‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Thursday, September 12, 2019 5:39 PM, Se7en <[email protected]> wrote:
> I expected Israel to do such a thing, however this is nothing new. A
> 2017 study found that nearly every single embassy in the Washington DC
> Area had Stingray Devices with the assumed goal of spying on members
> of Congress.
the disgusting aspect of this is government willingness to tolerate inherently
flawed and vulnerable infrastructure - if it enables their spying! - at the
expense of the public and our democracy.
telco flaws are a "feature"; we're just not the customer...
"""
Ron Wyden Wants The DOJ To Provide Answers On Stingray Devices' Disruption Of
Emergency Call Service
Legal Issues
from the gotta-risk-lives-to-save-lives-or-whatever dept
Tue, Aug 28th 2018 9:36am — Tim Cushing
The FBI has admitted -- albeit not that publicly -- that Stingray devices
disrupt phone service. Spoofing a cell tower has negative effects on innocent
phone users as the device plays man-in-the-middle while trying to locate the
targeted device. An unsealed document from a criminal prosecution and
assertions made in warrant affidavits alleging "minimal" disruption are all we
have to go on, at least in terms of official statements.
Supposedly, Stingrays are supposed to allow 911 service to continue
uninterrupted. But it's hard to square that with the fact every phone in the
device's range is forced to connect to the Stingray first before being allowed
to connect with a real cell tower. In some cases, the device might force every
phone in range to drop to a 2G connection. This may still allow 911 calls to
take place, but almost any other form of communication will be impossible as
long as the Stingray is in use.
Ron Wyden's staff technologist, Chris Soghoian (formerly of the ACLU), will be
fielding answers from the DOJ and FBI about 911 service disruptions, if those
answers ever arrive. Wyden's office has sent a letter [PDF] demanding to know
the extent of cell service disruption when Stingrays are deployed. And he'd
also like to know if these agencies are being honest about the negative side
effects when agents seek warrants.
1. The Communications Act of 1934 prohibits willful or malicious
interference with licensed radio communications. How is a federal law
enforcement agency's use of a cell-site simulator not authorized by a court
order consistent with the prohibition on interference with radio communications
in 47 U.S.C. 333?
2. Is it the position of DOJ that a search warrant authorizing a federal
law enforcement agency to use a cell-site simulator overrides the statutory
prohibition on interference in 47 U.S.C. 333? If yes, please explain Why.
3. Does DOJ believe that it has an obligation under the duty of candor to
notify federal courts considering an application for the use of a cell-site
simulator that federal law prohibits interference with cellular communications?
If not, please explain why.
4. Is it the position of DOJ that it is lawful, with or without a court
order, for a federal law enforcement agency to interfere with licensed radio
communications such that it disrupts a surveillance target's emergency cellular
communications with 9-1-1? If yes, please explain why.
We'll see if Wyden gets his answers. The DOJ still has yet to answer similar
questions Wyden asked last year, and there's little reason to believe its
response time to questions it doesn't want to answer has improved since 2017.
There is evidence cell site simulators do interfere with 911 service, even if
the US government has yet to admit it. A document obtained by the ACLU from the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police clearly states cell site simulators have negative
effects on emergency calls.
The MDI [Mobile Device Identifier] will shut itself off if a mobile within
its range dials 911. However, recent testing at HQ revealed that more than 50%
of the GSM mobile telephones tested had not automatically completed their 911
calls after the MDI had shut itself off.
This memo says the RCMP should inform judges of this possible side effect when
seeking warrants and use a 3-minutes-on, 2-minutes-off cycle to minimize cell
service disruption and overcollection of cell data from non-targets. If the DOJ
has directed the FBI to engage in practices like these, it has yet to make that
information public. From what little has been gleaned from public statements
and begrudging answers to legislators and Congressional committees, the FBI's
use of Stingrays appears to only be constrained by a warrant requirement that
is merely the DOJ's internal policy, rather than codified by law.
"""
-
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180827/15331640515/ron-wyden-wants-doj-to-provide-answers-stingray-devices-disruption-emergency-call-service.shtml
