> Along these lines, you might find Marcia Hofmann's analysis > of why only passwords preserve your 5th Amendment rights: > > www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/the-unexpected-result-of-fingerprint-authentication-that-you-cant-take-the-fifth > > --dan
This is actually sort of a neat point and I'd be curious to see what happens if someone refused to be fingerprinted due to it being their authentication credentials on their phone. I bet you can't stop the fingerprint but could get an injunction against using it to decrypt your phone/whatever...which at least in the test tube would make it perfect encryption in that LEO couldn't attempt to crack the crypto. In other news; I just learner about this recently myself but there is such a thing as cancellable biometrics (1) which sidesteps the "you cant change your fingerprint if its compromised" argument, at least in theory anyways. Implementation is always a different matter. I wonder how crazy it is to think of biometrics, when dealt with in a cancellable manner, as a password complexity reduction mechanism rather than a replacement-- meaning you need the biometric data and a pin or similar. Also lop wait apple managed to reduce fingerprints to a 1 in 50000 odds of collision? (1) http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Cancelable_biometrics
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