On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 05:45:13AM -0500, fred concklin wrote: > from > https://github.com/wetube/bitcloud/blob/master/bitcloud.org#protected-routing > —proof-of-bandwidth "Basically, the law is applied by judging (checking) > that every node and client is doing the work as it should, so, when asked, > it should answer with the truth of what is asked. If it is found that the > node or client is lying, it is penalized or banned, and its transactions > rejected are not included in the blockchain. > > Laws are written in the source code in the form of *generics* and the > corresponding *methods*. A *method* is a specific application of a *generic*. > For example, for the *generic* of the Law of Bandwidth there are going to > be several *methods* for judging nodes, users and publishers." > > > ---------------- > > It all breaks down there. You can attack by polluting the network with > nodes that share no bandwidth but report fraudulent bandwidth statistics of > honest nodes. Moreover, fraudulent node collections can overreport their > bandwidth capabilities, thus funneling all traffic into chokepoints. You > can disrupt the network as well as build attacker controlled majority > routes for traffic analysis and subsequent deanonymization of hidden > service protocols and/or onion routing. They are describing a MIX network > but they've removed the routing properties of an effective MIX network with > their prioritization of nodes (thus partitioning traffic heavily in a > nonuniform manner as it passes through the MIX). If they are not mixing and > instead onion routing they sacrifice the beneficial property of onion > routes being difficult for an adversary to observe by performing route > selection in a geospatially indiscriminate manner.
I'm convinced (for the moment) that the anonymity cost is going to kill the project. For http://minco.me (which I wrote in a fit of political speech), I came to the conclusion that there must be some sort of 'local authority' as a 'method' to evaluate human-usable proof-of-work, and this would have to utilize the pre-existing legal and court infrastructure. If you can sue the operator of a node fraudulently collecting 'proof of bandwidth' rewards for theft, it might work. However, in a global network with no clear idea where (or who) the node operators are, it's going to take a lot more human mathematical and crypto work to prove bandwidth. All that being said, I'm encouraged that there is wild-eyed optimism and excitement about what's possible, so between my pet project for per-packet micropayments (I might as well call it IPv7), and bitcloud, we might collective make enough mistakes to learn how to make it happen.
