The Flippening, BTC to BCH The Last Mile Upgraded #BCH <https://mobile.twitter.com/hashtag/BCH?src=hashtag_click> #EDA <https://mobile.twitter.com/hashtag/EDA?src=hashtag_click>. This time, once the BTC chain come into the orbit, of the death grip, of the Chain Death Spiral, they will not be "rescued" by a BCH difficulty adjustment. http://bitcoinandtheblockchain.blogspot.ch/2017/11/the-flippening-btc-to-bch-last-mile.html) bitcoinandtheblockchain.blogspot.ch/2017/11/the-f <https://t.co/h0ke3Z8BXK?amp=1>
On Nov 13, 2017 9:51 AM, "Lee Clagett" <fo...@leeclagett.com> wrote: > Sorry for reviving this old thread. Just noticed I replied directly to > Steven instead of the list, there might be something in here people > find interesting ... replies inline. > > On Wed, 23 Aug 2017 12:26:43 -0700 > Steven Schear <schear.st...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 8:34 PM, Lee Clagett <fo...@leeclagett.com> > > wrote: > > > > > On Fri, 18 Aug 2017 14:18:40 -0500 > > > Steven Schear <schear.st...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > And now some politics... > > > > > > > > *Here is why Bitcoin Cash (BCH) Is The Real Bitcoin* > > > > > > > > *It is the original bitcoin* > > > > It was hijacked from Gavin Andresen very surreptitiously by Adam > > > > Back (back in the day, Adam and I worked on hashcash and digital > > > > cash-related projects) with his Sidechain > > > > <http://www.satoshisdeposition.com/podcast/BTCK-169-2015-09-11.mp3> > > > > proposal. It was a "Trojan Horse" and together with the help of > > > > Blockstream, Theymos and the Core developers the process was > > > > completed. We, the original community, have finally regained > > > > control of the Bitcoin project, except that we have lost control > > > > of the name. This position is about to be redressed. > > > > > > > > *It does not have Segwit.* > > > > If you look at a Bitcoin file as AD. A being the address and D > > > > being the data, Segwit removes the address portion A, It is > > > > reduced to a hash and the original signature is discarded after > > > > it is verified. So if your "fingerprint" is the hash of all your > > > > signatures, the signatures are discarded after being checked, and > > > > only the "fingerprint" is kept. This is in effect what Segwit > > > > does. > > > > > > > > The signatures are stored on another chain, but not the main > > > > chain. Some nodes will keep signatures, some only keep partial > > > > records, some will discard them entirely. If you ever need to > > > > refer back to the transaction to check on the signatures all you > > > > have is the hash. "The fingerprint". Satoshi's original design of > > > > bitcoin being an unbroken record of signatures is violated. > > > > > > It has been possible to "prune" old transactions from a local copy > > > of the blockchain with Bitcoin Core for some time before Segwit was > > > ever merged. You cannot realistically force someone to store the > > > entire blockchain for you. The ability to prune old signatures > > > while keeping the core transaction is actually a benefit - every > > > transaction is necessary to verify that no double-spending has > > > occurred or that miners did not create more coins than allowed. So > > > even if the entire network dumped all segwit information, some > > > critical checks of the system can be done by newcomers (but only if > > > at least one person stores the entirety of the transaction > > > information). > > > > Accessing information from another's blockchain db is a privacy issue. > > That's why running your own full, private, node is such a good idea. > > Its not practical to do so in your mobile so an appliance is good > > solution. > > > > A few years back some cypherpunks write a paper with controversial > > suggestions on improving the Bitcoin blockchain. I think its still > > worth a read. Here's the coverage article. There's a link inside to > > the paper on scribd.: > > > > https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-activists-suggest- > hard-fork-to-bitcoin-to-keep-it-anonymous-and-regulation-free/ > > What did this have to do with my post? You seem to be addressing a > tangential part - yes pruning transaction information in your local > blockchain may cause information leakage - but my focus was refuting > the argument against separating the signatures from the transactions. > Bitcoin is not a cryptonote like design where the signatures are > intricately linked to double spending and the inflation schedule. So > the impact/negatives are in more of a "gray" area. > > > Key suggestions: > > > > 1. Use forced mixing (like ZeroCoin/ZCash) to improve transaction > > privacy 2. Enforce a limited, regular-sized, block chain > > 3. Ability to choose miners of payments > > > > Steve > > 1. Privacy transactions are optional in ZCash, which reduces its > cloaking set. I am not sure about the Zcoin variant, but privacy > transactions are also unlikely to be mandatory due to the costs of > computing such transactions. And most likely Bitcoin would switch to > something closer to Dash than the ZeroCoin protocol (not that its > necessarily a better privacy option, just that its a smaller less risky > transition). > > 3. I do not see how this is desirable based on the information provided > in that Bitcoin 2.0 paper. The "winner" of the next block is still based > on hashing power and therefore this does not appear to be a solution > that prevents mining centralization. No reasonable person would select > a miner with low probability of mining the next block. I suppose if > magically nearly everyone agreed to ban one miner it could work, but > only until the miner generated another alias. > > > > > > > > > > > [...] > > > > > > > > Steve > > > > > > > > > > Lee > > > > > > > > > > > Lee >