On Mon, 2013-12-16 at 00:40 -0300, Juan Garofalo wrote: > > said another way, breaking Tor at protocol level is currently too > > expensive a solution > > And you know that, how, exactly?
All of the most recently leaked documents pertaining to Tor (from 2007 to 2011 IIRC) treat it as far too expensive. These documents are largely congratulatory for Tor, and most of the fears of the research community (correlation attacks in particular) are as yet unrealized. As coderman says, there are a wide variety of lucrative active attacks that the NSA is not shy about using. Given these attacks, there's no reason to try to become a global passive adversary or implement correlation attacks. You don't need a correlation attack if you've owned your target's computing platform with a 0day or several. To respond to another comment of yours: > Also, given the fact that the american nazi government has > influenced and > bribed virtually everybody in the 'security' 'community', isn't it an > obvious educated guess that Tor, which is directly funded by the > american > nazi governemnt is, let's say, not so trustable? Virtually all academic computer science in the United States is government-funded; Tor isn't substantially different. Further, the Tor developers include people whom the US Government is openly hostile towards (Jacob Applebaum), and are generally very principled people. What is your source for the "fact that the american government has influenced and bribed virtually everybody in the security community"? -- Sent from Ubuntu
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