interesting and devastating that fucking barrett is writing for fucking intercept ... whenever he gets out of solitary i guess = horror
gg didnt even know anything about pierre before he signed up to work for him and fucking scahill thought that was funny haha ... money On Aug 23, 2015 9:40 AM, "Steve Kinney" <[email protected]> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 08/22/2015 12:49 PM, Softy wrote: > > > > appears to stand up well. I believe it's very possible that > > Snowden never obtained access to the useful and relevant > > technical documents that seem to be missing from his dump: > > > > http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-sur > ro > > > > > und-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673 > > <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-su > rro%0Aund-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673> > > > > :o/ > > > > > > > > This speaks to the success of the SCI model, more than > > anything about Snowden. He had widespread network access - but > > not specific compartmental access. I would guess rather than > > risk exposing himself he intentionally didn't (or couldn't) > > attempt an active spoof of credentials needed to gain SCI > > access - which is where the technical details live. Everything > > I have seen dumped from his trove is purely > > presentational/summary reports handed around between > > offices/echelons and posted on intranets for dissemination. > > My thoughts exactly: Snowden never left the reservation when he > collected his docs, except in that he copied quite a lot of them > and carried them out. Reading up on what your internal customers > use the network for is healthy and encouraged behavior for admins > - - up to the point of "sensitive sources and methods." > > > > > In the big picture those details don't change the validity of > > the trove -- any criticism based on the 'lack of code' is > > purely an apologist or diversion tactic. I think the situation > > speaks for itself: Managerial reporting to higher speaks to > > tech capabilities just as great as actual tech source. > > Similarly, intent is very difficult to discern from knowing > > technical ability, however is readily gleaned from managerial > > planning/status updates - especially at higher echelons. > > Ah yup. > > Project scopes, code names, and functional descriptions give one a > high level but fairly definitive picture of the systems described. > Once one knows what they are doing, the how is largely self > explanatory. The only surprise in the whole Snowden dump is the > scope and depth of U.S. engagement in cyber-spying: Going from > well founded suspicion to detailed documentary evidence is a > quantum leap, converting knowledge into intelligence. > > The extent of Greenwald & Co. cooperation with State authorities, > vs. purely commercial motives, remains an open question. > > It may be a coincidence that the first two Big Stories of the > Snowden Saga broke on the same days as the last two major events > in the Manning trial. Greenwald knocked Chelsea's story right off > the public's radar. I do believe in coincidences, but I try not > to bet on them, and this one casts a creepy, PsyOps kind of light > on the Snowden business. The sale of those documents to Pierre > Omidyar also seems a little creepy to me: > > http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/13/greenwald-omidyar-joint-v > enture-the-blurring-lines-between-being-a-source-being-a-journalist/ > > One content gap that I find puzzling is the absence of references > in published Snowden docs to what was formerly called Romas/COIN > then Odyssey, a system revealed by the H.B. Gary e-mail dump. > Maybe I missed a description of that program under another name: I > have not been reading everything that comes down the pipe. > > Romas/COIN was the name of Uncle Sam's cellular network, smart > phone and social media surveillance and exploitation toolkit from > Hell (see echelon2.org). As a rich source of high quality > collection in regions vital to the National Interest, I am sure > that the NSA taps into this kit's databases and/or work products, > even if it "belongs to" another Service. Maybe somebody here > recognizes Romas/COIN as somthing appearing under another name in > Snowden docs? > > :o) > > > > > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJV2WmpAAoJEDZ0Gg87KR0LhOAP/3iAeJwbt+BFyM3eX2A5hsbT > /QY7cnIR8/Xxrakl/fxjAe8Io3KYE3NRoPlxn1qEgTOIvqMV93xIPNI2wvw7LdMn > 7QTWChic0L1iHIHvjC8qH7FyYmexbOddRpeLU+dANmekCXB58tR0D0/XXSMzob5s > 7N8utgxZpvbHdKlDQaEWTh9/7vOMwQ1620l0WCslafe8H94/g8w1ydfMKXhsTWyw > K8kQi2rgmVMMYRlAgR1rzIksAgFcrdYre7y8uwKTf0RP0PkIS2+JUwti5cJSUvKf > 00n3k373grus2R60RL1d/o8E6rjvqx0IjVs2Z0Kle3zkFP5s+8c0PI8ypiPaw2kk > XmleNHhwEOMlMmNC9izWhqoZkgx9vCN+7yhskXH96BhijAPjGzsQKkg23teO6Gl2 > fTTRavgsE7rM65x/jZIQ1oyi/5CzSXyx41o5YC8VzHjoB3THOaB0EVBq35mrCr5K > l7OasL02huSzT8M6fSJ3tY09vagcILnKwAztiQ4QASJOy7ojkabkkgbBrPo8iGN6 > AY1mB8ksoTsSyfNLeVh5cAkwiOipJQ3CuZDURvXpZb+05Q0dFTPkJO9y7VRCWAyo > EpeLCcIYOVuNReeaCkKqNqwnegdW1IRXyJJqKkDGgy0AW8LuspgUKU+i3aBBEb1f > 9NtVcX6NVOyFxippoY0S > =eVua > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >
