https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/us/politics/darkmatter-uae-hacks.html

Ex-U.S. Intelligence Officers Admit to Hacking Crimes in Work for Emiratis

They were among a trend of Americans working for foreign governments trying to 
build their cyberoperation abilities.

WASHINGTON — Three former American intelligence officers hired by the United 
Arab Emirates to carry out sophisticated cyberoperations admitted to hacking 
crimes and to violating U.S. export laws that restrict the transfer of military 
technology to foreign governments, according to [court documents made public on 
Tuesday](https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/uae-darkmatter-hackers-charges/ca1b8217e19395b7/full.pdf).

The documents detail a conspiracy by the three men to furnish the Emirates with 
advanced technology and to assist Emirati intelligence operatives in breaches 
aimed at damaging the perceived enemies of the small but powerful Persian Gulf 
nation.

The men helped the Emirates, a close American ally, gain unauthorized access to 
“acquire data from computers, electronic devices and servers around the world, 
including on computers and servers in the United States,” prosecutors said.

The three men worked for DarkMatter, a company that is effectively an arm of 
the Emirati government. They are [part of a 
trend](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/us/politics/government-hackers-nso-darkmatter.html)
 of former American intelligence officers accepting lucrative jobs from foreign 
governments hoping to bolster their abilities to mount cyberoperations.

Legal experts have said the rules governing this new age of digital mercenaries 
are murky, and the charges made public on Tuesday could be something of an 
opening salvo by the government in a battle to deter former American spies from 
becoming guns for hire overseas.

The three men, Marc Baier, Ryan Adams and Daniel Gericke, [admitted violating 
U.S. laws as part of a three-year deferred prosecution 
agreement](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-us-intelligence-community-and-military-personnel-agree-pay-more-168-million).
 If the men comply with the agreement, the Justice Department will drop the 
criminal prosecution. Each man will also pay hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in fines. The men will also never be able to receive a U.S. government security 
clearance.

Mr. Baier worked for the National Security Agency unit that carries out 
advanced offensive cyberoperations. Mr. Adams and Mr. Gericke served in the 
military and in the intelligence community.

DarkMatter had its origins in another company, an American firm called 
CyberPoint that originally won contracts from the Emirates to help protect the 
country from computer attacks.

CyberPoint obtained approval from the American government to work for the 
Emiratis, a necessary step intended to regulate the export of military and 
intelligence services. Many of the company’s employees had worked on highly 
classified projects for the N.S.A. and other American intelligence agencies.

But the Emiratis had larger ambitions and repeatedly pressed CyberPoint 
employees to exceed the boundaries of the company’s American license, according 
to former employees.

CyberPoint rebuffed requests by Emirati intelligence operatives to try to crack 
encryption codes and to hack websites housed on American servers — operations 
that would have run afoul of American law.

So in 2015 the Emiratis founded DarkMatter — forming a company not bound by 
U.S. law — and lured numerous American employees of CyberPoint to join, 
including the three defendants.

DarkMatter employed several other former N.S.A. and C.I.A. officers, according 
to a roster of employees obtained by The New York Times, some making salaries 
of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year.

The investigation into the American employees of DarkMatter has continued for 
years, and it had been unclear whether prosecutors would bring charges. Experts 
cited potential diplomatic concerns about jeopardizing the United States’ 
relationship with the Emirates — a country that has cultivated close ties to 
the past several American administrations — as well as worries about whether 
pursuing the case might expose embarrassing details about the extent of the 
cooperation between DarkMatter and American intelligence agencies.

There is also the reality that American laws have been slow to adapt to the 
technological changes that have provided lucrative work for former spies once 
trained to conduct offensive cyberoperations against America’s adversaries.

Specifically, the rules that govern what American intelligence and military 
personnel can and cannot provide to foreign governments were devised for 
20th-century warfare — for instance, training foreign armies on American 
military tactics or selling defense equipment like guns or missiles.

They have not addressed the hacking skills honed in some of America’s most 
advanced intelligence units and sold to the highest bidder.

This year, the C.I.A. sent a [blunt 
letter](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/politics/intelligence-officers-foreign-governments.html?referringSource=articleShare)
 to former officers warning them against going to work for foreign governments. 
The letter, written by the spy agency’s head of counterintelligence, said it 
was seeing a “detrimental trend” of “foreign governments, either directly or 
indirectly, hiring former intelligence officials to build up their spying 
capabilities.”

“I can’t mince words — former C.I.A. officers who pursue this type of 
employment are engaging in activity that may undermine the agency’s mission to 
the benefit of U.S. competitors and foreign adversaries,” wrote Sheetal T. 
Patel, the C.I.A.’s assistant director for counterintelligence.

Prosecutors said that the Emirates gradually transitioned its contracts from 
CyberPoint to DarkMatter, but that at no time did the three men obtain the 
necessary approvals to provide defense services to DarkMatter. The court 
documents said that the three men and others worked in DarkMatter’s “Cyber 
Intelligence Operations,” which gained access to “information and data from 
thousands of targets around the world.”

In interviews, former DarkMatter employees said that Emirati officials were 
particularly focused on hacking the computer systems of the country’s main 
rival, Qatar, but that operations were also carried out against Emirati 
dissidents and journalists. They even [hacked the 
emails](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/technology/cyber-hackers-usa.html?referringSource=articleShare)
 of a Qatari minister communicating with the former first lady Michelle Obama 
about a planned trip to Qatar.

Mr. Baier and his group purchased computer tools from U.S. companies for use in 
hacking operations, according to prosecutors. In two instances, DarkMatter paid 
about $750,000 and $1.3 million — illustrating how much American companies 
stand to gain from selling those dangerous tools to foreign countries and 
businesses.

Prosecutors said the men “expanded the breadth and increased the 
sophistication” of the operations that DarkMatter was providing to the Emirati 
government. The efforts took aim at “individual, corporate and government 
targets by compromising computers and accounts belonging to associates, 
employees or relatives of the primary targets,” according to court documents.

Prosecutors said CyberPoint warned the Americans that it could not support 
DarkMatter’s intended computer exploitation operations without obtaining the 
proper U.S. authorization.

Two former employees, Lori Stroud and Jonathan Cole, left the company after 
growing troubled about DarkMatter’s hacking and targeting of American citizens. 
When the pair, who are married, raised the issue with their superiors, they 
were sidelined, they said.

They left the company in 2017 and began cooperating extensively with the 
F.B.I.’s investigation.

“This is a huge win,” Mr. Cole said in an interview on Tuesday. “This will send 
a message to former U.S. intelligence operatives working overseas. They should 
not share U.S. tradecraft with foreign governments.”

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