What is peculiar about the rejoinders to Lucky's sensible proposal is the dismissal of it with elaborate affirmations of mathematical surety, as if there has not been voluminous warnings to never rely on mathematical surety when weaknesses are far more likely to be found in the faulty implementation of cryptosystems.
It's as if comfort is to be found in a return to early faith in chanting unbreakable crypto mathematics to avoid the truth that math at any strength is not the solution to comsec, rather it is what you promote (and blow sunshine) when you don't have a solution to implementation weaknesses except to advance the virtues sophisticated security monitoring systems. This waving the flag of mathematical security, coupled with the need for long-term security monitoring, sure smells like national security religion, and lucrative it is so long as nobody can prove its shinola. Strong crypto systems of super-duper key length are likely crumbling regularly behind this scrim of mathematical pin-headedness.
