I don't fully understand the model that excludes GPS data as a provider of a "specific place". Would the GPS satellites and ground units be an "external" data source? If so, is your assertion that GPS data from a device's logging app could be forged in transit?
-lee On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 8:12 PM, Rich Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > I'm familiar with J3M, but unfortunately none of the current J3M/informacam > techniques actually work, as they have no _external_ verifiability. There > isn't actually any information which ties the media to a place or a time, > it's just information encoded into data which could be applied to any > document at any time. By factoring the network, a geotemporal pkey system > would address this problem. J3M is good for tying information to a specific > device (sort of) - but not to a place or a time. > > R > > > On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 4:58 PM, Lee Azzarello <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> Informacam >> >> "InformaCam is a mobile application for Android that enables users to >> inflate image and video with extra points of data, or metadata. The >> metadata includes information like the user’s current GPS coordinates, >> altitude, compass bearing, light meter readings, the signatures of >> neighboring devices, cell towers, and wifi networks; and serves to >> shed light on the exact circumstances and contexts under which the >> digital image was taken. With InformaCam the app starts to behave >> almost like Adobe Photoshop or GIMP, supporting non-destructive, >> layer-based edits to media built on top of Obscuracam." >> >> https://guardianproject.info/apps/informacam/ >> >> There is a sub-project to standardize metadata called j3m. >> http://j3m.info/ >> >> -lee >> >> On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 7:08 PM, Rich Jones <[email protected]> wrote: >> > This is a small, unfinished idea I had, but I'd be interested in hearing >> > any >> > feedback anybody here might have to offer. Normally we talk about >> > cryptography to secure communications, but this is an idea rather about >> > verifying the authenticity of media. >> > >> > [Quick backround: OpenWatch is a global citizen media network using >> > mobile >> > phones as the basis for a free worldwide press. We care very much about >> > the >> > authenticity of citizen media, and have designed some systems which >> > attempt >> > to improve the verifiability of citizen media.] >> > >> > The problem is that sometimes media artifacts are presented as a record >> > of a >> > current event, when in fact they from different events. An example of >> > this >> > was when images of a marathon race in Istanbul were presented as images >> > of >> > the recent Occupy Gezi protests. >> > >> > Now, imagine the globe divided into a grid coordinate system, say >> > 100,000 >> > units (or perhaps 232, if IP rather than physical address is to be >> > used). >> > Based on their physical location, reporters can contact a server and are >> > assigned a key with which to sign or encrypt their media to. This then >> > ties >> > a media object to a physical space. This can be further improved to >> > include >> > both time and space by dividing a space-day into a number of units, >> > suppose >> > 1440, such that different keys would be handed out at different times of >> > the >> > day, thus further tying a document to a moment in time as well. >> > >> > Does anybody know if any systems like this have ever been discussed or >> > designed in the past? I suppose this is somewhat similar to the >> > RSA-keyfob >> > system, although this allows for anonymous access without >> > pre-arrangement as >> > well. >> > >> > R >> > > > > -- > ————————————— > > Rich Jones > > OpenWatch is a global investigative network using mobile technology to build > a more transparent world. Download OpenWatch for iOS and for Android!
