Dubious Public Perceptions
Recent treatments of Homeland Security research concentrate on how to
spend billions to protect sensitive installations from attack (14, 15).
But this
last line of defense is probably easiest to breach because of the
multitude of vulnerable and likely targets (including discotheques,
restaurants, and
malls), the abundance of would-be attackers (needing little supervision
once embarked on a mission), the relatively low costs of attack
(hardware
store ingredients, no escape needs), the difficulty of detection
(little use of electronics), and the unlikelihood that attackers would
divulge sensitive
information (being unaware of connections beyond their operational
cells). Exhortations to put duct tape on windows may assuage (or incite)
fear, but
will not prevent massive loss of life, and public realization of such
paltry defense can undermine trust. Security agencies also attend to
prior lines of
defense, such as penetrating agent-handling networks of terrorist
groups, with only intermittent success.
A first line of defense is to prevent people from becoming terrorists.
Here, success appears doubtful should current government and media
opinions
about why people become human bombs translate into policy (see also
supporting online text on contrary academic explanations). Suicide
terrorists
often are labeled crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who
thrive in the midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvious course becomes
to
hunt down terrorists while simultaneously transforming their supporting
cultural and economic environment from despair to hope. What research
there
is, however, indicates that suicide terrorists have no appreciable
psychopathology and are at least as educated and economically well off
as their
surrounding populations.
Psychopathology: A Fundamental Attribution Error
U.S. President George W. Bush initially branded 9/11 hijackers "evil
cowards." For U.S. Senator John Warner, preemptive assaults on
terrorists and
those supporting terrorism are justified because: "Those who would
commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational and
are not
deterred by rational concepts" (16). In attempting to counter
anti-Moslem sentiment, some groups advised their members to respond that
"terrorists
are extremist maniacs who don't represent Islam at all" (17).
Social psychologists have investigated the "fundamental attribution
error," a tendency for people to explain behavior in terms of individual
personality
traits, even when significant situational factors in the larger society
are at work. U.S. government and media characterizations of Middle East
suicide
bombers as craven homicidal lunatics may suffer from a fundamental
attribution error: No instances of religious or political suicide
terrorism stem from
lone actions of cowering or unstable bombers.
Psychologist Stanley Milgram found that ordinary Americans also readily
obey destructive orders under the right circumstances (18). When told by
a
"teacher" to administer potentially life-threatening electric shocks to
"learners" who fail to memorize word pairs, most comply. Even when
subjects
stressfully protest as victims plead and scream, use of extreme
violence continues--not because of murderous tendencies but from a sense
of
obligation in situations of authority, no matter how trite. A
legitimate hypothesis is that apparently extreme behaviors may be
elicited and rendered
commonplace by particular historical, political, social, and
ideological contexts.
With suicide terrorism, the attributional problem is to understand why
nonpathological individuals respond to novel situational factors in
numbers
sufficient for recruiting organizations to implement policies. In the
Middle East, perceived contexts in which suicide bombers and supporters
express
themselves include a collective sense of historical injustice,
political subservience, and social humiliation vis-`-vis global powers
and allies, as well as
countervailing religious hope (supporting online text on radical
Islam's historical novelty). Addressing such perceptions does not entail
accepting them
as simple reality; however, ignoring the causes of these perceptions
risks misidentifying causes and solutions for suicide bombing.
There is also evidence that people tend to believe that their behavior
speaks for itself, that they see the world objectively, and that only
other people
are biased and misconstrue events (19). Moreover, individuals tend to
misperceive differences between group norms as more extreme than they
really are. Resulting misunderstandings--encouraged by religious and
ideological propaganda--lead antagonistic groups to interpret each
other's views
of events, such as terrorism/freedom-fighting, as wrong, radical,
and/or irrational. Mutual demonization and warfare readily ensue. The
problem is to
stop this spiral from escalating in opposing camps (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Demonization works both ways. (A)
Demonstrator's placard outside the Palestinian embassy in Beijing
vilifying the United Nations and the United
States (April 2002). [Reuters/Andrew Wong] (B) Anti-Moslem sign
outside Jacksonville, Florida, church
(January 2003). [Photo courtesy of Florida Times-Union]
[View Larger Version of this Image (80K GIF
file)]
Poverty and Lack of Education Are Not Reliable Factors
Across our society, there is wide consensus that ridding society of
poverty rids it of crime (20). According to President Bush, "We fight
poverty
because hope is the answer to terror. ... We will challenge the poverty
and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that too
often
allow conditions that terrorists can seize" (21). At a gathering of
Nobel Peace Prize laureates, South Africa's Desmond Tutu and South
Korea's Kim
Dae Jong opined, "at the bottom of terrorism is poverty"; Elie Wiesel
and the Dalai Lama concluded, "education is the way to eliminate
terrorism"
(22).
Support for this comes from research pioneered by economist Gary Becker
showing that property crimes are predicted by poverty and lack of
education (23). In his incentive-based model, criminals are rational
individuals acting on self-interest. Individuals choose illegal activity
if rewards
exceed probability of detection and incarceration together with
expected loss of income from legal activity ("opportunity costs").
Insofar as criminals
lack skill and education, as in much blue-collar crime, opportunity
costs may be minimal; so crime pays.
Such rational-choice theories based on economic opportunities do not
reliably account for some types of violent crimes (domestic homicide,
hate
killings). These calculations make even less sense for suicide
terrorism. Suicide terrorists generally are not lacking in legitimate
life opportunities
relative to their general population. As the Arab press emphasizes, if
martyrs had nothing to lose, sacrifice would be senseless (24): "He who
commits
suicide kills himself for his own benefit, he who commits martyrdom
sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation... . The
Mujahed is full
of hope" (25).
Research by Krueger and Maleckova suggests that education may be
uncorrelated, or even positively correlated, with supporting terrorism
(26). In a
December 2001 poll of 1357 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians 18 years of
age or older, those having 12 or more years of schooling supported
armed attacks by 68 points, those with up to 11 years of schooling by
63 points, and illiterates by 46 points. Only 40% of persons with
advanced
degrees supported dialogue with Israel versus 53% with college degrees
and 60% with 9 years or less of schooling. In a comparison of Hezbollah
militants who died in action with a random sample of Lebanese from the
same age group and region, militants were less likely to come from poor
homes and more likely to have had secondary-school education.
Nevertheless, relative loss of economic or social advantage by educated
persons might encourage support for terrorism. In the period leading to
the
first Intifada (1982-1988), the number of Palestinian men with 12 years
or more of schooling more than doubled; those with less schooling
increased
only 30%. This coincided with a sharp increase in unemployment for
college graduates relative to high school graduates. Real daily wages of
college
graduates fell some 30%; wages for those with only secondary schooling
held steady. Underemployment also seems to be a factor among those
recruited to Al-Qaida and its allies from the Arabian peninsula (27).
The Institutional Factor: Organizing Fictive Kin
Although humiliation and despair may help account for susceptibility to
martyrdom in some situations, this is neither a complete explanation nor
one
applicable to other circumstances. Studies by psychologist Ariel Merari
point to the importance of institutions in suicide terrorism (28). His
team
interviewed 32 of 34 bomber families in Palestine/Israel (before 1998),
surviving attackers, and captured recruiters. Suicide terrorists
apparently span
their population's normal distribution in terms of education,
socioeconomic status, and personality type (introvert vs. extrovert).
Mean age for
bombers was early twenties. Almost all were unmarried and expressed
religious belief before recruitment (but no more than did the general
population).
Except for being young, unattached males, suicide bombers differ from
members of violent racist organizations with whom they are often
compared
(29). Overall, suicide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional
attributes (fatherless, friendless, or jobless) or suicidal symptoms.
They do not vent
fear of enemies or express "hopelessness" or a sense of "nothing to
lose" for lack of life alternatives that would be consistent with
economic rationality.
Merari attributes primary responsibility for attacks to recruiting
organizations, which enlist prospective candidates from this youthful
and relatively
unattached population. Charismatic trainers then intensely cultivate
mutual commitment to die within small cells of three to six members. The
final step
before a martyrdom operation is a formal social contract, usually in
the form of a video testament.
From 1996 to 1999 Nasra Hassan, a Pakistani relief worker, interviewed
nearly 250 Palestinian recruiters and trainers, failed suicide bombers,
and
relatives of deceased bombers. Bombers were men aged 18 to 38: "None
were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. ...
They all seemed to be entirely normal members of their families" (30).
Yet "all were deeply religious," believing their actions "sanctioned by
the
divinely revealed religion of Islam." Leaders of sponsoring
organizations complained, "Our biggest problem is the hordes of young
men who beat on
our doors."
Psychologist Brian Barber surveyed 900 Moslem adolescents during Gaza's
first Intifada (1987-1993) (31). Results show high levels of
participation
in and victimization from violence. For males, 81% reported throwing
stones, 66% suffered physical assault, and 63% were shot at (versus
51, 38, and 20% for females). Involvement in violence was not strongly
correlated with depression or antisocial behavior. Adolescents most
involved
displayed strong individual pride and social cohesion. This was
reflected in activities: for males, 87% delivered supplies to activists,
83% visited
martyred families, and 71% tended the wounded (57, 46, and 37% for
females). A follow-up during the second Intifada (2000-2002) indicates
that
those still unmarried act in ways considered personally more dangerous
but socially more meaningful. Increasingly, many view martyr acts as
most
meaningful. By summer 2002, 70 to 80% of Palestinians endorsed martyr
operations (32).
Previously, recruiters scouted mosques, schools, and refugee camps for
candidates deemed susceptible to intense religious indoctrination and
logistical training. During the second Intifada, there has been a
surfeit of volunteers and increasing involvement of secular
organizations (allowing
women). The frequency and violence of suicide attacks have escalated
(more bombings since February 2002 than during 1993-2000); planning has
been less painstaking. Despite these changes, there is little to
indicate overall change in bomber profiles (mostly unmarried, average
socioeconomic
status, moderately religious) (28, 30).
In contrast to Palestinians, surveys with a control group of Bosnian
Moslem adolescents from the same time period reveal markedly weaker
expressions of self-esteem, hope for the future, and prosocial behavior
(30). A key difference is that Palestinians routinely invoke religion to
invest
personal trauma with proactive social meaning that takes injury as a
badge of honor. Bosnian Moslems typically report not considering
religious
affiliation a significant part of personal or collective identity until
seemingly arbitrary violence forced awareness upon them.
Thus, a critical factor determining suicide terrorism behavior is
arguably loyalty to intimate cohorts of peers, which recruiting
organizations often
promote through religious communion (supporting online text on
religion's role) (33). Consider data on 39 recruits to Harkat al-Ansar,
a
Pakistani-based ally of Al-Qaida. All were unmarried males, most had
studied the Quran. All believed that by sacrificing themselves they
would help
secure the future of their "family" of fictive kin: "Each [martyr] has
a special place--among them are brothers, just as there are sons and
those even
more dear" (34). A Singapore Parliamentary report on 31 captured
operatives from Jemaah Islamiyah and other Al-Qaida allies in Southeast
Asia
underscores the pattern: "These men were not ignorant, destitute or
disenfranchised. All 31 had received secular education... . Like many of
their
counterparts in militant Islamic organizations in the region, they held
normal, respectable jobs... . As a group, most of the detainees regarded
religion
as their most important personal value... secrecy over the true
knowledge of jihad, helped create a sense of sharing and empowerment
vis-`-vis
others." (35).
Such sentiments characterize institutional manipulation of emotionally
driven commitments that may have emerged under natural selection's
influence to
refine or override short-term rational calculations that would
otherwise preclude achieving goals against long odds. Most typically,
such emotionally
driven commitments serve as survival mechanisms to inspire action in
otherwise paralyzing circumstances, as when a weaker person convincingly
menaces a stronger person into thinking twice before attempting to take
advantage. In religiously inspired suicide terrorism, however, these
emotions
are purposely manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters, and
trainers to benefit the organization rather than the individual
(supporting online
text on religion) (36).
Rational Choice Is the Sponsor's Prerogative, Not the Agent's
Little tangible benefit (in terms of rational-choice theories) accrues
to the suicide bomber, certainly not enough to make the likely gain one
of
maximized "expected utility." Heightened social recognition occurs only
after death, obviating personal material benefit. But for leaders who
almost
never consider killing themselves (despite declarations of readiness to
die), material benefits more likely outweigh losses in martyrdom
operations.
Hassan cites one Palestinian official's prescription for a successful
mission: "a willing young man... nails, gunpowder, a light switch and a
short cable,
mercury (readily obtainable from thermometers), acetone ... . The most
expensive item is transportation to an Israeli town" (30). The total
cost is
about $150.
For the sponsoring organization, suicide bombers are expendable assets
whose losses generate more assets by expanding public support and pools
of potential recruits. Shortly after 9/11, an intelligence survey of
educated Saudis (ages 25 to 41) concluded that 95% supported Al-Qaida
(37). In a
December 2002 Pew Research Center survey on growing anti-Americanism,
only 6% of Egyptians viewed America and its "War on Terror"
favorably (38). Money flows from those willing to let others die,
easily offsetting operational costs (training, supporting personnel,
safe houses,
explosives and other arms, transportation, and communication). After a
Jerusalem supermarket bombing by an 18-year-old Palestinian female, a
Saudi telethon raised more than $100 million for "the Al-Quds
Intifada."
Massive retaliation further increases people's sense of victimization
and readiness to behave according to organizational doctrines and
policies
structured to take advantage of such feelings. In a poll of 1179 West
Bank and Gaza Palestinians in spring 2002, 66% said army operations
increased their backing for suicide bombings (39). By year's end, 73%
of Lebanese Moslems considered suicide bombings justifiable (38). This
radicalization of opinion increases both demand and supply for
martyrdom operations. A December 2002 UN report credited volunteers with
swelling a reviving Al-Qaida in 40 countries (40). The organization's
influence in the larger society--most significantly its directing
elites--increases in
turn.
<snip>
