I'm not sure I agree. Technically, sure, you can hack into things and take them out. However, comparing hacking to a cruise missile is a stretch. I can patch my systems today and your cyber-attack tomorrow is foiled. Or maybe I switch from Mac to Windows. A Tomahawk cruise missile is just as effective against a Russian radar system or a French one.
Don't get me wrong - hacking, backdoors, denial of service, altering messages, decrypting sensitive messages .etc all have their place. I just think the categories are cyber intelligence, terrorism, espionage, sabotage or crime but not "warfare". We've been doing intel, terror, spying, sabotage and crime for a long time and the tools have just changed with the introduction of hyper-connected computers and targets. -- Ron Gula, CEO Tenable Network Security http://www.tenable.com On 3/20/2011 10:52 PM, greg hoglund wrote: > > I agree with you Dave. Cyberwar is technical. Granted, like any war, > > it must be backed by intel and psyops. But, like any war, the kills > > people see in the press are kinetic. Cruise missiles are technical, > > and kinetic. But, everything is backed by intel. Even missiles. In > > cyber, the importance of HUMINT far outweighs that of kinetic damage. > > The technology is new and different, but the classic principle > > applies. This war is not new. > > > > -Greg > > > > > > On Sunday, March 20, 2011, Dave Aitel <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Paper Review >> >> Cyberwar as a Confidence Game >> >> Martin C. Libicki >> >> http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/libicki.pdf >> >> >> >> Here's the last line, which sums it up nicely: >> >> """ >> >> Building up our offensive >> >> capabilities is a confidence game. It says to those who would compete in >> >> our league: are you confident enough in your cyberwar skills that you can >> >> build your military to rely on information systems and the machines that >> >> take their orders? >> >> """ >> >> >> >> One thing missing from this paper is any evidence that this kind of >> >> logic (aka, Fear Uncertainty and Doubt in military information systems >> >> as applied to network centric warfare) has any real-world effect. >> >> Militaries (including our own) simply don't take these things into >> >> account when deploying new systems. >> >> >> >> But the main anomaly in the paper is simple: He treats Stuxnet as an >> >> aberration, rather than the tip of the iceberg that finally made the >> >> newspapers. And this leads him (and most other strategic analysts) to >> >> conclude that hacking does not have real world effects. I have to >> >> assume this is the WWII legacy of Enigma - where in order to take >> >> advantage of intelligence you had to go out and order your sub killers >> >> to go sink a boat. But just because hacking is tied to intelligence >> >> bodies in most countries, and staffed with people who look and act a >> >> lot like intelligence officers, does not make it the same thing. >> >> Hacking is as kinetic as a cruise missile when you do it right. >> >> >> >> -dave >> >> (This is a first in a series of posts where-in we all get to review >> >> the Strategic Studies Quarterly's Spring Cyber-War papers - >> >> http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/ ). >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Dailydave mailing list >> >> [email protected] >> >> https://lists.immunityinc.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Dailydave mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://lists.immunityinc.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave > > _______________________________________________ Dailydave mailing list [email protected] https://lists.immunityinc.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave
