Acknowledged, yet TS as currently built requires NSA/Google binaries installed with root access and passes all data traffic through NSA/Google directly anyway. Even if one end uses Tor and we assume the binaries are totally beneficent, traffic analysis combined with social network data will rapidly determine who's who unless everyone's being so cautious they're likely to not carry a phone in any case.
Given this, I'd choose the option that doesn't require NSA binaries on my device and potentially passes data through a "dumb pipe" outside NSA's jurisdiction and budget. It costs them a lot more to tap Irish SMS networks than to simply receive, through Google, your messages directly, so at least I'm costing them more. ;) On 12 April 2015 14:11:52 GMT+01:00, Markus Ottela <[email protected]> wrote: >NSA gets massive amounts of text messages through it's Dishfire >program. >Users should not assume they're excluded just because the program had >limited scope of 200,000,000 SMS per day -- four years ago. > >The content is unavailable in both data channels, yet you get better >protection against metadata analysis by routing TextSecure traffic >through Tor. > > > >On 12.04.2015 00:51, Shelley wrote: >> On April 11, 2015 1:18:35 PM Yush Bhardwaj <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Text Secure is way better >> *snip* >> >> Quoting Cathal from a post earlier today: >> >>>> TextSecure no longer supports SMS and the data channel requires >>>> installing bundles from Google, an NSA asset. Use SMSSecure, an >>>> SMS-only fork of TextSecure, also on FDroid store now whereas >>>> TextSecure was pulled from FDroid by the devs to maintain their >>>> Google-only distribution system.<< >> >> -S >> >> -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
