It's important to be clear about what characteristics of a national ID card are objectionable. Among those may be a requirement that it be shown on demand, that it be tied to databases that track movements, etc. What is disturbing about a national ID card is not the fact that it's standardized, for instance, but an array of features that could crop up elsewhere.
It is possible to imagine a scenario where a database-linked, biometric-tied system using driver's licenses is worse -- that is, more privacy-invasive -- than some forms of a "national ID card." I posted more on a SiliconValley.com roundtable recently: http://forums.siliconvalley.com/discussion/msgshow.cfm/msgboard=5968009897410465&msg=8036926450156813&page=1&idDispSub=5145094516046185 -Declan On Wed, Nov 21, 2001 at 06:33:22PM -0000, Anonymous wrote: > >From: "Peter G. Neumann" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Subject: Risks of belief in identities > > > >For those of you who might believe that national ID cards might be a good > >idea, check out the December 2001 *Commun.ACM* Inside Risks column by me > >and Lauren Weinstein, previewed on my Web site > > http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/insiderisks.html > > The criticisms in this essay have nothing to do with national ID cards > per se. The points have nothing to do with the cards being national, > with them proving ID, or with them being in the form of a card for > that matter. What the essay really argues against is any attempt to > prove that someone has been checked for a certain property by showing > a document. Documents can be forged, biometrics are imperfect, and the > employees who issue the documents can be bribed. > > By this argument, we should have no driver's licenses, credit cards, > or paper cash for that matter. Everything stuffed into your wallet > is useless. Any one of those items could be forged or could have been > given to you improperly. But we find them to be useful anyway. > > In actuality, no one in politics is seriously pushing for a national > ID card. However they are talking about having an air travel card > which would allow holders to go through an expedited security check. > Neumann's arguments apply just as strongly against such a card (which > need not have ID printed on it at all), further proving that he is not > in fact opposing a national ID card but any kind of carried credential.
