On Wed, 2 Oct 2002, Ben Laurie wrote: > Adam Shostack wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 02, 2002 at 04:54:54PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: > > | Lucky Green wrote: > > | >I also agree that current MTAs' implementations of STARTTLS are only a > > | >first step. At least in postfix, the only MTA with which I am > > | >sufficiently familiar to form an opinion, it appears impossible to > > | >require that certs presented by trusted parties match a particular hash > > | >while certs presented by untrusted MTAs can present any certificate they > > | >desire to achieve EDH-level security. > > | > > | This is probably a stupid question, but... why would you want to do this? > > > > So that your regular correspondants are authenticated, while anyone > > else is opportunisticly encrypted. > > ??? How does checking their MTA's cert authenticate them? What's wrong > with PGP sigs?
PGP sigs authenticate the senders of the email. MTA certs authenticate the mail servers. This would be a useful feature with regard to the current anonymous remailer network, which relies on SMTP for message transfer, for instance.
