On Wed, Sep 04, 2013 at 08:13:30AM -0700, Ian Fette (????????) wrote:
> Ond?ej, I might be getting it wrong, but since our CA is cross-signed by
> another CA, the chain that most clients will build will be rooted in
> something else. You can see this if you go to https://mail.google.com -
> GeoTrust shows as the root, which signs Google Internet Authority G2, which
> signs a cert for mail.google.com. If someone is using openssl and it
> follows AIA chaining or otherwise constructs a trust chain up to GlobalSign
> and we had specified "2" with the intermediate, would that break or still
> work? (Sorry, this is probably the most confusing part of the spec)
Usage 2 chains work just like PKIX chains with the additional
freedom that the trust-anchor need not be a root CA previously
known to the client.
If you also read
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dukhovni-dane-ops-01
you'll see that since the client will typically not have the associated
CA certificate on hand, the server's certificate chain (sent in the
TLS handshake) must include the trust anchor certificate.
If the trust-anchor in a TLSA "2 1 1" record is an intermediate
CA, the above will typically already be the case. When the "2 1
1" trust-anchor is actually a root CA (I encourage you to use a CA
as close as possible to the leaf server that is stable enough to
publish in your TLSA RRs) you now need to make sure that it is
sent in the TLS handshake since unlike the PKIX case, the client
won't have it on hand.
--
Viktor.
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