Sorry to be a blabbermouth folks, but this one is interesting. Delete
anything I've written in the last two days if ya' want.
Here's something I've been thinking about for various reasons. I'm assuming
this doesn't exist yet, but it's such an interesting idea I'm tempted to
brush the dust off my C programming books...
Here's what I 'want':
Let's say I've been coerced into revealing the private key to a certain
encrypted message. And now, of course, the authorities use that key and open
the message, and see the contents (let's assume they are picture of a
demonstration or whatever).
WOULDN'T IT BE NICE...If the original encrypted message actually had TWO
messages inside it, both very similar. In this example, one of the messages
is the "incriminating" pictures of the demonstration, the other is pictures
of Pam Anderson or whatever.
AND, this double message has two private keys associated with it: one
corresponds to the Pam Anderson photos, the other corresponds to the
Demonstration photos. When coerced, I give up the key that opens the Pam
Anderson photos (while hopefully annhilating the Incriminating photos).
Of course, there's no way the authorities know that there was another
message (not if done very cleverly...Pam Anderson photos might be a little
obvious) that they destroyed when they used the fake Private Key.
Does this exist? Would it be difficult?
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- Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) Tyler Durden
- Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) Keith Ray
- Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) Tyler Durden
- RE:Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) jayh
- Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera) Tyler Durden
- Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (eJazeera... Neil Johnson
- Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (... Morlock Elloi
- Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private K... Eugen Leitl
- Re: Video Mules: (Was: Re: Psuedo-Private Key (... Bill Stewart
