https://tkg.af/english/2022/02/09/afghanistan-one-mln-children-at-risk-of-starvation/

In a 9 February 2022 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Crisis Group’s Senior Afghanistan Consultant Graeme Smith outlined 
two long-term ways the U.S. can mitigate Afghanistan’s humanitarian and 
economic crises in the aftermath of war and subsequent Taliban takeover.

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and distinguished members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for your attention to this important subject and for 
inviting me to testify.

I am a Senior Consultant for the International Crisis Group, which covers more 
than 50 conflict situations around the world, including Afghanistan, with the 
aim of helping to prevent, resolve or mitigate deadly conflict. I have worked 
in the country since 2005.

In previous years, I listened to U.S. congressional hearings from Kandahar or 
Kabul, sometimes with gunfire or explosions in the background. The Internet 
connection was not always good, but I heard enough to understand that the 
United States had ambitious plans for Afghanistan.

Now the guns are silent. America has withdrawn its forces. In the aftermath of 
war, the United States and its allies should focus on more modest plans, such 
as easing restrictions on the Afghan economy and saving the lives of starving 
people. These are not the lofty goals of the past decades. What is required now 
is urgent action to help address basic needs.

Tens of millions of lives are at stake. Afghanistan ranks as world’s largest 
humanitarian crisis, and there is a serious risk of widespread famine. The 
United Nations estimates that 97 per cent of Afghans could fall into poverty 
this year. People are so desperate that they are selling their own daughters, 
anything to survive.

U.S. and European envoys signalled that they understand these life-or-death 
issues at a recent meeting in Norway. They committed to 1) “helping prevent the 
collapse of social services” and 2) “supporting the revival of Afghanistan’s 
economy.” Further steps are now required to achieve those two objectives.

1. Help Prevent the Collapse of Essential Public Services

The United States has donated generously to emergency relief efforts, funding 
humanitarian agencies that are sending bags of food and other assistance into 
Afghanistan. However, such short-term assistance is not enough because this is 
not a natural disaster; it’s a man-made crisis resulting from the end of the 
war economy and the economic isolation imposed by Western governments on the 
new Taliban regime and – in effect – on the Afghan population. The Afghan state 
is collapsing. Half a million government employees lack salaries, and essential 
services such education, sanitation, and agricultural programs are not being 
delivered. Entire systems such as the electrical grid could fall apart. The 
United States, among others, invested billions of dollars to build these state 
services over the last two decades.

a) Support the Public Sector with Existing Funds

The largest support mechanism for civil servants’ salaries before the Taliban 
takeover was the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), a 
pool of aid to which the United States and other donors contributed. The fund 
has about $1.2 billion in unspent money waiting to be disbursed, which could be 
allocated immediately to health, education, and other social services. Health 
funding is uncontroversial because implementing partners are outside the Afghan 
state — but health programs cannot stand alone because otherwise the clinics 
will be overwhelmed by the medical needs of a starving population. Some funding 
should be directed to the public sector in areas such as agricultural support 
and village-level development programs. Support should be targeted at Afghan 
livelihoods — not the state-building efforts of the past, in which donors 
supplied 75 per cent of the Afghan government’s budget. Safeguards could be put 
in place to prevent the Taliban from diverting funds. Notably, nearly all of 
the civil servants on the job today were hired before the Taliban arrived in 
Kabul.

b) Build on Progress in Education

The biggest employer in the country is the education system, but right now 
there is no plan for paying 200,000 teachers and staff through the school year. 
The United Nations has successfully negotiated with the Taliban to allow girls’ 
secondary schools to re-open in some provinces, and building on that momentum 
now depends on making funds available to reward progress. The United States and 
its allies should offer funding for education in provinces where the UN has 
verified that secondary education is open for boys and girls. None of these 
transfers would reach Taliban appointees because the teachers were already 
registered for electronic salary payments. The United Nations Children’s Fund, 
UNICEF, has started using these channels to pay teachers small emergency 
stipends, proving that the mechanisms work.

2. Support Economic Revival

Even more urgent than channeling targeted support to the public sector is 
releasing the chokehold on the private sector. Afghanistan needs a viable 
economy because humanitarian assistance will never be sufficient or 
sustainable. Unfortunately, many parts of the Afghan economy cannot function 
because of Western sanctions, asset freezes, and other economic restrictions.

a) Allow the Central Bank to Function

The United States has worked with the United Nations in recent months toward 
setting up a humanitarian currency swap mechanism, which, if implemented, could 
inject some of the cash liquidity that is urgently required for the functioning 
of the Afghan economy. These swaps involve humanitarian actors giving U.S. 
dollars to approved Afghan businesses in exchange for local currency. However, 
currency swaps are a short-term and limited workaround to make up for the lack 
of a functioning central bank. Swaps cannot supply all of the hard currency 
required — among other things, for imports of food and medicine.

Afghanistan needs an entity to serve the functions of a central bank, holding 
U.S. dollar currency auctions, printing local currency, and regulating the 
banking sector. A variety of options are under discussion, but the most 
straightforward and durable solution would be reviving Da Afghanistan Bank 
(DAB), the central bank. This might require foreign technical assistance, and 
“ring-fencing” DAB to keep it independent from the Taliban-controlled 
government. The United States should exercise leadership at the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund to obtain these institutions’ help with DAB’s 
rehabilitation.

b) Describe a Path Toward Unfreezing Assets

The central bank’s frozen assets remain stuck in political and legal 
complications, mostly in the United States, but the U.S. government should 
immediately signal an intention to someday return these state assets to DAB on 
behalf of the Afghan people. While litigation is pending, the U.S. could ask 
European partners to return the DAB assets located in their jurisdictions. The 
U.S. could also return to their rightful Afghan owners the hundreds of millions 
of dollars among the frozen assets that comprise private deposits in Afghan 
banks. These owners include small businesses and ordinary Afghans who have been 
deprived of their savings. As reserves become available, the United States 
should return them in gradual tranches, monitoring closely for unintended 
effects. The U.S. should also insist on the appointment of qualified officials 
to DAB and undertakings by central bank officials to respect the Afghan laws 
that constrain the uses of reserves.

c) Reduce the Impact of Sanctions

The U.S. Department of the Treasury should be commended for publishing general 
licenses exempting from sanctions enforcement the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
However, many sectors of the Afghan economy remain negatively affected by the 
threat of U.S. sanctions enforcement. It is not feasible for the U.S. Treasury 
to devise lists of all of the various sectors of the Afghan economy that should 
be permitted; instead, U.S. officials must start thinking about what should not 
be allowed. This would mean relieving the Afghan people of the broad effects of 
sanctions that are choking the economy and, instead, targeting sanctions to 
people and activities of concern. (For example, an arms embargo could help to 
address proliferation concerns in the region.) Tailoring sanctions in this way 
would better fit their original purpose, which was not to constrict the entire 
Afghan public sector or the country’s economy. The financial sector may require 
extra assurances: to allow Afghan banks to regain access to the global 
financial system, the U.S. government must actively encourage international 
banks to resume transactions with Afghanistan.

This set of proposals is not only the best way to save lives. This kind of 
pragmatic engagement with the Taliban-controlled government is also the most 
reliable way of protecting U.S. interests. Keeping economic pressure on the 
Taliban will not get rid of their regime, but a collapsing economy could lead 
to more people fleeing the country, sparking another migration crisis. It would 
result in more smuggled drugs and weapons. It might also raise the threat of 
terrorism. America’s reputation would also suffer if the U.S. legacy in the 
country was a famine.

Unfortunately, avoiding catastrophe requires cooperation with the Taliban on 
the issues I have discussed. That is, for many, more than distasteful after two 
decades of war. In power, the Taliban continue to flout human rights standards, 
as illustrated by the recent arrests of female activists. Still, sometimes it 
is necessary to work with bad actors for the sake of a greater good. That is 
not easy. Months of conversations between the Taliban and Western officials 
have not resulted in much cooperation on basic tasks.

The impasse is partly the Taliban’s fault, because they have not yet accepted 
Western donors’ reasonable demands: among other things, allowing universal 
education of girls and women of all ages. But part of the stalemate results 
from the U.S. and its allies pushing for unrealistic goals, such as an 
“inclusive” government with more ethnic minorities and women. American 
officials may be correct that the Taliban should select a more participatory 
form of government for the sake of legitimizing and stabilizing their regime, 
but U.S. diplomats can no longer expect to successfully insist on such things. 
Considering the Taliban’s strength on the ground, the new authorities in Kabul 
feel justified in rejecting what they view as Western meddling.

The way forward is limited cooperation on narrow goals. We can still dream of 
an Afghanistan at peace with itself and the world, a country that recovers from 
a terrible succession of wars and finds a way to sustain its own population. 
America had bigger plans at the beginning, but in the end this is what can, and 
must, be achieved. I look forward to your question

"Tens of millions of lives are at stake. Afghanistan ranks as world’s largest 
humanitarian crisis, and there is a serious risk of widespread famine. The 
United Nations estimates that 97 per cent of Afghans could fall into poverty 
this year. People are so desperate that they are selling their own daughters, 
anything to survive"

My opinion:
American government is responsible for Taliban entering the city.Innocent 
people have been killed for years.They ruined people's lives first, then 
pretended to help.The victim of this story is Assange and Afghan women.

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