[https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/us/data-privacy-fbi.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/us/data-privacy-fbi.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage)

Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas Scoop Up Personal Data From Scores of Companies

Image[The headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 
Washington.]The headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 
Washington.CreditCreditLeah Millis/Reuters

By [Jennifer 
Valentino-DeVries](https://www.nytimes.com/by/jennifer-valentino-devries)

Sept. 20, 2019Updated 3:47 p.m. ET

The F.B.I. has used secret subpoenas to obtain personal data from far more 
companies than previously disclosed, newly released 
[documents](https://www.documentcloud.org/search/projectid:45842-Termination-Letters)
 show.

The requests, which the F.B.I. says are critical to its counterterrorism 
efforts, have raised privacy concerns for years but have been associated mainly 
with tech companies. Now, records show how far beyond Silicon Valley the 
practice extends — encompassing scores of banks, credit agencies, cellphone 
carriers and even universities.

The demands can scoop up a variety of information, including usernames, 
locations, IP addresses and records of purchases. They don’t require a judge’s 
approval and usually come with a gag order, leaving them shrouded in secrecy. 
Fewer than 20 entities, most of them tech companies, have ever revealed that 
they’ve received the subpoenas, known as national security letters.

The documents, obtained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation through a Freedom 
of Information Act 
[lawsuit](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/05/victory-eff-wins-national-security-letter-transparency-lawsuit)
 and shared with The New York Times, shed light on the scope of the demands — 
more than 120 companies and other entities were included in the filing — and 
raise questions about the effectiveness of a 2015 law that was intended to 
increase transparency around them.

“This is a pretty potent authority for the government,” said Stephen Vladeck, a 
law professor at the University of Texas who specializes in national security. 
“The question is: Do we have a right to know when the government is collecting 
information on us?”

The documents provide information on about 750 of the subpoenas — representing 
a small but telling fraction of the half-million issued since 2001, when the 
Patriot Act expanded their powers.

The credit agencies Equifax, Experian and TransUnion received a large number of 
the letters in the filing. So did financial institutions like Bank of America, 
Western Union and even the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. All declined to 
explain how they handle the letters. An array of other entities received 
smaller numbers of requests — including Kansas State University and the 
University of Alabama at Birmingham, probably because of their role in 
providing internet service.

Other companies included major cellular providers such as AT&T and Verizon, as 
well as tech giants like Google and Facebook, which have 
[acknowledged](https://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-report/us-report/)
 
[receiving](https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public-policy/sharing-national-security-letters-public/)
 [the 
letters](https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/reinforcing-our-commitment-to-transparency/)
 in the past.

Albert Gidari, a lawyer who long represented tech and telecommunications 
companies and is now the privacy director at Stanford’s Center for Internet and 
Society, said Silicon Valley had been associated with the subpoenas because it 
was more willing than other industries to fight the gag orders. “Telecoms and 
financial institutions get little attention,” he said, even though the law 
specifically says they are fair game.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation determined that information on the roughly 
750 letters could be disclosed under a 2015 law, the USA Freedom Act, that 
requires the government to review the secrecy orders “at appropriate intervals.”

The Justice Department’s interpretation of those instructions has left many 
letters secret indefinitely. Department 
[guidelines](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/nsl-ndp-procedures.pdf/view) 
say the gag orders must be evaluated three years after an investigation starts 
and also when an investigation is closed. But [a federal 
judge](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judge-criticizes-secrecy-rules-surrounding-fbi-requests-for-companies-data/2016/08/05/37f80ba6-5b2b-11e6-831d-0324760ca856_story.html)
 
[noted](https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/16-518Opinion_Redacted.pdf)
 “several large loopholes,” suggesting that “a large swath” of gag orders might 
never be reviewed.

According to the new documents, the F.B.I. evaluated 11,874 orders between 
early 2016, when the rules went into effect, and September 2017, when the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital rights group, requested the 
information.

“We are not sure the F.B.I. is taking its obligations under USA Freedom 
seriously,” said Andrew Crocker, a lawyer with the foundation. “There still is 
a huge problem with permanent gag orders.”

Image[Richard Salgado, Google’s director of law enforcement and information 
security. The company has been public about the secret subpoenas it has 
received from the F.B.I.]Richard Salgado, Google’s director of law enforcement 
and information security. The company has been public about the secret 
subpoenas it has received from the F.B.I.CreditTom Williams/CQ Roll Call, via 
Getty Images

The Justice Department declined to comment.

National security letters, which the F.B.I. has issued since the 1980s, have 
long been a point of contention in the debate over privacy and security. 
Initially, the bureau had to show “specific and articulable facts” indicating 
that the target was an agent of a foreign power. Now, the F.B.I. must certify 
that the information is “relevant” to a terrorism, counterintelligence or leak 
investigation.

“NSLs are an indispensable investigative tool,” the Justice Department argued 
in the Freedom of Information Act case. The department has said in [legal 
documents](https://www.eff.org/files/2017/01/10/redacted_opposition_brief.pdf) 
that the information gleaned from the letters is important to identifying 
subjects and their associates, while helping to clear the innocent of suspicion.

According to [a 2007 report](https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0703b/final.pdf) 
from the Justice Department inspector general, the F.B.I. didn’t track how 
often information from the letters was used in criminal proceedings. But the 
report also said the letters had led to guilty pleas for arms trading, at least 
one conviction for material support of terrorism, and multiple charges of fraud 
and money laundering. The tool was [also 
cited](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/politics/crossfire-hurricane-trump-russia-fbi-mueller-investigation.html?module=inline)
 in efforts to investigate Russian meddling in the 2016 election.

Much of the concern about the letters has focused on the gag orders, which 
accompany nearly every request and prevent the recipient — typically 
indefinitely — from disclosing even the existence of the letter. The federal 
government has argued that the secrecy is necessary to avoid alerting targets, 
giving would-be terrorists clues about how the government conducts its 
surveillance or hurting diplomatic relations.

After a series of court rulings found that the gag orders violated First 
Amendment protections, Congress enacted the review requirements.

The documents obtained through the lawsuit include the number of orders 
reviewed, as well as redacted copies of 751 letters from the F.B.I. informing 
companies and organizations their gag orders had been lifted. These so-called 
termination letters do not reveal the contents of the original national 
security letters, but indicate which entities received them.

Because so few gag orders have been reviewed and rescinded, it isn’t possible 
to say whether the companies that received the most termination letters also 
received the most national security letters. But given the overall secrecy 
around the program, the termination letters offer a rare glimpse into these 
subpoenas.

Equifax, Experian and AT&T received the most termination letters: more than 50 
each. TransUnion, T-Mobile and Verizon each received more than 40. Yahoo, 
Google and 
[Microsoft](https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/05/22/new-success-in-protecting-customer-rights-unsealed-today/)
 got more than 20 apiece. Over 60 companies received just one.

The underlying national security letters were not included in the documents, 
and it is unclear when most of them were issued and who the individual targets 
were.

Tech companies have disclosed more information about the letters they received 
than the major phone providers, which included general information about them 
in transparency reports.

“We have fought for the right to be transparent about our receipt” of national 
security letters, Richard Salgado, Google’s director of law enforcement and 
information security, said in a [2016 
statement](https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public-policy/sharing-national-security-letters-public/)
 explaining why the company was releasing [the 
subpoenas](https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/us-national-security).
 “Our goal in doing so is to shed more light on the nature and scope” of the 
requests, he added.

Other companies have generally remained mum. In response to inquiries, a 
TransUnion spokesman would say only that the company “has not disclosed the 
receipt of any national security letters.” A spokesman for Equifax said it was 
“compliant with the national security letters process.”

Mr. Gidari, the former tech lawyer, attributed some of that lack of reporting 
to differences in company culture, noting that tech firms were more predisposed 
to openness, and financial institutions less likely to discuss any outside 
access to customer data. And most small companies, he said, don’t have the 
resources to keep long-term track of or challenge the subpoenas.

“That’s the problem with the Freedom Act: It procedurally pretended to solve 
the problem,” he said. “But the whole structure of this involves presumption in 
favor of the government for perpetual sealing.”

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