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----- Original Message ----- From: "Worker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, March 17, 2003 1:05 AM Subject: (en) From the NEFAC electronic newswire An anti-state communist perspective on the war - by Angyal Istvan
> ________________________________________________ > A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E > http://www.ainfos.ca/ > http://ainfos.ca/index24.html > ________________________________________________ > > > Is Uncle Sam about to get caught - BETWEEN IRAQ AND A HARD PLACE? > > an anti-state communist perspective on the war > As I write this, in early March 2003, the rulers of the United > States are about to attack Iraq. If the prevalent guesses are > correct, the American empire will rapidly defeat and destroy > Saddam Hussein's regime, seize Iraqi oil fields, and occupy > major urban centers. This will probably be accomplished with > an initially low number of US military casualties, and a very > high number of deaths among Iraqi civilians and military > personnel. The United States will attempt to cobble together > a client regime analogous to that of Karzai's in Afghanistan, > and it will be at this point, the high-point of an apparently > overwhelming and inexpensive US military victory, that a > real, enduring defeat for the United States may begin. > > Thirty years after the US defeat in Indochina, America's > main imperialist rival of the day, the Soviet Union, is no > more; American companies have completely recolonized > Vietnam; the United States is now unchallenged as the > world's dominant economic, military, and cultural power. > With the possible exception of Israel, no other government on > Earth is as promiscuous in the use of large-scale violence in > the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. On the surface, it > appears that the US. has gotten over its post-Vietnam > hangover, that nothing keeps the rulers of the US from > lashing out wherever they choose, and that we are seeing an > example of this against former US asset Saddam Hussein. > The conquest of Iraq is intended to be the first episode in a > new period of unlimited aggressive global warfare by the > United States. But the American empire is much more > vulnerable, and American society itself more fragile, than > either its friends or enemies think. A bloody, incoherent > 'victory' over Saddam Hussein may have the same > devastating impact on the interests of the US ruling class as > an outright military defeat. > > One motivation behind the Bush Administration's launching > of a major war is to get Bush re-elected in 2004 -- but that's > just the small tip of a very big iceberg. Bush wants to ape his > father's high popularity ratings after the episode of mass > murder committed by the US and its allies in Iraq in January > 1991. Bush needs to get the American public's mind off the > deepening economic crisis, the disappearance of several > million jobs and an ever-increasing atmosphere of domestic > US hardship. The people who own Bush will try to boost the > US out of a major economic downturn with the massive > increase in military spending that a big war and subsequent > occupation will entail. > > Bush also needs to divert attention from his failure to locate > or kill Osama Bin Laden, to dismantle al Qaeda, capture or > destroy its top leadership, or even account for the > whereabouts of Mullah Omar. Afghanistan also propels Bush > into a new war, because the Afghan campaign otherwise had > the surface appearance of a quick cheap victory, with the > Taliban collapsing more rapidly than American projections > had forecast. > > Bush's response to the rapid taking of Kabul by the Northern > Alliance is recounted this way in Bush At War, by Bob > Woodward: > > "(Bush) did not conceal his astonishment at the shift of > events. 'It's a stunner, isn't it?' Everyone agreed. It was > almost too good to be true." > > Bush and company seek a mechanical replay in Iraq; a > military victory occurring close enough to the November > 2004 elections to propel him into a second presidential term. > > Iraq has never attacked the United States. No credible links > have been established between Saddam Hussein and any > significant anti-US. action. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, > America's second-most significant ally in the region, is the > birthplace of al Qaeda, the organization behind the most > devastating military blow inflicted on the United States since > Pearl Harbor. > > Fifteen out of nineteen of the September 11th hijackers were > Saudis. Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan > have been financed with funds from backers in Saudi Arabia. > Even the wife of the Saudi Ambassador to Washington was > found to have contributed money through a charitable > organization to men associated with the Sept. 11th > hijackers. > > A classified intelligence briefing to the Pentagon's defense > advisory board from the Rand Corporation, a national > security think-tank, leaked to the US news media, had this to > say about America's Saudi allies: > > "The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from > planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from > ideologist to cheerleader." > > The report went on to describe the kingdom as 'the kernel of > evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent,' that > the US faces in the Middle East. > > Faced with a pattern of major anti-US military action backed > from elements in the Saudi elite, the perpetually bellicose > US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld denied that the intelligence > assessment quoted above reflected US government policy. > Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer said that George Bush > was 'pleased with the kingdom's contributions' to the war > against al Qaeda. During a visit to Mexico in November 2002, > Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed his desire to avoid > a crisis in relations with 'a country that has been a good > friend.' > > Elements of the Saudi elite have backed and continue to > back significant actions against the United States. In > response the world's only superpower can't even offer > something as benign and symbolic as a public formal > diplomatic complaint. > > The US has to keep the Saudi elite happy; for the time being, > they have no choice in the matter. A UK Guardian article > notes: > > "Despite attempts to diversify US sources of oil, US > dependence on Persian Gulf oil is projected to increase, not > decrease, over the next 20 years. All major oil production > increases in that period are also projected to take place in > and around the (Persian) Gulf; Saudi Arabia is the only > producer with enough spare capacity to keep the world > market stable and prevent price 'spikes' in times of crisis. > Without Saudi Arabia, it is no exaggeration to say that the > US economic motor could quickly conk out." > > ("Sleeping With the Enemy." Simon Tisdale, Guardian, Nov. > 28, 2002) > > Saudi Arabia supplies 17% of daily US oil needs. Saudi > Arabia controls 25% of the world's known oil reserves. In > literal terms, Saudi Arabia has the world's only superpower > over a barrel. US oil dependency is a central part of the Bush > Administration's need to placate to the House of Saud, and a > real measure of American weakness in the Middle East. > Saudi Arabia is also the world's largest purchaser of US > weapons systems, and the source of roughly $600 billion in > investments in the US economy. > > In the near future, elements in the US elite aspire to be in a > position to place major pressure on the Saudis, or even > topple the House of Saud and replace them with more pliant > allies. The US cannot do this now, but the conquest of Iraq is > a stepping stone in this process, a move toward a permanent > US military occupation of Western Asia, and a bid for direct > US control of the world's major oil supplies. 'The road to the > entire Middle East goes through Baghdad,' said a Bush > Administration official in the Washington Post on August 8 > of last year. > > The journal Aspects of India's Economy notes: > > "The journal Aspects of India's Economy notes: 'Direct > control over West Asian oil resources -- the world's richest > and most cheaply accessible -- would allow the US to > manipulate oil supplies and prices according to its strategic > interests, and thereby consolidate American global > supremacy against any future challenger." (1) > > The future of the United States as the world's leading > economic and military power hinges on the US dollar > continuing to be the currency used in international oil > market transactions: > > "Over the past year...the euro has started to challenge the > dollars' position as the international means of payment for > oil. The dollars' dominance of world trade, particularly the oil > market, is all that permits the US Treasury to sustain the > nation's massive deficit, as it can print inflation-free money > for global circulation. If the global demand for dollars falls, > the value of the currency will fall with it, and speculators will > shift their assets into euros or yen or even yuan, with the > result that the US economy will begin to totter..." > > ("Out of the Wreckage." George Monbiot, Guardian, Feb. 25, > '03) > > The US economy is already tottering; the US is stuck in a > recession, a crisis of overproduction where corporate profits > and business investments have suffered their steepest > declines since the 1930s; 'this is no normal business cycle, > but the bursting of the biggest bubble in America's history.' > (Economist, Sept. 28, 2002) And now major oil suppliers like > Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Chavez regime in Venezuela have > expressed interest in switching to the new European currency > for their oil transactions. If they do this, others will follow, > with significant negative effects on the dollar and on an > already weakened US economy. The US must try at all costs > to stop this from happening. This in part accounts for the > frantic drive to conquer Iraq by the Bush Administration. > > The United States imports roughly half its oil supply; this > percentage is projected to increase in coming years. But > Japan, Germany and France each import almost 100% of > their oil. China is also projected to become more reliant on > imported oil in coming years. American domination of the > world's oil supplies is key to keeping all these rivals in a > weakened position. If the US controls Iraq, the US will > control the world's second-largest oil reserves. The US will > use this to dominate the global oil market. > > The conquest of Iraq is intended to maintain the position of > the dollar in the international oil trade, provide a stepping > stone for future US aggression against Iran and Saudi Arabia, > keep major rivals (Europe, Japan and China) in a weakened > position, and guarantee the US long-term access to oil as its > domestic production declines and its consumption needs > increase. This is central to understanding the humanitarian > noises against US aggression made by major European Union > nations. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld responded to this > opposition by dismissing France and Germany as being > insignificant on the world scene when compared to Poland > and the Czech Republic. This doesn't discredit the Bush > Administration in the eyes of the American public, since > most American citizens don't own passports, can't say what > century the American Civil War took place in, think Mexico > is in South America, and have trouble locating Canada on a > map of the world. Rumsfeld's comments make him sound > like an All-American provincial dolt, but they underscore the > fact that the war is about the United States keeping the > European Union and America's Asian economic rivals at bay. > > The war with Iraq is the high point of a series of recent > unilateral actions by the United States, most notably the > refusal of the Bush Administration to cooperate with the > Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, but also its refusal to sign > the treaty banning anti-personnel mines, its unilateral > withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic missile treaty, and its > stated intention of developing a new generation of nuclear > weapons, including nukes for battlefield use against > non-nuclear foes. Other examples abound. These actions, and > an increasing penchant for resolving economic questions by > military means are examples of the growing vulnerability of > the United States as a world power. What they could once > achieve by diplomacy or trade must now be acquired by > force. > > Significantly, the rulers of the US have also made it clear > that they will not cooperate with the recently-established > International Criminal Court, which is supposed to try future > defendants accused of genocide and war crimes. > > Another facet of the US's weakness as a world power is it's > relationship with Israel. Israel is something like a Northern > European social democracy with apartheid and nukes, but > that still makes it a virtual 51st state when compared to > Syria, or Egypt, or Iraq. Israel is the fulcrum of US strategic > requirements in its part of the world. And because of this, > Israel is also the love-object of a 50-year-long, out-of-control > unrequited crush on the part of the US political elite. Among > the US political class, some are pro-Israel, some are > fanatically pro-Israel, and some are wildly, fanatically > pro-Israel. This unanimity of thought extends from the > right-wing establishment leftward to irrelevant feeble > liberals of the Nation magazine stripe. The United States is > at the beck and call of the Israeli ruling class, and will > endlessly cater to Israelâ�,��"�s military and economic > needs. This includes allowing Israel to spy on the US and > attack the US militarily during time of war. All factions of > the US political elite have made it clear that the US will also > back any action the Zionist state takes against the original > inhabitants of the territory it occupies, no matter how much > this damages long-term US imperial interests in > predominantly Arab and Muslim regions of the world. > > For example, the constant expansion of Jewish settlements > into territory supposedly conceded to a Palestinian authority > is an American tax-dollar subsidized large-scale public > housing program for Israel. This housing program is taking > place during a major domestic housing crisis in the United > States, where subsidized housing projects have suffered > massive funding cuts or been closed down. The US buys > social peace for Israeli society with this; poorer, dark-skinned > Jews, who are near the bottom of the class hierarchy in > Israeli society, are fronted off into the settlements, where > they bear the brunt of anti-settler Palestinian guerrilla > violence. This in turn drives these settlers to form part of the > most recalcitrant and reactionary element of Israeli society. > The constant expansion of the settlements over Arab lands > would be impossible without the decades-long infusion of an > average of three million US tax dollars per day into the > ever-floundering Israeli economy. > > The US is effectively a pawn of its client state in Jerusalem. > This is a comically absurd situation; try to imagine the late > 19th century British Empire being perpetually on its knees > before the King of Nepal. In return for US sponsorship, Israel > has carte blanche do whatever it wants to its Palestinian > subjects and to anyone living within striking distance of the > Israeli Air Force. > > In the Middle East, America must do what Israel needs > before America can do what America needs. The current > rulers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt give the US the > cover it needs to be the tool of its favorite client, and the US > must keep all of them happy. Powerless to act against the > Saudis for the time being, the US now uses Iraq as a punching > bag to convince the rest of the world, especially Saudi Arabia, > that the US isn't a declining world power. Bush and Company > cannot yet jeopardize their relationship with the House of > Saud, but they would like to scare them back into line while > plotting their next big move. They will do this with an > extremely bloody US armaments industry trade show next > door in Iraq, a sequel to Bush's father's unsuccessful > reelection campaign of '91. > > A weak power can attempt to hide its weakness by fighting > and defeating a much weaker enemy. Iraq is ideal for this. > Iraq was flattened by the 1991 war, and by the subsequent > twelve years of widespread starvation, disease and economic > ruin imposed by US-backed UN sanctions. In theory Iraq > should provide Bush with a massacre that can get him > re-elected a year and a half later, when the memory of easy > victory will still be fresh in voters minds. > > As the world's only superpower, the United States cannot > publicly threaten military action, and then back down if the > pretext for action disappears. Once the threat is offered, it > absolutely must be followed by force; the principle is > identical to what's found with a schoolyard bully or a > jailhouse sexual predator. Anything short of a rapid conquest > of Iraq will be universally perceived as a defeat for the > United States. > > The goal in the first Bush war against Saddam Hussein was > limited to expelling the Iraqi Army from an extremely small > territory, and consequently liberating the flow of $60 billion > in Kuwaiti investments in the US banking system. Now the > US must destroy the government of a large territory with an > unruly and ethnically divided populace, occupy its main > urban centers, and assume sole responsibility for keeping the > country together until a puppet regime is securely in place. > This will include spending many billions of dollars to rebuild > at least some of the infrastructure that the US has spent the > last twelve years assiduously destroying. The Congressional > Budget Office estimates the cost of a military occupation of > Iraq at anywhere from $17 billion to $45 billion a year; that's > an up to $45 billion annual gift to US oil companies from US > taxpayers. The war itself may run anywhere from $44 billion > to $80 billion. (2) > > Bush and company hope for a repeat of their quick war in > Afghanistan, but the sequel won't be as satisfying as the first > version was. Reuters ran an article on Feb. 11th announcing > that the Bush plan for a post-Saddam Iraq involves a > projected US occupation of Iraq lasting two years. That's > twenty-four months' worth of American service personnel > trickling home in plastic bags during a major economic > downturn. > > It might prove to be a very, very long twenty-four months. In > a document titled, 'Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: US > Policy to Reshape a Post-Saddam Iraq,' Anthony H. > Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International > Studies, a Pentagon-connected Washington DC think tank, > offers a gloomy assessment of the prospects for successfully > remaking Iraq in the image of shopping-mall-land, instead of > a post-breakup Yugoslavia with camels: > > "We may or may not be perceived as liberators...We may well > face a much more hostile population than in Afghanistan. We > badly need to consider the Lebanon model: Hero to enemy in > less than a year. We also need to consider the Bosnia/Kosovo > model where internal divisions leave no options other than > stay and police or leave and watch civil conflict emerge... > > "We cannot hope to get an Iraqi, regional, or world mandate > to act as occupiers...if we act this way, we are certain to > encounter massive problems... > > "We must realize that one day after our forces enter any area, > the world will hold us to blame for every bit of Iraqi suffering > that follows, as well as for much of Saddam's legacy of > economic mistakes and neglect...we cannot pass our > problems on to a non-existent international community...We > have to stay as long as it takes, or at least until we can hand > a mission over to the Iraqis..." > > Another work by Cordesman at CSIS gives more background > for his prognosis. 'Iraq's Military Capabilities in 2002: A > Dynamic Net Assessment,' estimates that even after losing > 40% of its forces in the 1991 war, as of July 2002 the Iraqi > military still had at least 424,000 men in arms. Some > estimates including reserve forces push the potential number > of Iraqi combatants as high as 700,000. The United States is > openly committed to decapitating the regime commanding > this vast army. Even if the United States kills as many as > 200,000 Iraqi troops, that still leaves at least a quarter of a > million, and possibly as many as half a million individuals, all > with military training, and some with combat experience; > desperate, impoverished, and with little to lose in a shattered > society after Saddamâ�,��"�s government has collapsed. > > The United States will be able to wipe out Saddam's Air > Force, his tanks and other armored vehicles, his anti-aircraft > sites and major artillery weapons. But cruise missiles and > B-52 sorties will still leave several million assault rifles with > billions of rounds of ammunition, and comparable quantities > of heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, > mortars, light artillery and ordnance to spare. There is no > way that US forces will be able to locate, confiscate or > destroy all those weapons. It adds up to a huge potential > armory for the former conscripts of what was one of the > largest armies on earth, the soldiers of a state that will no > longer exist. They might not fight hard for Saddam, but that > doesn't mean that some of them won't want to kill > Americans. The Iraqis will be hungry. They will be angry, > they will be armed to the teeth, and they will have all the > good reason in the world to ambush the soldiers of an > occupying army from a empire that has butchered one out of > every twenty-three Iraqis, more than a million people, and > most of them infants and small children, since Bush's dads' > war in 1991. > > Even if US forces take Baghdad without sustaining major > casualties, the best scenario they can then hope for will be > near total social collapse and large-scale banditry, a > Kalashnikov and RPG-7 equipped crime wave bigger and > badder than the one that hit Central America after the US > victory there at the end of the 1980s. Millions of people will > need to be fed and housed. The rulers of the US aren't doing > such a great job of that with the poor and unemployed in > America; will they be any better at it in a predominantly > Arabic-speaking country on the other side of the globe? > Maybe the US can buy off some of Saddam's former soldiers > by refraining from killing them, offering to feed them, and > then slapping them into shape as the constabulary of a > puppet regime. The resulting Mad-Max style police force will > make the thuggish cops of the Palestinian Authority look like > a comparative model of Quaker rectitude. Americaâ�,��"�s > allies in Ankara won't sit on their hands when things explode > on their southern border, so the pacification of Kurdistan will > be fobbed off on the obsequious Brits. The Special Air > Service will be happy to eat shrapnel in a former UK colonial > possession for a former governor of Texas. They will later > return to the Sceptered Isle minus their limbs and lower > jaws, forever proud of their sacrifice in the sublime cause of > defending the UK's status as a combination Kentucky Fried > Chicken franchise and US air base off the coast of France. > > The British can take on the sustained anti-bandit and > anti-guerrilla fighting. Or Bush can try to unload it on the > awe-inspiring Czech infantry, the vanguard of a burgher class > that's always eager to lick the shoes of the dominant power of > the day. The Americans won't want to do it, and that's where > the big problem for Uncle Sam begins. > > In October 1983 in Beirut, one suicide driver in a truck > carrying 300 kilos of explosives killed 241 US Marines and > chased Ronald Reagan out of Lebanon. To get American > minds off this embarrassment, Reagan immediately invaded > Grenada, a tiny island ruled by a regime that was too busy > self-destructing to offer resistance to American forces. > Reagan's successor George Bush invaded Panama, a very > small country, with the very small goal of grabbing the very > small former US asset General Noriega. The mission was a > success, ending quickly with the massacre of a few thousand > slum-dwellers and with Noriega safely tucked away in a > Federal Prison. Bush also quickly accomplished a similar, > very limited goal in expelling Saddam from another very > small country. He did this in record time with extraordinarily > favorable circumstances on his side; Bush waged war against > a regional power already weakened by a ten-year long war, > and Bush's war was supported by numerous other > governments providing military wherewithal and most of the > financial backing for the attack. When Bush later invaded > Somalia, US forces were unable to impose their version of > order, they couldn't locate and grab a local warlord as part of > their plan for imposing order, and they ended up being > humiliated in combat with the hostile locals. In the face of > urban warfare similar to what the US may find when it > occupies Iraq, the US ran away. Clinton oversaw this rout, as > well as the later US intervention and rapid retreat from > Kosovo. Vietnam is the shadow looming over all these > engagements. > > The lesson of Vietnam, the enduring impact of the Vietnam > defeat on US foreign policy, is that the United States can no > longer afford to fight a protracted ground war -- anywhere in > the world. The political expense for American politicians is > too high, and, more importantly, the impact on American > society is potentially too destructive. The preferred > post-Vietnam US method of warfare is to bankroll proxies > like the Nicaraguan Contras, or Savimbi in Angola, or > Saddam against Iran, or guys like Bin Laden against the > Russians in Afghanistan. If the US military has to become > more intimately involved, then vast quantities of high > explosives are dumped on civilians from the safe distance of > an aircraft carrier group. But the world's only superpower > can't fight all its wars with the airborne equivalent of a > drive-by shooting, or by always paying others to do their > fighting for them. Somewhere and soon, the United States > will have to engage in a major protracted war on the ground, > with US forces taking on the brunt of the fighting. There is no > technological escape from this dilemma. > > We need to go back in time to see what the future might > offer to an American occupation force in Iraq. > > On July 14, 1958, the monarchy of Iraq was deposed in the > 'Free Officers' coup, led by Abdul Karim Qasim. The royal > family were executed. Crowds took to the streets. A number > of US businessmen staying at the Baghdad Hotel were killed. > People took food from shops without paying, thinking that > money would now be obsolete. Although Islamic influence > remained strong, there were outbreaks of anti-clericalism, > including public burnings of the Koran. > > Peasants in the south of the country looted landlords' > property, burned down their homes and destroyed debt > accounts and registers of land ownership. Fearing the spread > of rebellion throughout the rest of the Middle East, the US > sent 14,000 marines to Lebanon. Plans for a join US/UK > invasion of Iraq went nowhere, because no reliable > collaborators among the Iraqis could be found. > > In another uprising in the town of Kirkuk in Iraqi Kurdistan > the following year, 90 generals, landlords and capitalists were > taken to a road, had ropes tied around their necks, and were > dragged around behind cars until they were dead. From an > early point in the capitalist modernization process, the > working people of Iraq demonstrated a consistent propensity > for mass violence against their oppressors. > > The Ba'ath Party toppled Qasim and seized power for the > first time in 1963. The Ba'athists suppressed demonstrations > by running over protesters with tanks and by burying people > alive. The Ba'athists also assassinated roughly 300 labor > activists and members of the Moscow-Stalinist Iraqi > Communist Party with the help of a hit-list provided by the > CIA. This marked the beginning of the blood marriage > between the United States government and the Ba'ath Party > of Iraq. > > After being overthrown, the Ba'athist seized power again in > 1968. As in the case of Iran, oil wealth provided a basis for > rapid industrialization of a predominantly rural nation. Land > reform propelled the development of a fully capitalist > economy. Iraqi society became more urbanized and secular, > with increasing levels of literacy, access to medical care, and > a higher percentage of people attending college than in most > other Middle Eastern countries. The status of women > improved markedly, especially when compared to places like > Saudi Arabia. A more modern society meant more modern > social conflicts. Strikes and rebellions by wage workers and > impoverished peasants often tended to become explosive, > and Saddam's response was always brutal. In Iraq a secular, > rapidly modernizing police state with a national socialist > ideology found itself up against intractable class conflicts > like those generated by the modernization program of the > monarchy in Iran next door. > > The fate of the Shah's regime must have given the butcher > Saddam reason to pause. In spite of its grim end in the > establishment of the Islamic republic, the 1979 Iranian > revolution was one of the most significant revolutionary > upheavals of the 20th century. In Iran, the world's > second-largest oil exporter, a government with a large > modern military and a sophisticated police and intelligence > apparatus was overthrown by a mass rebellion. The rebellion > involved street demonstrations with millions of marchers, > and culminated in a long-term general strike and an armed > insurrection. The revolt against the Shah also saw a > widespread organization of wage workers' struggles in the > form of 'shoras', which translates as 'committee' or 'council'; > the word means something akin to soviet. The councils > movement was particularly powerful among oil industry > workers: > > "We do not mean to contribute to a myth of 'Iranian workers > councils'...autonomous proletarian interests...remained > subordinated to the limited and even reactionary elements of > the Iranian revolt. Nevertheless they bear witness to an > important phenomenon. In Iran, a highly religious Islamic > country, the working class played a key role in a popular > movement of rebellion with a six-month general strike, > organized in the absence of trade unions and powerful left > parties, with a continuously high level of mass action and > mass organization. This was made possible, as in > revolutionary movements in more capitalistically developed > countries, by the formation of workers' committees and > councils, confirming again that this is a 'natural' > organizational form for workers' struggles. > > "...It is an experience which will gain new meaning when the > struggle resumes on a new, more truly revolutionary basis." > > (Babak Varamini, "The Shah is Dead: Long Live the Caliph," > Root and Branch #8, 1980. Root and Branch was a council > communist magazine produced in the Boston, Massachusetts > area.) > > With the excuse provided by a border dispute, and fear of an > Islamic revolution spreading throughout the Persian Gulf, > Saddam, now the undisputed ruler of Iraq, launched a war > with Iran in September 1980. The first Gulf War lasted ten > years, killing more than a million people. It was the longest > major war of the 20th century. > > The Iran-Iraq war also saw the biggest, longest and most > violent anti-war movement anywhere in the world since the > Russian Revolution and the wave of insurrections that ended > World War One; violent strikes, mass fraternization between > soldiers of the contending armies, mass desertion, > widespread killings of officers and regime functionaries, and > armed mutinies. The unrest occurred in both countries, but it > appears to have been more widespread in Iraq. By 1983, Iraqi > commanders were attacking Iraqi troops suspected of > fraternizing with or failing to fight Iranian troops with > artillery barrages, air strikes and ground-to-ground missile > attacks. Kurdish nationalist peshmergas (guerrillas) served > as military police for Saddam, seizing deserters and turning > them over to Saddam loyalists for execution. Saddam's > generals launched numerous air strikes against > battalion-sized concentrations of armed deserters in the > marshland region near the Iranian border. Armed deserters > retaliated by ambushing loyal troops and blowing up > ammunition depots. Saddam's poison gas attack against the > town of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1988 appears to have > been motivated by the presence of large numbers of Iraqi > Army deserters in the town. The deaths of thousands in > Halabja was followed by the looting of the dead and injured > by Kurdish nationalist peshmergas. > > The US backed Saddam in the war against Iran. One month > after the Halabja massacre US forces attacked an Iranian > frigate in the Persian Gulf. The Reagan Administration > provided 'crop-spraying' helicopters for use in chemical > warfare attacks, and approved sales by Dow Chemical of > components for chemical weapons. The US attacked two > Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf, killing around 200 people, > and even shot down an Iranian passenger jet, killing almost > 300 civilians. In an article in the New York Times (August > 18, 2002) former US Defense Intelligence Agency officers > discussed US preparation of detailed battle planning for > Saddam's forces: > > "The Pentagon 'wasn't so horrified by Iraq's use of gas," said > one veteran of the program. 'It was just another way of killing > people -- whether with a bullet or phosgene, it didn't make > any difference.' " (3) > > Uncle Sam was up to his eyeballs in Saddam's chemical and > biological warfare program: > > "A US Senate inquiry in 1995 accidentally revealed that > during the Iran-Iraq war the US had sent Iraq samples of all > the strains of germs used by the latter to make biological > weapons. The strains were sent by the Centers for Disease > Control and Prevention (sic!) and the American Type Culture > Collection to the same sites in Iraq that UN inspectors later > determined were part of Iraq's biological weapons program." > > (Times of India, Oct. 2, 2002) (4) > > After the war with Iran, in the summer of 1990, before > Saddam moved to annex Kuwait, he'd consulted with the US > Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, and Glaspie gave Saddam > the apparent go-ahead. But the potential damage to Kuwaiti > investments in US banks meant that America's ally against > Iran was suddenly transformed into what President Bush > frantically described at the time as 'another Hitler.' > Concerns about Saddam's spotty human rights record became > audible from US journalists and elected officials at this > point. > > The second Gulf war in January 1991, with the US and its > allies driving Saddam out of Kuwait, resulted in 131 deaths > among the US and allied forces. Roughly 250,000 Iraqi were > killed, and the civilian infrastructure of the country was > completely devastated by the allies bombing and cruise > missile campaigns. > > As the first phase of the older Bush's massacre of the Iraqis > ended an uprising began in Basra, in the south, near Kuwait, > with rebels using a tank to shell a huge Stalinesque portrait > of Saddam. Soon the revolt became general throughout Iraq. > All the tendencies toward large-scale armed revolt that had > broken out during the war with Iran came into full force > nationwide in the days after the defeat. > > In Hawlir in Iraqi Kurdistan the revolt began when a woman > who was enraged at the murder of her son by a cop disarmed > the cop, killed him with his own weapon, then headed to a > police station to kill more cops, followed by a snowballing > crowd of angry people. In Sulliemania, a center of the > movement, students took to the streets. Some were killed by > the secret police, and a bloody fight commenced, ending on > March 9th with insurgents overrunning the secret police > headquarters and killing 800 of Saddam's security forces. > Fifty shoras formed all over the city. Throughout Iraqi > Kurdistan, police stations, government buildings, > Baâ�,��"�ath Party headquarters, and army bases were > overrun, wrecked and burned. More than in the south, in > Kurdistan a perspective for a far-going revolutionary > transformation of society was clearly present, as can be seen > by the egalitarian slogans of the rebels; 'Make the shoras > your base for long term struggle!' 'Class consciousness is the > arm of liberation!' 'Victory to the popular workers uprising!' > 'Down with capitalism, long live socialism!' (5) > > With the general arming of the working populace, the rapid > violent destruction of the regime's functionaries and the > symbols of its power, and the replacement of the state by the > shoras, the revolt in Kurdistan appears to have been a real > proletarian revolution, the beginning of a profound > overturning of the old order. With time, the revolt might > even have spread to Iran. But by March, after the service > provided to Saddam by the US and UK air forces in the > massacre of deserters on the Basra road, the uprising in the > south was put down by Saddam's Republican Guard units. > They then turned their attention to Kurdistan. As the revolt > in the north became isolated, Kurdish nationalists gained the > upper hand against the shoras movement. Better armed and > better organized than the rebellious working people, the > peshmergas succeeded in encouraging large numbers of > people to flee across the border to Turkey. The revolution > collapsed, and Saddam remained in power. > > As it was with the truce between Versailles and the Prussians > at the time of the Paris Commune, and the blockade of the > Republican-held zone during the Spanish Civil War, the > revolution in Iraq had compelled a unanimity of interests to > rapidly assert itself among all the otherwise contending > government forces. The US, the UK, the Kurdish nationalists > and Saddam had, in effect, acted together to crush the > uprising and save Saddam's regime. > > The United States and the UK performed a spectacular > counter-insurgency service for their apparent foe Saddam, > with American and British fighter pilots immolating roughly > three infantry divisions of Iraqi army deserters fleeing > Kuwait on the road to Basra. US pilots gleefully referred to > this war crime of massacring forces no longer opposing them > as a 'duck shoot'. This carpet bombing of Iraqi Army > deserters wiped out men who could have provided the extra > muscle to overwhelm Saddam's Republican Guards and finish > off his regime. > > >From the perspective of the worlds' major democracies, > 'another Hitler' is always better than another working class > revolution, especially one taking off in one of the world's > major oil producing regions, where an insurgent power could > do real, enduring damage to the global capitalist system. > > Now, twelve years later, the rulers of the United States and > their gurkhas in Whitehall are assuming that their 1991 war, > the UN-backed starvation blockade, and the resulting 1.2 to > 1.5 million deaths will have beaten all resistance out of the > vast majority of the populace in Iraq. The United States, the > UK, and their former allies in the Ba'ath Party have > perpetrated a phenomenal amount of death and suffering > against wage earners and poor peasants in Iraq; this is only a > subset of the violence committed by the United States and > its allies all over the world, including in the US itself, and of > the ever-more murderous essence of commodity relations in > their dictatorship over life on earth today. But a violent > social order repeatedly gives rise to a violent proletarian > response, and nowhere has this been more true than in Iraq. > Our rulers may be galloping into an abattoir; the mayhem > American democracy has inflicted on millions of people may > now be about to spill all over Uncle Sam's lap. > > Maybe the US will take Baghdad without a fight. Or maybe > the new war will only take six months, and five thousand US > dead. After the initial conquest, the entire population of Iraq, > including possibly one million refugees and several hundred > thousand unemployed former soldiers, may place all the > blame for their suffering on Saddam. Maybe the Iraqis will > forget about all those dead babies. Theyâ�,��"�ll forget > about the military and intelligence aid the US gave Saddam, > and the two conventional wars the United States waged > against the populace Saddam brutalized. They'll forget about > the systematic destruction of water pumping and sewage > treatment facilities and the resulting epidemics of dysentery, > typhoid and cholera; the destruction of the Amiriya air-raid > shelter in Western Baghdad, filled with children and their > mothers; they'll forgive the blockade against food and > medical supplies and the hundred-thousand-plus cancer > deaths produced by the spent radioactive munitions the US > used against Iraqis in Bush's father's war. Maybe the > survivors of a twelve year long campaign of mass murder > committed by the United States will be nice and play the > game George's way. Maybe they just won't feel up to shooting, > killing and maiming American soldiers. > > Or maybe they will. To compound the tragedy, the Americans > who will be killed and wounded will mostly be the conscripts > of the poverty draft, instead of Norman Schwarzkopf, > Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton, and the adult males of the > Bush family. > > In the late 1970s, when President Jimmy Carter began > funneling weapons and money to men like Osama Bin Laden > in Afghanistan, his National Security Advisor Zbigniew > Brzezinski gloated that the Carter Administration would > soon deliver the Russians into their own version of the > Vietnam war in Afghanistan. Maybe the US is in turn about > to get its own Afghan war in Iraq; a long slow bleeding wound > that can have a catastrophic impact on the world power > waging it. > > Iraqis who kill Americans after the fall of Saddam won't have > to defeat the American military, or even fight for a politically > coherent objective. All they have to do is create a steady > stream of dead Americans. They only have to inflict enough > damage on the occupiers to make it clear to the world that > the US hasnâ�,��"�t prevailed in Iraq. This can be > conceptualized as a form of obscene primitive math; X equals > the number of American soldiers getting killed and wounded > every month in Iraq, times Y as the number of months that > Americans occupy Iraq, factoring out to Z: the point at which > an inconclusive long-running war can trigger civil unrest in > the United States. > > Nothing brings the internal weaknesses of a society to the > surface like an unsuccessful war. A long-term bloody > occupation of Iraq could bring this home with a vengeance to > the ever-more repressive, impoverished, incarcerated, > overworked, underpaid, United States domestic front. The > home front has never been more potentially volatile. Under > the right circumstances even the quiescent US wage earning > class may reach its breaking point, and violently shear away > from the patriotic consensus. If a big war goes badly for the > US, it could mark the beginning of the end for bigger things > than the government of Saddam Hussein. (6) > > Maybe all of what I've written here is a mistake, an exercise > in wishful thinking. Maybe the US is going to have a quick > cheap victory in Iraq. Maybe the US will only suffer four or > five hundred military personnel killed in combat and > accidents. Maybe the US media apparatus will do an > adequate job of sweeping anything else under the rug, the way > they have with one hundred thousand-plus US veterans > affected by Gulf War Syndrome, the post-combat domestic > victims of Bush's father's war. Maybe the enormous expense > of the war will be covered by a looting of Iraq's 112 billion > barrels of proven oil reserves during the period of US > 'trusteeship.' Maybe the war will be a stepping stone to > successful moves against the Mullahs in Iran and the Saudis. > Maybe the only people who will pay will be Iraqis. > > But it's much more likely that major problems will begin for > the American empire soon after the downfall of Saddam, > during the post-war occupation, when the US finds itself > alone in the mess it has created, within a larger context of > spreading global chaos that is also a US creation. A bloody > two-year long 'low-intensity' conflict is likely -- like what the > Israelis get with the Palestinians, but on a much larger scale, > the humiliation experienced by US Army Rangers in > Mogadishu magnified many times over. A large-scale popular > uprising isn't impossible, either. At that point, the rulers of > the US will be forced to chose between running away again, > like they did in Lebanon, and Somalia, and Kosovo -- or > condemning US troops to be bled white in a conflict they > can't win. > > And that's not even beginning to imagine what can go wrong > for the owners of America if they get the US into a second or > third major ground war in another part of the world while still > attempting to impose their version of order in Iraq. > > Angyal Istvan > > (1) 'The Torment of Iraq.' Aspects of India's Economy, Nos. > 33 & 34, December 2002. Available on-line, at: > http://www.rupe-india.org/34/torment/html > > (2) 'Military Solution to an Economic Crisis.' Aspects of > India's Economy, op. cit. > > (3) 'The Iran-Iraq War: Serving American Interests.' Aspects > of India's Economy, op. cit. > > (4) Aspects of India's Economy, op. cit. > > (5) The Kurdish Uprising and Kurdistan's Nationalist Shop > Front and its Negotiations With the Baathist/Fascist > Regime. Available on-line, at: > http://www.geocities.com/cordobakaf/blob_kurds.html > > (6) Mass insubordination by enlisted people can play a > central role in the defeat of a protracted war or occupation. > For an example of how this developed during the US war in > Vietnam, see, 'Harass the Brass: Some Notes Toward the > Subversion of the US Armed Forces,' at: > http://infoshop.org/myep/love3.html > > (4) Aspects of India's Economy, op. cit. > > (5) The Kurdish Uprising and Kurdistan's Nationalist Shop > Front and its Negotiations With the Baathist/Fascist > Regime. Available on-line, at: > http://www.geocities.com/cordobakaf/blob_kurds.html > > > ******* > ******** > ****** The A-Infos News Service ****** > News about and of interest to anarchists > ****** > COMMANDS: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > REPLIES: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > HELP: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > WWW: http://www.ainfos.ca/ > INFO: http://www.ainfos.ca/org > > -To receive a-infos in one language only mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] the message: > unsubscribe a-infos > subscribe a-infos-X > where X = en, ca, de, fr, etc. (i.e. the language code) >
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