On Thu, 4 Jul 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

>A moment ago you were arguing maximum utility (your public good
>argument).

I was still arguing precisely the same point. If the personal decision
calculus of the individuals leads them to freeride, it will also lead them
to prefer access to old stuff instead of future access to fresh material,
when asked individually. But if people are faced with the choice you
presented in a setting in which it is clear that either all will pay or
all will get free access, not something in between, and consensus is
reached, then maximum utility is apparently attained thru copyright
abolition, and I have nothing more to say. So, you might be right, as I
conceded. The real point was, so could I -- the question about copyright
isn't usually posed in this fashion, hence making it difficult to tell the
utility maximizing alternative from the other. (The canonical references
here would be Buchanan and Wicksell.)

>If that convention ceases to be convenient and useful, ceases to have
>utility, we should not continue it.

Indeed.

>And if you are going to argue from long established conventional rights,
>copyright has been extended by twenty years every twenty years, so it is
>not a long established conventional right.

Quite. My gut feeling is that the efficient term for copyrights would be
considerably shorter (say, 1-2 years) than the one guaranteed by the Berne
convention, and that this fact largely mitigates the loss in welfare
likely accompanied by the inefficiency we would get if we repealed
copyright law altogether. This makes the moral argument in favor of free
speech, against IP, far more persuasive. This is more or less the line of
reasoning I use when actually advocating something wrt IP.

>As more and more stuff piles up, the production of new stuff becomes a
>less and less valuable public good.

Unless we assume that information is highly perishable, which I believe
most of it in fact is. Yesterday's news is...well...just that. So is any
entertainment which has an element of fashion in it, which nowadays covers
practically all youth culture. And so on. In the case of perishables there
exists a more or less constant efficient level of production and
investment in it.

>At the same time, as with any "public good", congress (being in the
>pocket of state created interest groups) creates greater and greater
>incentives to produce more and more of this public good.

True. It seems likely to me too that we're currently overinvesting in IP,
though less than you propose.

>If an anarchic free market underproduces public goods, government
>subject to interest groups overproduces public goods, a problem that is
>particularly serious with such dubious public goods as "defense",
>cultural or racial purity, and so on and so forth.

Agreed. As I already said, the really interesting part isn't the public
goods analysis, but practical ways of alleviating the transaction costs.
In particular, it's far from given that public (non-rival and so on) goods
should be produced publicly (i.e. jointly, governmentally) produced.
Limited term copyrights and patents are one way to try and deal with the
issue via the market, by establishing a property right. We now know this
precise approach, though useful, isn't quite as stable as we could hope,
so the logical question becomes, what next? Limiting the term, if
possible, would probably be a good starting point. Repealing those parts
of copyright law which have to do with derivative works would be another.
Extending fair use would be a third. And after we know that the market can
do without such property rights, abolition logically follows.

Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111
student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front
openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2

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