At 06:56 PM 12/17/01 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: >On Mon, 17 Dec 2001, Trei, Peter wrote: > >> Yes, I have read the letter - they need to treat input from known remailers >> differently due to worries over spam and flooding attacks, so they treat >> other known remailers as priviliged sources of high volume traffic.
Can't spam be repelled by not forwarding email not encrypted to the remailer's key? >> This does not invalidate my point - that such special treatment could lead >> a remop into legal problems. We have two different problems, with mutually >> undesirable solutions. > >If the sending node doesn't know about the destination node, how does it >konw where to send the traffic (even if the sender provides the address)? >The reality is that the remailers must 'know' of each other one way or >another. Simply being part of a 'remailer network' (anonymous or not) >tends to already put one in a 'conspiratorial' situation. Isn't it sufficient for a remailer node to publicly broadcast its existance (and the protocols it handles)? This seems to work and there is no cooperation required --just a one-way broadcast. Mere advertising is not evidence of a conspiracy.
