Are servers that publish their trust anchor details via DNS in full:
_25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA 2 0 0 <DER cert in hex>
exempt from being obligated to provide the same certificate somewhere
in their trust chain? It is far easier to treat the "2 0 0" case
as a more specific bulky match blob, than to also arrange for it
to be an input into the client's trust chain construction algorithm.
The latter is largely impractical with OpenSSL. I though I saw
some text in the RFC about "2 x y" trust-anchors needing to be
explicitly provided in the server's trust chain, since clients
cannot be expected to already have these on hand. Can't seem
to find it any more.
I am hoping that the above includes the "2 0 0" case, for though
the cert is available in DNS it is not in the trust chain or trust
store, and moving it from the DNS into the trust chain or trust
store is non-trivial.
I am also hoping that almost nobody will use match type 0 certs,
and that in practice all TLSA records will be sha2 digests.
If verifiers are obligated to attempt to use the certificate in
"2 0 0" as part of the trust chain if missing, then I may need
to treat "2 0 0" as "unusable" until OpenSSL makes it possible
to configure each connection with a private list of additional
trust anchors before starting the handshake (without polluting
the trust store for future connections that use the same
persistent SSL_CTX).
--
Viktor.
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