It's not just about Kazakhstan.Somebody's got to talk about those names now
Like Evgeny Abolonin ? ------- Original Message ------- zeynepaydogan <zeynepaydo...@protonmail.com> 21 Şubat 2022 Pazartesi saat 01:35 tarihinde yazdı: > “The only way to expose its wrongdoing is to find ways to penetrate the veil > of secrecy that protects it, he said.”….. “One person believed this strongly > enough to take action: The leaker of the data.”… > > What should I do this data. > > ------- Original Message ------- > zeynepaydogan <zeynepaydo...@protonmail.com> 21 Şubat 2022 Pazartesi saat > 01:25 tarihinde yazdı: > >> https://www.occrp.org/en/suisse-secrets/what-is-suisse-secrets-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-swiss-banking-leak >> >> What is Suisse Secrets? >> >> Suisse Secrets is an international investigation into one of the world’s >> wealthiest and most important banks. >> >> More than 163 journalists from 48 media outlets in 39 countries across the >> world spent months analyzing bank account information leaked from Credit >> Suisse, Switzerland’s second-largest lender. The leak included more than >> 18,000 accounts that held in excess of US$100 billion at their peaks. It is >> the only known leak of a major Swiss bank’s client data to journalists. >> >> Switzerland is a well-known destination for money from all over the world, >> in part because of its banking secrecy laws. There is nothing inherently >> wrong with having a Swiss bank account. But banks are supposed to avoid >> clients who earned money illegally or were involved in crimes — and >> reporters identified dozens of corrupt government officials, criminals, and >> alleged human rights abusers among Credit Suisse account holders. >> >> Despite their notoriety — which, in some cases, would have been obvious from >> a quick Google search — Credit Suisse maintained relationships with some of >> these clients for years, though it is possible that some accounts were >> ordered frozen by law enforcement. >> >> The Suisse Secrets project investigates these account holders, whose >> exploitation of Swiss banking secrecy is a prime example of how the >> international financial industry enables theft and corruption. Given Credit >> Suisse’s numerous pledges to reform its due diligence practices over the >> years, the project highlights the need for increased accountability in this >> sector. >> >> . Where did the data come from? What’s known about it? >> >> The Suisse Secrets data was provided to the German newspaper Süddeutsche >> Zeitung by an anonymous source more than a year ago. Nothing is known about >> the source’s identity. >> >> The source, however, did provide a statement explaining his or her >> motivations. It reads, in part: >> >>> “I believe that Swiss banking secrecy laws are immoral. The pretext of >>> protecting financial privacy is merely a fig leaf covering the shameful >>> role of Swiss banks as collaborators of tax evaders. … This situation >>> enables corruption and starves developing countries of much-needed tax >>> revenue.” >>> >>> “I want to emphasize the fact that the responsibility for this state of >>> affairs does not lie with Swiss banks but rather with the Swiss legal >>> system. Banks are simply being good capitalists by maximizing profits >>> within the legal framework they operate in. Simply put, Swiss legislators >>> are responsible for enabling financial crimes and — by virtue of their >>> direct democracy — the Swiss people have the power to do something about >>> it.” >>> >>> “I am aware that having an offshore Swiss bank account does not necessarily >>> imply tax evasion or any other financial crime. I am sure that some of the >>> accounts … have a legitimate reason for existing or that they have been >>> declared to tax authorities in compliance with the relevant legislation. >>> However, it is likely that a significant number of these accounts were >>> opened with the sole purpose of hiding their holder’s wealth.” >> >> The full statement has been published by Süddeutsche Zeitung >> in[English](http://www.sz.de/suissesecrets-whistleblower-statement)and[German](http://www.sz.de/suissesecrets_whistleblower_stellungnahme). >> >> 3. What’s in the leaked data? >> >> The leaked data includes information about more than 18,000 Credit Suisse >> accounts and 30,000 account holders. (Some clients hold multiple accounts, >> while many accounts are controlled by multiple clients.) >> >> The information about each account includes the account number, the name of >> the holder or holders, the opening and closing dates, and the maximum amount >> ever present in the account. There is no indication of whether they are >> checking, savings, or investment accounts. >> >> Credit Suisse has multiple subsidiaries, and has also acquired several banks >> over the years. There’s no indication in the data whether some of these >> accounts were opened at one of those other banks before being moved to >> Credit Suisse, or whether they belong to a subsidiary. All accounts are >> referred to in this investigation as “Credit Suisse” accounts. >> >> Some of the account holders are people, while others are legal entities such >> as companies. They are domiciled in more than 120 jurisdictions and >> represent over 160 nationalities. >> >> The total amount of money held in the accounts at their maximum was more >> than US$100 billion. The average account held about 7.5 million Swiss francs >> at its largest point, but there were some outliers: Over a dozen accounts >> held more than 1 billion Swiss francs. These figures do not give any >> indication of the total amount of money moved through the accounts over the >> years, which is unknown but is likely to be much higher. >> >> The data in the leak does not extend through the present day, though many of >> the accounts remained open well into the 2010s. The years with the most >> account openings were 2007 and 2008. The year of peak account closings was >> 2014, coinciding with the[introduction of new regulations in >> Switzerland](https://www.estv.admin.ch/estv/en/home/international-fiscal-law/automatic-exchange-information-aeoi.html)to >> automatically exchange tax information on clients with foreign residency. >> The average account was open for about 11 years. >> >> 4. Why are clients from some countries not represented in the data? >> >> Though the leaked Credit Suisse data includes information about customers >> from more than 120 jurisdictions, some of the world’s biggest countries — >> including the United States, Russia, China, and Brazil — are not heavily >> represented. >> >> While the reasons for this are not entirely clear, journalists observed that >> many clients that did appear in the data live in countries that did not sign >> on to use the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) — a global anti-tax evasion >> initiative that requires countries to automatically exchange basic banking >> information with tax authorities — or only agreed to signed on in the last >> few years. >> >> Countries that featured heavily in the data, such as Egypt, Ukraine, and >> Venezuela, have not yet committed to exchange banking information under the >> CRS. >> >> One outlier is the United States, which also has not signed on to the CRS >> and yet was not heavily represented in the leak. However, the United States >> has agreed to numerous bilateral tax treaties, including one with >> Switzerland, which gives tax authorities mutual access to banking >> information of customers suspected of tax evasion and other financial crimes. >> >> 5. How was the veracity of the data checked? What do we know and not know? >> >> Journalists spent months interviewing knowledgeable insiders and checking >> the data against other sources, including company records, official >> gazettes, court files, and criminal investigations. >> >> In dozens of cases, the account numbers in the data matched those found in >> external documents. The dates of birth of over 150 account-holders in the >> leak also matched those found in public records. >> >> Reporters found additional corroboration of several Suisse Secrets bank >> accounts in two other leaks of banking data that had been obtained years >> earlier. >> >> Accounts belonging to the sons of a high-level Azerbaijani official and one >> of their business partners appeared in data from >> the[Troika](https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/)and[Azerbaijani](https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/)Laundromats, >> two large money-laundering systems previously uncovered by OCCRP. >> Transaction records show that shell companies associated with the >> laundromats sent millions of dollars to the Credit Suisse accounts over a >> period of several years. ([Learn more about the Talibov family’s Swiss bank >> accounts](https://www.occrp.org/en/suisse-secrets/sons-of-azerbaijani-strongman-vasif-talibov-received-millions-from-money-laundering-systems).) >> >> Reporters also reached out to the clients whose information was leaked. In >> several cases, they confirmed the existence of the accounts listed in the >> data. >> >> Citing client privacy, Credit Suisse neither confirmed nor denied the >> veracity of the leaked data. >> >> One significant limitation of the data is that journalists were unable to >> determine whether the accounts they examined had been frozen at any point. >> When contacted by reporters, some clients said that their accounts had been >> frozen, but no clear pattern emerged in the data from these cases that could >> be applied to others. >> >> 6. How did journalists select whose information to publish? What about >> privacy concerns? >> >> It is not a crime to open a Swiss bank account, and all journalists working >> on this project operated from that position. In responsible journalism, >> there is no justification for publishing private banking data without a >> compelling public interest. >> >> That’s why the Suisse Secrets project used the leaked data — which will >> never be released in raw form — only as a starting point. >> >> Journalists spent months confirming the veracity of the leak and >> investigating Credit Suisse’s clients. We pursued stories only when there >> was reason to suspect that clients were exploiting the Swiss banking system >> to nefarious ends. Conservative editorial judgment was used, and hundreds of >> accounts that raised questions were not ultimately reported on. >> >> Those cases that merited publication involved clients known to have been >> high-risk: politically connected people or those accused or convicted of >> serious crimes. OCCRP’s[interactive feature also follows this >> framework](https://cdn.occrp.org/projects/suisse-secrets-interactive/en/), >> showing dozens of Credit Suisse accounts belonging to prominent figures, >> alongside the scandals, criminal investigations, or high-profile political >> events they were involved in. >> >> One example is[Rodoljub >> Radulović](https://www.occrp.org/en/suisse-secrets/credit-suisse-opened-accounts-for-serbian-drug-lord-known-as-misha-banana), >> a high-ranking member of one of Eastern Europe’s largest cocaine-smuggling >> cartels, led by the notorious Serbian drug lord Darko Sarić. Radulović was >> able to open a Credit Suisse account despite a long history of involvement >> in financial scandals in the United States. He then used it to launder over >> 3 million euros’ worth of drug money, Serbian prosecutors say. >> >> Another is[Eduard >> Seidel](https://www.occrp.org/en/suisse-secrets/bribing-businessman-had-secret-credit-suisse-accounts), >> a former top executive in Nigeria for German telecommunications giant >> Siemens, whose accounts contained tens of millions of Swiss francs. Two of >> them remained open for almost a decade after allegations of his involvement >> in a major bribery scandal in Nigeria first broke. >> >> Then there’s[Muller Conrad ‘Billy’ >> Rautenbach](https://www.occrp.org/en/suisse-secrets/credit-suisse-banked-and-financed-zimbabwean-fraudster-in-deal-that-saved-mugabe), >> a mining magnate who has openly boasted of his willingness to bribe his way >> to the top, and was sanctioned by the U.S. and EU. He opened high-value >> accounts at Credit Suisse even after the U.N. warned he was allegedly >> overseeing corrupt mining deals in the Democratic Republic of Congo. >> >> The larger story that unites these cases is that of a major financial >> institution that allowed clients to stash away laundered or stolen assets. >> Nearly all of the stories rely on publicly available information, meaning >> that Credit Suisse’s due diligence department would have had access to it as >> well. >> >> “Everyone should have some access to the banking system,” said Graham >> Barrow, a financial crime specialist. “What you should not be able to do is >> use the banking system to introduce corruptly acquired wealth and legitimize >> it.” >> >> In the end, the goal of investigative journalism is to identify and expose >> systemic failures. Over the last 20 years, Credit Suisse has been embroiled >> in more than a dozen major scandals involving corruption, tax evasion, money >> laundering, or other crimes on the part of its clients. The bank has paid >> multiple fines and reached multiple settlements with authorities, >> periodically promising to strengthen its compliance practices. But the >> scandals have continued. >> >> 7. What is a bank’s responsibility regarding its clients? >> >> Journalists spoke to multiple financial experts, regulators, and banking >> insiders about what precautions Credit Suisse should have taken to prevent >> suspicious clients from being taken on. >> >> Ross Delton, a U.S.-based anti-money-laundering expert and lawyer, said that >> high-risk and politically influential people aren’t prohibited from opening >> bank accounts, but must be subject to enhanced scrutiny. The origin of their >> wealth needs to be examined, and a senior manager must approve their >> onboarding, he said. >> >> As for people convicted of corruption, “that’s a different level entirely,” >> he said. “There, the question should be whether to take the client on at >> all.” The same is the case for people who are convicted of drug dealing >> charges, appear on sanctions lists, or have outstanding Interpol notices. >> >> “Although banks don’t like to say no, they are supposed to say no,” Delton >> said. “The probability of opening the bank to money laundering [in such >> cases] is so high that the account should not be open to begin with.” >> >> Other specialists explained why institutions like Credit Suisse might be >> inclined to disregard these norms. >> >> “Banks may make the calculation that they’ll earn more money from having >> that business than it will cost them in reputation,” said Graham Barrow, a >> financial crime specialist. >> >> Another question pertinent to a bank of Credit Suisse’s size is what degree >> of responsibility it should assume when taking on clients through mergers. >> For example, in March 2013, the bank took on $13 billion in assets belonging >> to high-net-worth customers of Morgan Staneley’s Private Wealth Management >> division. >> >> Monika Roth, a Swiss lawyer and jurist specializing in financial market >> legislation and white collar crime, said that there’s no official deadline >> in terms of when the bank must conduct checks on new clients coming from a >> merger. But the bank is still responsible for the risk of bringing them on, >> she said. >> >> “The more exotic the place, the more susceptible to corruption, the more >> vulnerable the country of origin or residence of the client, the higher the >> assets brought in, the faster you have to have done it,” she said. >> >> “Usually before the merger is approved, there should be extensive due >> diligence, including on money laundering risks,” said Maira Martini of >> Transparency International. “It is not justifiable to say that they were not >> aware [of money laundering risks] because the clients came from the other >> bank.” >> >> 8. What do experts say needs to change? >> >> Many financial experts consulted on Credit Suisse and the questionable >> clients identified by reporters suggested that the problem went beyond the >> bank’s own due diligence failures, pointing to weak regulations throughout >> the Swiss banking industry. >> >> Hervé Falciani, a French-Italian systems engineer credited with exposing >> more than 130,000 suspected tax evaders who were primarily clients at HSBC’s >> Swiss banking division, was blunt: “The system is the problem.” >> >> The only way to expose its wrongdoing is to find ways to penetrate the veil >> of secrecy that protects it, he said. >> >> “Do you see one week without a scandal, a tax scandal, or a money laundering >> scandal where Switzerland is not mentioned?” asked Sebastian Geux, a Swiss >> historian who has studied his country’s banking sector for nearly four >> decades. >> >> The basic problem, specialists said, is insufficient regulatory enforcement. >> >> James Henry, an economist and adviser to the Tax Justice Network, explained >> that the “basic penalty of choice” for banks operating in Switzerland is >> paying a fine. But “this is just a rounding error” that they pass off to >> their customers, or something they treat as “a cost of doing business.” >> >> When Credit Suisse was fined 2.6 billion by the U.S. Department of Justice >> over what it described as “a conspiracy to aid U.S. tax evaders” in 2014, >> the fine itself was tax deductible, Henry pointed out. Nobody went to jail, >> and nobody lost any licenses. “Some CEOs have to go to jail,” he said. “They >> have to do actual jail time for this to hit home.” >> >> Swiss law also makes journalistic reporting on financial crime difficult. >> >> Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law puts journalists in the country at risk >> of being prosecuted for merely possessing, much less publishing, private >> banking data. For that reason, Tamedia, a Swiss newspaper that was >> approached as a partner, chose not to participate in the Suisse Secrets >> investigation. >> >> “This law is a massive restriction of press freedom in Switzerland,” said >> Arthur Rutishause, the newspaper’s chief editor. “It only serves to censor >> and intimidate the media. The law can protect criminals and their assets. >> Journalists who try to expose them risk criminal proceedings.” >> >> 9. What is Credit Suisse’s point of view? How has the bank responded? >> >> In response to a detailed list of questions sent by Suisse Secrets >> journalists, Credit Suisse provided the following statement: >> >>> “Credit Suisse strongly rejects the allegations and inferences about the >>> bank’s purported business practices. The matters presented are >>> predominantly historical, in some cases dating back as far as the 1970s, >>> and the accounts of these matters are based on partial, selective >>> information taken out of context, resulting in tendentious interpretations >>> of the bank’s business conduct. While Credit Suisse cannot comment on >>> potential client relationships, we can confirm that actions have been taken >>> in line with applicable policies and regulatory requirements at the >>> relevant times, and that related issues have already been addressed.” >>> >>> “As a leading global financial institution, Credit Suisse is deeply aware >>> of its responsibility to clients, and the financial system as a whole to >>> ensure that the highest standards of conduct are upheld. These media >>> allegations appear to be a concerted effort to discredit the bank and the >>> Swiss financial marketplace, which has undergone significant changes over >>> the last several years. In line with financial reforms across the sector >>> and in Switzerland, Credit Suisse has taken a series of significant >>> additional measures over the last decade, including considerable further >>> investments in combating financial crime. Across the bank, Credit Suisse >>> continues to strengthen its compliance and control framework, and as we >>> have made clear, our strategy puts risk management at the very core of our >>> business.” >> >> Credit Suisse also provided additional responses on several topics. >> Following what the bank described as a “preliminary review” of “a large >> volume of accounts” about which reporters asked questions, the bank noted >> that “more than 90 percent” are now “closed or in the process of closure.” >> >> “Of the remaining active accounts,” a Credit Suisse representative wrote, >> “we are comfortable that appropriate due diligence, reviews, and other >> control related steps were taken, including pending account closures.” >> >> The representative wrote that Credit Suisse has a “strict zero tolerance >> policy towards tax evasion,” “only wishes to deal with clients who are tax >> compliant,” and “has implemented numerous client tax compliance programs >> spanning multiple jurisdictions.” >> >> Turning to prevention of money laundering, the representative wrote that >> Credit Suisse has “stringent control mechanisms in place” and “conducts name >> screening in line with industry standards … both at onboarding as well as in >> relation to existing accounts.” >> >> “Where we identify any relationships which could have been used for [money >> laundering] or other illicit activity, we take prompt and decisive action,” >> the representative wrote. >> >> Credit Suisse also listed a number of risk management initiatives that “have >> already been completed or are underway” as part of a “full-scale risk review >> across the entire bank” that took place in 2021. These include: >> >> - “Fundamental risk review, examining how risks are being assessed, managed >> and controlled across the Group.” >> - “Clear definition of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities across >> all divisions, as Credit Suisse continues to implement remediation efforts >> that were initiated earlier in the year.” >> - “Development of tools and processes to improve business accountability and >> ownership as the first line of defense for risk and controls.” >> - “Revision of compensation process and structure, incorporating >> risk-sensitive performance and non-financial objectives into the enhanced >> performance scorecards.” >> - “Fostering a culture that reinforces the importance of personal >> accountability and responsibility.” >> >> Citing Swiss banking secrecy legislation, the bank did not provide any >> answers about specific clients identified by reporters as problematic. >> >> “We will continue to analyze the matters and take additional steps if >> necessary,” the Credit Suisse representative added. >> >> 10. What is OCCRP’s response to Credit Suisse’s criticisms? >> >> Ultimately, Western banks like Credit Suisse handle most of the world’s >> criminal and corrupt money. Therefore, they bear the most responsibility for >> identifying and restricting it. Credit Suisse acknowledges that it is >> required to follow strict procedures that help the bank understand who its >> customers are and verify that their sources of income are legitimate. When >> the bank fails to perform this due diligence, crime and corruption becomes >> easier, more lucrative, and more successful — and we will report it. >> >> We do so because financial secrecy is more than an academic abstraction: >> Opaque money means opaque power. When corrupt money can flow unhindered into >> the financial system, we get more crime, more extremism, and more >> undercutting of democratic norms. Dark money is now viewed by many countries >> as a significant national security issue. >> >> The Swiss system, which values secrecy over accountability, is especially >> prone to misuse. Swiss banks have a long history of taking on bad clients, >> from the Nazis to some of the modern world’s worst autocratic dictators. >> They have pledged multiple times — and have indeed acted — to eliminate many >> bad people from their list of clients. Those actions are commendable. But >> they are held accountable only by a regulatory system that is restricted by >> secrecy laws and a government that prioritizes secrecy. The data leak on >> which the Suisse Secrets project is based represents a rare opportunity for >> journalists to independently hold this system accountable. >> >> We believe the dozens of examples we have cited raise serious questions >> about Credit Suisse’s effectiveness and commitment to meeting its >> responsibilities. Without providing any corroborating information, Credit >> Suisse has claimed it has resolved “90 percent” of the cases we brought up. >> Even if we accept that, there are still a number of seriously corrupt or >> criminal characters who have Swiss accounts — and those are just the cases >> reporters asked about. There could be many more. >> >> Credit Suisse has also said that the cases we are writing about are >> “historical.” But that is irrelevant. Our data shows the bank continued to >> keep clients for many years who were publicly known to be under indictment, >> accused of serious crimes, or have family members in positions of power in >> autocratic regimes. In some cases, account holders who appear in the data >> have confirmed to us that their accounts are still open. >> >> Even many Credit Suisse employees reached by reporters said that there are >> special rules within the bank for the wealthiest clients regardless of their >> criminality, and that it has failed to do enough to weed out illicit funds. >> >> One person believed this strongly enough to take action: The leaker of the >> data.
