two private-key 
polynomials using convolution and is able to generate the same set of 
polynomials as the two private-key polynomials. A digital message is then 
hashed and encoded as a pair of polynomials that are essentially random.

A pair of polynomials in the set generated by the private keys is computed 
from the private key so that they are within a predetermined, close bound 
to the hashed message. One of the nearest-neighbor polynomials then 
becomes the digital signature. The original message is sent along with the 
signature, and the recipient, after using the same hashing algorithm, is 
able to verify that the resulting polynomial pair is within the 
predetermined distance from the polynomials representing the digital 
signature.

No brute force

The security of the system is ensured by the difficulty of finding close 
polynomials in a large collection of polynomials. Someone attempting to 
fake the digital signature might be able to find a pair of polynomials 
close enough to the hashed document to pass the verification step, but 
doing that by brute force becomes computationally impossible with only 
moderately long key sequences. In fact, the key sequences can be as short 
as 1,024 bits, conforming to the size of keys used by RSA encryption. The 
underlying polynomial operations are computationally very easy, however, 
which is what makes the method easy to implement in digital systems.

The high speed and small computational requirements are ideal for 
radio-frequency applications that need some type of security. A current 
example is Mobile Corp.'s Speed Pass, which allows motorists to purchase 
gas simply by holding a small RF tag near an antenna on a gas pump. The 
system verifies the driver's ID and credits the purchase to the driver's 
account. In this case, the details of the purchase and the public key need 
not be secure, but a digital signature is required to verify that the 
purchase was made by the owner of the account.

NTRU has received $38 million in financing from a variety of investors, 
including Texas Instruments Inc. and Sony Corp.

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