Hi, I didn't read the entire paper; I noted enough logic jumps and such that I risked writing a large volume in response. To say I humbly disagree and expected more from the (traditionally) great minds at rand is an understatement.
On Sun, Mar 20, 2011 at 07:52:40PM -0700, greg hoglund wrote: > [...] Granted, like any war, > it must be backed by intel and psyops. [...] You're kinda sorta hitting the nail on the head imho; one of the flaws in the authors line of thought appears to be that the forces are in competition and mutually exclusive, instead of impressively complimentary. Under citation, the author makes the statement "If cyberwar is going to assume strategic importance, it must be able to generate effects that are at least comparable to, and preferably more impressive than, those available from conventional warfare.". Isn't this sorta like saying horses couldn't possibly be useful on the battlefield because they can't replace the sword? ..What missle destroyed the kremlin again? Without getting overly long-winded, basically, it seems a mistake to analyze the independent spectrums of war as competitive channels, but instead to think about how the combination of electronic, economic, conventional forces, et cetera can all compliment and extend each other and *then* judge the effectiveness and suggested usage of each. > On Sunday, March 20, 2011, Dave Aitel <[email protected]> wrote: > > Paper Review > > Cyberwar as a Confidence Game > > Martin C. Libicki > > http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/libicki.pdf > > > > Here's the last line, which sums it up nicely: > > """ > > Building up our offensive > > capabilities is a confidence game. It says to those who would compete in > > our league: are you confident enough in your cyberwar skills that you can > > build your military to rely on information systems and the machines that > > take their orders? > > """ > > > > One thing missing from this paper is any evidence that this kind of > > logic (aka, Fear Uncertainty and Doubt in military information systems > > as applied to network centric warfare) has any real-world effect. > > Militaries (including our own) simply don't take these things into > > account when deploying new systems. > > > > But the main anomaly in the paper is simple: He treats Stuxnet as an > > aberration, rather than the tip of the iceberg that finally made the > > newspapers. And this leads him (and most other strategic analysts) to > > conclude that hacking does not have real world effects. I have to > > assume this is the WWII legacy of Enigma - where in order to take > > advantage of intelligence you had to go out and order your sub killers > > to go sink a boat. But just because hacking is tied to intelligence > > bodies in most countries, and staffed with people who look and act a > > lot like intelligence officers, does not make it the same thing. > > Hacking is as kinetic as a cruise missile when you do it right. > > > > -dave > > (This is a first in a series of posts where-in we all get to review > > the Strategic Studies Quarterly's Spring Cyber-War papers - > > http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/ ). > > _______________________________________________ > > Dailydave mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://lists.immunityinc.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave > > > _______________________________________________ > Dailydave mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.immunityinc.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave _______________________________________________ Dailydave mailing list [email protected] https://lists.immunityinc.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave
