On 2/24/16, Steve Kinney <[email protected]> wrote: > ... > But in the same press release, EFF endorses absurd non sequiturs > that demonstrate painful ignorance of the subject matter at hand. > The EFF endorses the assertations that the only way to obtain > access to encrypted data stored on an iPhone is to manually key in > a password on the device itself,
not the *only* way... > that removing a software function > that deletes a stored key hash after n. failed decryption attempts > voids the security of the encrypted data stored on that device, not voids, but weakens. Apple creating and signing and deploying said feature is certainly a measurably more significant risk than if they did not, right? the FBI would like such a weakening to exist in a vacuum, yet reality insists otherwise. > and that doing this to one iPhone would affect the security of all > iPhone users. it does, the question is by how much. (remember the OPM? :) > Either people without the slightest understanding of how > cryptography works /or/ how computer forensics works are calling > the shots at EFF, or someone there has deliberately stood up > strawmen for the FBI'a attorneys to knock down, or... damn if I know plenty of fail all around! no need to prune sets so preemptively... ;) best regards,
