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On Tue, 4 Jul 2000, Adam Back wrote:
> So the problem is that we would like to prevent, or make MITM
> attacks against nyms who can not reveal their True Names more
> expensive to mount and maintain.
I like this problem characterization: make MITM attacks expensive or
impossible....
> The thing is we could frustrate MITM attacks if we model the set of
> pseudonymous communicants as being connected by a network with set
> of links only some proportion of which the attacker can maintain
> MITM over.
Yes! Intuitively, I thought broadcasts and multiple channels were
good. This is a more formal statement, as is your weighted decision
algorithm for distinguishing between MITM and true signatures.
> So if the nyms can communicate without MITM some of the time they
> can detect MITM. So the nyms exchange fingerprints, and hashes of
> sets of fingerprints say using hashtrees and broadcast them over any
> available channels.
Fingerprints and hashes seem a fruitful direction for thought. What
are hashtrees?
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