-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 01/17/2015 01:34 PM, rysiek wrote: > Dnia sobota, 17 stycznia 2015 11:22:02 Mirimir pisze: >> On 01/17/2015 03:52 AM, rysiek wrote: >>> So, >>> >>> Mirmir wrote: >>>> | 13. Targeted attacks against PGP key ids are possible >>>> >>>> This is an advantage of Keybase. Then we're not depending on the KeyID, >>>> or even on the fingerprint, but rather on an identity that's multiply >>>> and independently authenticated. >>> >>> I keep hearing more and more about keybase, and I have a problem with it. >>> It's a centralised service, owned and controlled by a single entity; >>> moreover, the keys are tied to online identities controlled by corporate >>> third parties (Twitter, Facebook, et al). I don't see a Diaspora/The >>> Federation support, for instance. >> >> As I understand it, Keybase is an API. The website/service is merely a >> demonstration. The developers are aiming for mass adoption, and so >> they've targeted the most popular sites. With some coding, arbitrary >> sites could be used, with two requirements. First, it must be possible >> for users to post persistent signed proofs. Second, it must be possible >> for the API to access those signed proofs, in order to verify them. >> >>> My problem with this is two-fold: >>> >>> 1. It might allow abuse, esp. MITM attacks. If Keybase becomes a /de >>> facto/ >>> standard of acquiring keys, it seems trivial to me for them to replace a >>> valued target's key with something a LEA would provide. >> >> That's the value of trackers. Those tracking such a comprised target >> would see that various public signed proofs are no longer valid for the >> target's key on Keybase. The adversary could alter all of the target's >> public signed proofs. But even that wouldn't suffice, because trackers >> have independent snapshot histories of public proofs. And furthermore, >> snapshot histories are embedded in the Bitcoin blockchain. > > Wait, how/where does Bitcoin come into this? Did I miss it somehow? I admit I > didn't dive into keybase increadibly deep, but still...
See <https://keybase.io/docs/server_security> and re the blockchain <https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_root_in_bitcoin_blockchain>. | Every public announcement you make on Keybase is now verifiably | signed by Keybase and hashed into the Bitcoin blockchain. To be | specific, all of these: | | o announcing your Keybase username and your public key | o identity proofs (twitter, github, your website, etc.) | o public bitcoin address announcements | o public tracking statements | o revocations of any of these >>> 2. It still promotes the closed, walled-gardens. Diaspora or GNU Social >>> support would not be that hard to implement. >> >> Signed proofs could be placed anywhere that's accessible to the API. But >> that takes coding, and developers have priorities. One can request. > > Right. > >> Anyway, I've created a test identity: https://keybase.io/Proba. Once >> I've added enough proofs, and have enough trackers, I plan to mess with >> it by replacing the public key held by Keybase, altering some of the >> proofs, and so on. Then we can see how that shows up for its trackers, >> and for other users. I'll also explore impacts of malicious trackers. > > Oh, great, I really appreciate that effort. Please keep me posted! Thanks. If you join, you can play :) I'm <https://keybase.io/mirimir> and the test account is <https://keybase.io/proba>. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJUut40AAoJEGINZVEXwuQ+3zAH/A7f9GqRi3T3P+viT6M46pXw 4TcxxWGmWtqGz6fbtkYN5AMuedG1hgSRSaqoznpdVhC82kzv6oljC5DyGDJ96Rqv UH0d3xAtiDHO2xN8v7nzE8NmQj7MPRHD0/dZouVaryEAmlFxmsEm0EUGYWhNyIr8 6r6aSCpLgfQi26AhdUdc2PhGf+bAnLnWVQHmpFVaEddi6Vws8MCEeCqhtRmNsoGJ E9wDxhciVcMQKthATgo7K9a8yfEY5jglyFlK38qMrcGrE0TZ/f3wmShQGQqI7B4E aQ4AXCc1X09DwuzEoCiYZQpCixkteH9ZKOMXCWR834SHYcEUNu7lV2eMowXv6OM= =1QmD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
