Ah apologies, I thought you meant it only obfuscated "internal" metadata, ie headers.
On 10 April 2015 21:43:51 GMT+01:00, Mike Ingle <[email protected]> wrote: >My software goes through Tor hidden services (or exit node if >necessary) >and sets up a TLS session inside that. >The From address of the mail only exists inside the encrypted envelope, > >which only the recipient can open. >If someone had a global view of the Tor nodes, they might be able to >track a particular message via timing, but going through Tor prevents >mass surveillance by a passive observer. > >Mike > >On 4/10/2015 12:28 PM, Cathal (Phone) wrote: >> Metadata includes who speaks to who, which can only be hidden by >> obfuscation in a mixnet, public-message-boards that recipients pull >> randomly or fully from, or similar ways of removing means of >> connecting endpoints. >> >> On 10 April 2015 20:08:04 GMT+01:00, Mike Ingle >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> How does one go about getting on this list? I think Confidant >Mail >> qualifies. It uses GPG end to end, and encrypts the metadata in >transit. >> >> On 4/10/2015 6:44 AM, hellekin wrote: >> >> On 04/10/2015 03:59 AM, Seth wrote: >> >> >https://github.com/sweis/crypto-might-not-suck/blob/master/README.md >> >> >> *** When EFF launched the Secure Messaging Scoreboard, lynX >> and I were a bit pissed that they even mentioned proprietary >> solutions, so we made an alternate list: >> >http://libreplanet.org/wiki/GNU/consensus/Secure_Messaging_Scoreboard >> == hk >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
