On 10/12/2018 11:56 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>>>> This is the use case for Tails. . . . [T]here are no writes to storage,
>>>> unless users configure [otherwise] . . . .
> 
>> Sure, but this isn't a _Tor_ issue. It's just about Tor browser, which
>> is just (heavily) modified Firefox. And although I'm no software expert,
>> I'm guessing that it's impossible to guarantee what some code will or
>> won't leave behind when it crashes. Even if you tweaked the browser to
>> never write temp files to disk, and keep everything in RAM, you couldn't
>> guarantee that the OS won't write stuff to disk.
> 
>> That is, unless there _is_ no disk, as in Tails. Even with Whonix,
>> traces likely remain in the virtual disk.
> 
> There is never "no" disk, just a matter of which ones
> are plugged into the box, physically, or remotely.

OK, I should have said "unless there _is_ no disk, as there _can be_ in
Tails". I've run Tails (and my own LiveCDs) on diskless machines. And
yes, using USB for live systems is iffy. But write-once CDs are pretty
safe, I think. No?

<SNIP>

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