On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:48:43PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ > > On Sunday, March 31, 2019 7:14 PM, grarpamp <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > https://loki.network/ > > > https://github.com/majestrate/torrent.ano > > > http://anodex.oniichanylo2tsi4.onion/ > > > https://i2pd.website/ > > > https://github.com/loki-project/loki-network/blob/master/docs/high-level.txt > > > https://www.reddit.com/r/i2p/ > > > On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 06:42:54PM +0000, furrier wrote: > > Monero fork with premine, governance tax, and 50% funds lockup for > > "market-based sybil resistance". Good luck, I'll pass. > > > > Also, it wasn't clear from a quick look, do they utilize I2P at the > > networking layer or did they roll out they own custom solution like Kovri? > > > Loki network appears to be a ground up rewrite of I2P, with an eye to > the lower latency and clear-net accessibility of Tor, with newer > (presumably better) crypto than I2P.
This is correct. > > Appears to ignore the fundamental currently-missing feature in all > mix-/ anon-/ dark-/ onion-/ etc- nets in existence today - i.e. chaff > fill, which implies some sort of badwidth/ time reservation/ promise > between nodes, which is (re)negotiated from time to time between > nodes. > > This chaff fill feature is the single currently-missing feature which > is required to begin to handle the problem of global (in a network > sense) passive adversaries, aka GPAs - i.e. the NSA, the CIA, the > FSB, etc, i.e. those well-funded entities paid for and run by > nation-state actors who generally oppress the fundamental rights of > the rest of us, such as the rights to live, trade, and move about > within our communities. I am personally convinced that a flat traffic shape will only dare attackers to cut links between parts of the network, effectively making an even larger traffic shape to corrilate with. I am not convinced low latency systems can be immune to traffic shape corrilation and hence that being said, I think state actors are out of scope of the current threat model of llarp. This may or may not change.
