> He also trusted RSA enough to use it to encrypt communications with > Greenwald and Poitris (sp?).
Not only that, after Schneier took a look at the files he alluded that discrete-log crypto was a safer bet right now. So it looks like RSA remains ironclad in terms of age and security. Also, if AES were backdoored, I think we'd see waaay more panicked allusions to state-secret-smashing revelations. Besides, as has been argued many times; if you own the random number generator, you own the RSA/AES ciphers anyway, and that's what the NSA did. So yea, if you were using RSA-RSA, you're fucked because one of the CSPRNGs was backdoored. But the RSA algorithm, going by Snowden's usage and Schneier's interpretation of the documents, is still OK if properly implemented. > Very real possibility. Commercial tech is almost there. Assuming > government is 3-5 years ahead, they might well have that. But I really > don't see that as much of a threat. It just saves analysts time. Also permits more efficient storage for a backlog of dirt if they ever decide they don't like you. So, it is a bit of a game-changer. The NSA will never store raw audio of you being a total asshole if you're not a target, even though it would be great material for discrediting you someday if you get out of line. But they could easily store plaintext transcripts. On 21/01/14 15:38, Anonymous Remailer (austria) wrote: > On 01/20/2014 07:56 PM, grarpamp wrote:> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 2:57 > PM, Anonymous Remailer (austria) >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> I too wish the leaks would come at a faster pace. But I don't think >>> >> The pace is ok, it keeps up the pressure. The real question is, >> is what remains? More of this same stuff we all knew was happening >> anyways? Or is there more deeper stuff we only questioned but >> shrugged off due to the hardness/fantasy of it all? >> >> - decryption of aes? cracked rsa? > > Unlikely, unless it's buried deep within files that Snowden took. > Remember, during his very first few interviews, he encouraged us to > continue to use encryption and made the statement "encryption works". He > also trusted RSA enough to use it to encrypt communications with > Greenwald and Poitris (sp?). > >> - automatic and global translation to stored text of all voice calls? > > Very real possibility. Commercial tech is almost there. Assuming > government is 3-5 years ahead, they might well have that. But I really > don't see that as much of a threat. It just saves analysts time. > >> - gratuitous unwarranted passing of crimetips to LEA? > > Likely already being done. In fact, there seems to be some evidence that > this has happened in several instances. > >> - fundamental metadata knowledge of all persons/associations? > > Probably possible but not really feasible. Too difficult to filter even > using selectors. But I'm sure they're close. Still, there are ways to > communicate without generating useful metadata so it might not matter. > >> - political puppetstringing? > > I'd say this is nearly guaranteed. In fact, I suspect this is why > Congress has been so slow to do anything about it. The NSA has them by > the balls. If you were running a large, illegal, operation, wouldn't you > first gather as much dirt on the people who could shut it down as possible? > >> I suggest the answer lies in budget analysis... the possibilities >> within a well spent budget. Or a seriously conscientious leaker at >> the top who is yet to come... since so far Snowden seems limited >> to confirming lower level obviousness. > > Good point. You know what I'd like to see? I'd like to see code. I'd > like someone to drop the code to one of these massive systems online for > us to analyze. But I suppose documents and program details would be just > as useful. >
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