Ian Grigg wrote: >(Similar to GSM's. That is hard to attack, >there is AFAIR no 'trival' attack, [...]
Just wait a little while. By the way, one can already buy fake base stations that mount man-in-the-middle attacks on GSM as a way to eavesdrop on GSM calls. It's off the shelf, but it costs ridiculous amounts of money. >Now, it seems that the US standards didn't get >even that. Right. The major barrier is the need for a digital scanner (which indeed is a major barrier against certain threat models, but not a barrier for other threat models). >And, market forces >and all that, one would think that this would >happen in due course. I'm less optimistic. Market forces being what they are, one would expect that one would quickly get cellphones that are *claimed* and *perceived* to be more secure, regardless of their true merits or demerits. Oh wait, that already happened.