On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:59:00AM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > On 10/13/19, jim bell <[email protected]> wrote: > > arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops? 65,536 hops? > > An even larger power-of-2 hops?) > > Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond > a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking > with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails,
That's a point. > than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil GPA - Global Passive Adversary GAA - Global Active Adversary GT-1 - ?? > that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting > in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns > between all sets of two edge hosts. "between two edge hosts (aka src and dst)" is the point why more than say 3 to 9 hops adds little to nought - and if you're onion routing, not only reducing bw by [header_size] per layer, but consuming overall network bandwidth according to hop count (again, to little or no advantage to privacy). > If applied together with other tech, especially > regarding nets where you want any kind of > useable stream > (even delivery of storage or msgs is in a way a stream), indeed > beyond those hops is going to get > really unperformant, and less security return than thought. No increase in security in relation to conceivable attacks. Jurisdictional hops - e.g. through Russia if you're avoiding USGov etc - sound conceptually useful. > You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P, > to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more > secure from G* as result... probably not. Link(s) to Phantom please?
