Faustine: > Aimee wrote: > > > > To wit, no two people can safely tell the same lie to the same person. > > Bah. I say it depends entirely on what the lie is, who's being > lied to, and how > confident and artistic the confidence artists are.
You're probably right. > Choate: > > Actually they can, only one (or both, if we allow 3 or more agents, only > > one is required to 'know' the lie) of the people must believe it is the > > truth. > > If they were good enough (and their targets comfortable enough), all three > could be lying their asses off about anything and nobody would ever be the > wiser. Likewise, with three or more targets playing it the other > direction. > > > >Well, I doan' kno' nuttin' 'bout no agents. That fact has been > established. > > Careful parsing is the spice of life... :P So sayeth the academic-researcher-grad student pretext... :P > >But, you know, after pondering on that a bit...What if "the lie" was > >supposedly "really secret stuff?" > >You know, "ME LUCKY CHARMS!" > >I know the little boys and girls are after me lucky charms. > >If "3 or more agents" happen to run in the door with me lucky charms, > > Sounds about right. Yep, they would be lucky and charming. > >that might smell really fishy to some people since leprechauns > are hard to > >catch. > > Somewhere over the rainbow. > >Furthermore, if you ask them about these lucky charms in isolation, they > >better know the lucky charms like the back of their hand, or further > >investigation is likely to review not-so-lucky inconsistencies. The > >"knowing" part can be rendered irrelevant by context, indeed it is > >sometimes imperative that everybody KNOW so as to > provide...uhm.....secondary > >alternative consistency. > > But what about when the unlucky charmers find they're actually the victims > of a deceivers-deceiving-the-deceivers-deceiving-the-deceivers > kind of thing. Recursive is just writing backwards. > What shows that the snowers know they've slowly been snowed? Bet > it keeps a lot > of people awake at night, that one. Tricky, but fascinating. If > anyone knows of > any good links to counter-deception detection, drop me a line. > Not sure how "on > topic" it is, but something everyone here would do well to read > about. Either > that, or just default to not trusting anyone, ever. Works for me. Empathy skills in personal matters. On a grand scale: 1. counterdeception teams - multidisciplinary, "non-cultured," outsiders -- creatives, narratives, hoaxers, jokesters, emplotters, etc. 2. devil's advocacy in the event stream 3. competitive analysis 4. MUST HAVE: highest-level precision black channels -- requiring nothing short of a resurrection. Close surveillance. Sneaky submarines are not good enough. 5. Cultural change -- a bit of British eccentricity; decision-maker sensitization 6. Monitoring of foreign open source media and organizational theme variations (quantitative content and textual analysis; inferential scanning) 7. Monitoring of internal organizational dissenters, noncomformists and the intuitives (instead of quashing them, solicit them) Sounds down your alley of interests, interested in your thoughts. Due to the changing nature of the world, the U.S. could easily find itself hoodwinked, isolated, paralyzed and worse. It used to be "Uproar in the East, strike in the West." Today, it's "Fool the Sky." (transparent or false-flag cover plan) Our goal-states, perceptions, decision-points, etc. are there for all to see. Most deceptions play upon expectations. Our surveillance capabilities and superior military seem to point to a BARBAROSSA scenario -- a grand deception. Concealed within our strength is our weakness. > >And, "lucky charm lies" can take many forms, including physical, > which might > >be subject to verification, additional investigation and other > stuff I don't > >want to happen to me lucky charms, because I might want the > enemy to believe > >they are TRULY "lucky," "charmed," and "mine." > >I'm sure "it depends," but perhaps that wisdom came from just such a > >situation. > > Oh really? *blink blink* like what? "The Allies are landing at Normandy!" ..."It's just a trick." "What does German intelligence say?" ...Just what the British told them. The comment was from a review of FORTITUDE (deception plan) by one of the British designers. We could learn a lot from them --- save hundreds of thousands of lives by using these concepts defensively, domestically, and in new contexts. With each day that passes, we loose more of the window, and waste our resources on low-return countermeasures which do nothing but present 'barriers of certainty' to our adversaries, albeit a thin veil of comfort to our population. (I frequently point out that the Germans practically held hands along railways, and we still blew them all to heck in WW II.) In some places, we are taking actions that play into deception designs. Maybe we should change that, along with a few "street signs." Our adversaries know deception is a great strategic advantage, and they don't want the American public to accept it. Churchill didn't have a problem. The answer to some long-standing misperceptions could be as simple as involving the American people. Today's adversaries strike at the rear. Hell, that's "us." Deception planning has a history in civilian defense, terrorists collect intelligence and have decision-makers, so they offer a deception target. As part of Homeland Defense, we need Homeland Deception. "OPERATION TRICK TERRORISTS?" Instead of deception coming from the top, bring it up from the bottom in a security context. (Some people are working on it, but we could be doing more.) I just know there is guy taking ticket stubs somewhere on a nontraditional delivery vehicle. I bet he has an idea, or once exposed to certain concepts -- could come up with one -- because he knows his operative context better than anybody else. At the present time, much attention is being devoted to the development of "gadgetry." ~Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, (USMC) Ret. _On Guerrilla Warfare_ (1961). ~Aimee
