Know your disinformation sources: Zach Dorfman, senior fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
Jenna McLaughlin is a Johns Hopkins grad. Sean D. Naylor is a writer for Army Times, owned by Gannett. Rr On September 16, 2019 9:37:51 AM PDT, coderman <[email protected]> wrote: >https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-russia-carried-out-a-stunning-breach-of-fbi-communications-system-escalating-the-spy-game-on-us-soil-090024212.html > >Exclusive: Russia carried out a 'stunning' breach of FBI communications >system, escalating the spy game on U.S. soil > >Zach Dorfman, Jenna McLaughlin and Sean D. NaylorReporters, Yahoo >News•September 16, 2019 > >On Dec. 29, 2016, the Obama administration announced that it was giving >nearly three dozen Russian diplomats just 72 hours to leave the United >States and was seizing two rural East Coast estates owned by the >Russian government. As the Russians burned papers and scrambled to pack >their bags, the Kremlin protested the treatment of its diplomats, and >denied that those compounds — sometimes known as the “dachas” — were >anything more than vacation spots for their personnel. > >The Obama administration’s public rationale for the expulsions and >closures — the harshest U.S. diplomatic reprisals taken against Russia >in several decades — was to retaliate for Russian meddling in the 2016 >presidential election. But there was another critical, and secret, >reason why those locations and diplomats were targeted. > >Both compounds, and at least some of the expelled diplomats, played key >roles in a brazen Russian counterintelligence operation that stretched >from the Bay Area to the heart of the nation’s capital, according to >former U.S. officials. The operation, which targeted FBI >communications, hampered the bureau’s ability to track Russian spies on >U.S. soil at a time of increasing tension with Moscow, forced the FBI >and CIA to cease contact with some of their Russian assets, and >prompted tighter security procedures at key U.S. national security >facilities in the Washington area and elsewhere, according to former >U.S. officials. It even raised concerns among some U.S. officials about >a Russian mole within the U.S. intelligence community. > >“It was a very broad effort to try and penetrate our most sensitive >operations,” said a former senior CIA official. > >American officials discovered that the Russians had dramatically >improved their ability to decrypt certain types of secure >communications and had successfully tracked devices used by elite FBI >surveillance teams. Officials also feared that the Russians may have >devised other ways to monitor U.S. intelligence communications, >including hacking into computers not connected to the internet. Senior >FBI and CIA officials briefed congressional leaders on these issues as >part of a wide-ranging examination on Capitol Hill of U.S. >counterintelligence vulnerabilities. > >These compromises, the full gravity of which became clear to U.S. >officials in 2012, gave Russian spies in American cities including >Washington, New York and San Francisco key insights into the location >of undercover FBI surveillance teams, and likely the actual substance >of FBI communications, according to former officials. They provided the >Russians opportunities to potentially shake off FBI surveillance and >communicate with sensitive human sources, check on remote recording >devices and even gather intelligence on their FBI pursuers, the former >officials said. > >“When we found out about this, the light bulb went on — that this could >be why we haven’t seen [certain types of] activity” from known Russian >spies in the United States, said a former senior intelligence official. > >The compromise of FBI systems occurred not long after the White House’s >2010 decision to arrest and expose a group of “illegals” – Russian >operatives embedded in American society under deep non-official cover – >and reflected a resurgence of Russian espionage. Just a few months >after the illegals pleaded guilty in July 2010, the FBI opened a new >investigation into a group of New York-based undercover Russian >intelligence officers. These Russian spies, the FBI discovered, were >attempting to recruit a ring of U.S. assets — including Carter Page, an >American businessman who would later act as an unpaid foreign policy >adviser to Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. > >The breaches also spoke to larger challenges faced by U.S. intelligence >agencies in guarding the nation’s secrets, an issue highlighted by >recent revelations, first published by CNN, that the CIA was forced to >extract a key Russian asset and bring him to the U.S. in 2017. The >asset was reportedly critical to the U.S. intelligence community’s >conclusion that Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally >directed the interference in the 2016 presidential election in support >of Donald Trump. > >Yahoo spoke about these previously unreported technical breaches and >the larger government debates surrounding U.S. policies toward Russia >with more than 50 current and former intelligence and national security >officials, most of whom requested anonymity to discuss sensitive >operations and internal discussions. While the officials expressed a >variety of views on what went wrong with U.S.-Russian relations, some >said the United States at times neglected to appreciate the espionage >challenge from Moscow, and paid a significant price for a failure to >prioritize technical threats. > >“When I was in office, the counterintelligence business was … focused >entirely on its core concern, which is insider threats, and in >particular mole hunting,” said Joel Brenner, the head of U.S. >counterintelligence and strategy from 2006 to 2009. “This is, in fact, >the core risk and it’s right that it should be the focus. But we were >neither organized nor resourced to deal with counterintelligence in >networks, technical networks, electronic networks.” > >The discovery of Russia’s newfound capacity to crack certain types of >encryption was particularly unnerving, according to former U.S. >officials. > >“Anytime you find out that an adversary has these capabilities, it sets >off a ripple effect,” said a former senior national security official. >“The Russians are able to extract every capability from any given >technology. ... They are singularly dangerous in this area.” > > >The FBI’s discovery of these compromises took place on the heels of >what many hoped would be a breakthrough between Washington and Moscow — >the Obama administration’s 2009 “reset” initiative, which sought to >improve U.S.-Russia relations. Despite what seemed to be some initial >progress, the reset soon went awry. > >In September 2011, Vladimir Putin announced the launch of his third >presidential campaign, only to be confronted during the following >months by tens of thousands of protesters accusing him of electoral >fraud. Putin, a former intelligence officer, publicly accused >then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of fomenting the unrest. > >It was around this time that Putin’s spies in the United States, >operating under diplomatic cover, achieved what a former senior >intelligence official called a “stunning” technical breakthrough, >demonstrating their relentless focus on the country they’ve long >considered their primary adversary. > >That effort compromised the encrypted radio systems used by the FBI’s >mobile surveillance teams, which track the movements of Russian spies >on American soil, according to more than half a dozen former senior >intelligence and national security officials. Around the same time, >Russian spies also compromised the FBI teams’ backup communications >systems — cellphones outfitted with “push-to-talk” walkie-talkie >capabilities. “This was something we took extremely seriously,” said a >former senior counterintelligence official. > >The Russian operation went beyond tracking the communications devices >used by FBI surveillance teams, according to four former senior >officials. Working out of secret “listening posts” housed in Russian >diplomatic and other government-controlled facilities, the Russians >were able to intercept, record and eventually crack the codes to FBI >radio communications. > >Some of the clandestine eavesdropping annexes were staffed by the wives >of Russian intelligence officers, said a former senior intelligence >official. That operation was part of a larger sustained, deliberate >Russian campaign targeting secret U.S. government communications >throughout the United States, according to former officials. > >The two Russian government compounds in Maryland and New York closed in >2016 played a role in the operation, according to three former >officials. They were “basically being used as signals intelligence >facilities,” said one former senior national security official. > >Russian spies also deployed “mobile listening posts.” Some Russian >intelligence officers, carrying signals intelligence gear, would walk >near FBI surveillance teams. Others drove vans full of listening >equipment aimed at intercepting FBI teams’ communications. For the >Russians, the operation was “amazingly low risk in an angering way,” >said a former senior intelligence official. > >The FBI teams were using relatively lightweight radios with limited >range, according to former officials. These low-tech devices allowed >the teams to move quickly and discreetly while tracking their targets, >which would have been more difficult with clunkier but more secure >technology, a former official said. But the outdated radios left the >teams’ communications vulnerable to the Russians. “The amount of >security you employ is the inverse of being able to do things with >flexibility, agility and at scale,” said the former official. > >A former senior counterintelligence official blamed the compromises on >a “hodgepodge of systems” ineffective beyond the line of sight. “The >infrastructure that was supposed to be built, they never followed up, >or gave us the money for it,” said the former official. “The >intelligence community has never gotten an integrated system.” > >The limitations of the radio technology, said the former senior >officials, led the FBI’s surveillance personnel to communicate on the >backup systems. > >“Eventually they switched to push-to-talk cellphones,” said a former >counterintelligence executive. “The tech guys would get upset by that, >because if they could intercept radio, they might be able to intercept >telephones.” > >That is indeed what happened. Those devices were then identified and >compromised by Russian intelligence operatives. (A number of other >countries’ surveillance teams — including those from hostile services — >also transitioned from using radios to cellphones during this time, >noted another former official.) > >U.S. intelligence officials were uncertain whether the Russians were >able to unscramble the FBI conversations in real time. But even the >ability to decrypt them later would have given the Russians critical >insights into FBI surveillance practices, including “call signs and >locations, team composition and tactics,” said a former intelligence >official. > >U.S. officials were also unsure about how long the Russians had been >able to decipher FBI communications before the bureau realized what was >happening. “There was a gap between when they were really onto us, and >when we got onto them,” said a former senior intelligence official. > >Even after they understood that the Russians had compromised the FBI >teams’ radios, U.S. counterintelligence officials could not agree on >how they had done it. “The intel reporting was they did break our codes >or got their hands on a radio and figured it out,” said a former senior >intelligence official. “Either way, they decrypted our comms.” > >Officials also cautioned, however, that the Russians could only crack >moderately encrypted communications, not the strongest types of >encryption used by the U.S. government for its most sensitive >transmissions. It was nonetheless “an incredible intelligence success” >for the Russians, said the former senior official. > >While the Russians may have developed this capability by themselves, >senior counterintelligence officials also feared that someone from >within the U.S. government — a Russian mole — may have helped them, >said former officials. “You’re wondering, ‘If this is true, and they >can do this, is this because someone on the inside has given them that >information?’’ said another former senior intelligence official. > >Russia has a clear interest in concealing how it gets its information, >further muddying the waters. According to a former senior CIA officer >who served in Moscow, the Russians would often try to disguise a human >source as a technical penetration. Ultimately, officials were unable to >pinpoint exactly how the Russians pulled off the compromise of the >FBI’s systems. > >Mark Kelton, who served as the chief of counterintelligence at the CIA >until he retired in 2015, declined to discuss specific Russian >operations, but he told Yahoo News that “the Russians are a >professionally proficient adversary who have historically penetrated >every American institution worth penetrating.” > >This remains a core worry for U.S. spy hunters. The number of ongoing >espionage investigations into U.S. government personnel — at the CIA, >the FBI and elsewhere — including those potentially recruited by >Russia, “is not a little, it’s a lot,” said another former senior >counterintelligence official. > >Once the compromises of FBI communications devices were confirmed, U.S. >officials scrambled to minimize the exposure of mobile surveillance >team operations, quickly putting countermeasures in place, according to >former senior officials. There was a “huge concern” about protecting >the identities of the individuals on the teams — an elite, secret group >— said the former senior counterintelligence official. U.S. officials >also conducted a damage assessment and repeatedly briefed select White >House officials and members of Congress about the compromise. > >After the FBI discovered that its surveillance teams’ cellphones had >been compromised, they were forced to switch back to encrypted radios, >purchasing different models, according to two former officials. “It was >an expensive venture,” said one former counterintelligence official. > >But the spying successes went both ways. The U.S. intelligence >community collected its own inside information to conclude that the >damage from the compromises had been limited, partly due to the >Russians’ efforts to keep their intelligence coup secret, according to >a former senior intelligence official. “The Russians were reticent to >take steps [that might reveal] that they’d figured it out,” the former >senior official said. > > >Even so, the costs to U.S. intelligence were significant. Spooked by >the discovery that its surveillance teams’ communications had been >compromised, the FBI worried that some of its assets had been blown, >said two former senior intelligence officials. The bureau consequently >cut off contact with some of its Russian sources, according to one of >those officials. > >At the time of the compromise, some of the FBI’s other Russian assets >stopped cooperating with their American handlers. “There were a couple >instances where a recruited person had said, ‘I can’t meet you >anymore,’” said a former senior intelligence official. In a damage >assessment conducted around 2012, U.S. intelligence officials concluded >the events may have been linked. > >The impact was not limited to the FBI. Alerted by the bureau to >concerns surrounding Russia’s enhanced interception capabilities, the >CIA also ceased certain types of communications with sources abroad, >according to a former senior CIA official. The agency “had to resort to >a whole series of steps” to ensure the Russians weren’t able to >eavesdrop on CIA communications, the former senior official said. There >was a “strong hint” that these newly discovered code-breaking >capabilities by Russia were also being used abroad, said another former >senior intelligence official. > >The CIA has long been wary of Russian spies’ eavesdropping efforts >outside of the United States, especially near U.S. diplomatic >facilities. U.S. officials have observed Russian technical officers >repeatedly walking close to those compounds with packages in their >hands, or wearing backpacks, or pushing strollers, or driving by in >vehicles — all attempts, U.S. officials believe, to collect information >on the different signals emanating from the facilities. While the tools >used by the Russians for these activities were “a bit antiquated,” said >a former senior CIA official, they were still a “constant concern.” > >It’s not unusual for intelligence officers operating from diplomatic >facilities, including the United States’s own operatives, to try and >intercept the communications of the host nation. “You had to find ways >to attack their surveillance,” said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former head of >counterintelligence at the Department of Energy and a former CIA >officer who first served in Moscow in the 1980s. “The Russians do >everything in the U.S. that we did in Moscow.” > >Indeed, the focus on cracking radio communications was no different. > >“We put extraordinary effort into intercepting and monitoring the FSB >surveillance radio networks for the purpose of understanding whether >our officers were under surveillance or not,” said another former >senior CIA officer who also served in Moscow. > >The discovery of the Russians’ new code-breaking capabilities came at a >time when gathering intelligence on Russia and its leaders’ intentions >was of particular importance to the U.S. government. U.S. national >security officials working on Russia at the time received rigorous >security training on how to keep their digital devices secure, >according to two former senior officials. One former U.S. official >recalled how during the negotiations surrounding the reset, NSC >officials, partially tongue in cheek, “would sometimes say things on >the phone hoping [they] were communicating things to the Russians.” > >According to a former CIA official and a former national security >official, the CIA’s analysts often disagreed about how committed Russia >was to negotiations during the attempted reset and how far Putin would >go to achieve his strategic aims, divergences that confused the White >House and senior policy makers. > >“It caused a really big rift within the [National Security Council] on >how seriously they took analysis from the agency,” said the former CIA >official. Senior administration leaders “went along with” some of the >more optimistic analysis on the future of U.S.-Russia relations “in the >hopes that this would work out,” the official continued. > >Those disagreements were part of a “reset hangover” that persisted, at >least for some inside the administration, until the 2016 election >meddling, according to a former senior national security official. >Those officials clung to the hope that Washington and Moscow could >cooperate on key issues, despite aggressive Russian actions ranging >from the invasion of Ukraine to its spying efforts. > >“We didn’t understand that they were at political war with us already >in the second term once Putin was reelected and Obama himself was >reelected,” said Evelyn Farkas, the former deputy assistant secretary >of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia during the Obama >administration. > > >As high-level hopes for the U.S.-Russia “reset” withered, concerns >about the threat of Russian spying made their way to Capitol Hill. Top >officials at the FBI and CIA briefed key members of Congress on >counterintelligence issues related to Russia, according to current and >former U.S. officials. These included briefings on the radio >compromises, said two former senior officials. > >Mike Rogers, a former Republican lawmaker from Michigan who chaired the >House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 2011 to 2015, >alluded to counterintelligence concerns at a conference earlier this >year in Washington, D.C. > >One of those concerns was a massive intelligence failure related to the >secret internet-based communications system the CIA used to communicate >with agents. The extent of that failure, first reported publicly by >Yahoo News in 2018, got the attention of Congress earlier. > >But the problems were broader than that issue, according to Rogers. > >“Our counterintelligence operations needed some adjustments,” said >Rogers, adding that he and his Democratic counterpart from Maryland, >Dutch Ruppersberger, requested regular briefings on the subject from >agency representatives. “We started out monthly until we just wore them >out, then we did it quarterly to try to make sure that we had the right >resources and the right focus for the entire community on >counter[intelligence].” > >Rogers later told Yahoo News that his request for the briefings had >been prompted by “suspected penetrations, both physical and technical, >which is the role of those [Russian and Chinese] intelligence >services,” but declined to be more specific. > >The former committee chairman said he wanted the intelligence community >to make counterintelligence a higher priority. “Counterintelligence was >always looked at as the crazy uncle at the party,” he said. “I wanted >to raise it up and give it a robust importance.” > > >The briefings, which primarily involved counterintelligence officials >from the FBI and CIA and were limited to the committee leadership and >staff directors, led to “some useful inquiries to help focus the >intelligence community,” Rogers said. The leaders of the Senate Select >Committee on Intelligence were also included in some of the inquiries, >according to Rogers and a current U.S. government official. > >Spokespeople for the current House and Senate intelligence committees >did not respond to a request for comment. The FBI and CIA declined to >comment. The Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. did not respond to a >request for comment. > >The briefings were designed to “get the counterintelligence house in >order,” said Jamil Jaffer, senior counsel at the House intelligence >committee from 2011 to 2013, and to ensure that Congress and the >intelligence agencies were “on the same page” when it came to such >matters. “There were some concerns about what the agencies were doing, >there were some concerns about what Congress knew, and all of these >issues, of course, had China-Russia implications.” > >Rogers and Jaffer declined to provide further details about what >specific counterintelligence issues the committee was addressing, but >other former officials indicated that worries weren’t limited to the >compromise of FBI radio systems. Senior U.S. officials were >contemplating an even more disturbing possibility: that the Russians >had found a way to penetrate the communications of the U.S. >intelligence community’s most sensitive buildings in and around >Washington, D.C. > >Suspected Russian intelligence officers were seen conspicuously >loitering along the road that runs alongside the CIA’s headquarters, >according to former senior intelligence officials. “Russian diplomats >would be sitting on Route 123, sometimes in cars with diplomatic >plates, other times not,” a former senior intelligence executive said. >“We thought, they’re out doing something. It’s not just taking down >license plates; those guys are interrogating the system.” > >Though this behavior dated back at least to the mid-2000s, former >officials said those activities persisted simultaneously with the >compromise of the FBI’s communication system. And these were not the >only instances of Russian intelligence operatives staking out locations >with a line of sight to CIA headquarters. They were “fixated on being >in neighborhoods” that gave them exposure to Langley, said a former >senior official. > >Over time, U.S. intelligence officials became increasingly concerned >that Russian spies might be attempting to intercept communications from >key U.S. intelligence facilities, including the CIA and FBI >headquarters. No one knew if the Russians had actually succeeded. > >“The question was whether they had capabilities to penetrate our comms >at Langley,” said a former senior CIA official. In the absence of any >proof that that was the case, the working theory was that the Russian >activities were provocations designed to sow uncertainty within the >CIA. “We came to the conclusion that they were trying to get into our >heads,” the former senior official said. > >A major concern was that Russian spies with physical proximity to >sensitive U.S. buildings might be exfiltrating pilfered data that had >“jumped the air gap,” i.e., that the Russians were collecting >information from a breach of computers not connected to the Internet, >said former officials. > >One factor behind U.S. intelligence officials’ fears was simple: The >CIA had already figured out how to perform similar operations >themselves, according to a former senior CIA officer directly familiar >with the matter. “We felt it was pretty revolutionary stuff at the >time,” the former CIA officer said. “It allowed us to do some >extraordinary things.” > >While no one definitively concluded that the Russians had actually >succeeded in penetrating Langley’s communications, those fears, >combined in part with the breach of the bureau’s encrypted radio >system, drove an effort by U.S. intelligence officials around 2012 to >fortify sensitive Washington-area government buildings against >potential Russian snooping, according to four former officials. > >At key government facilities in the Washington area, entire floors were >converted to sensitive compartmented information facilities, or SCIFs. >These are specially protected areas designed to be impenetrable to >hostile signals intelligence gathering. > >The normal assumption was that work done in a SCIF would be secure, but >doubts arose about the safety of even those rooms. “The security guys >would say, your windows are ‘tempested’”—that is, protected against the >interception of emissions radiating from electronic equipment in the >building —“you’re in a SCIF, it’s fine,” a former senior >counterintelligence executive recalled. “The question was, ‘Is it >true?’” > >Increasingly, U.S. officials began to fear it was not. > >New security practices were instituted in sensitive government >facilities like the FBI and CIA headquarters, according to former >officials. “It required many procedural changes on our part to make >sure we were not susceptible to penetrations,” said a former senior CIA >official. These included basic steps such as moving communication away >from windows and changing encryption codes more frequently, as well as >more expensive adjustments, said four former officials. > >Revelations about the Russian compromise of the radio systems, recalled >a former senior intelligence official, “kick-started the money flowing” >to upgrade security. > > >While the breaches of the FBI communications systems appeared to >finally spur Congress and the intelligence agencies to adopt steps to >counter increasingly sophisticated Russian eavesdropping, it took the >Putin-directed interference in the 2016 election to get the White House >to expel at least some of those officials deemed responsible for the >breaches, and to shut down the facilities that enabled them. > >Even then, the decision was controversial. Some in Washington worried >about retribution by the Russians and exposure of American intelligence >operations, according to a former senior U.S. national security >official directly involved in the discussions. The FBI consistently >supported expulsions, said another former national security official. > >More than two years later, the Russian diplomatic compounds used in the >FBI communications compromises remain shuttered. The U.S. government >has prevented many of the Russian spies expelled by the United States >from returning, according to national security experts and senior >foreign intelligence officials. “They are slowly creeping back in, but >[the] FBI makes it hard,” said a senior foreign intelligence official. >“The old guard is basically screwed. They need to bring in a whole new >generation.” > >In the meantime, those familiar with Russian operations warn that the >threat from Moscow is far from over. “Make no mistake, we’re in an >intelligence war with the Russians, every bit as dangerous as the Cold >War,” said a former senior intelligence officer. “They’re trying all >the time ... and we caught them from time to time,” he said. Of course, >he added, “you don’t know what you don’t know.” > >That’s the same message that special counsel Robert Mueller tried to >convey during the highly contentious hearings to discuss his report on >Russian interference in the 2016 election. “They are doing it as we sit >here, and they expect to do it during the next campaign,” Mueller told >lawmakers on the House Intelligence Committee about covert Russian >involvement in U.S. politics. > >But a number of observers believe Mueller’s message about the threat >from Russia was largely lost amid a partisan battle on Capitol Hill >over President Trump. > >During his Washington conference appearance earlier this year, Rogers, >the former chair of the House Intelligence Committee, also lamented >that the current politicized state of the intelligence committees would >make spy agencies more hesitant to admit their failures. > >“They're not going to call you to say, 'I screwed up.' They're going to >say, 'God, I hope they don't find that,’” he said. “That's what's going >to happen. I'll guarantee it's happening today.” Rr Sent from my Androgyne dee-vice with K-9 Mail
