On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 08:45:57PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 04:30:36PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > > On Wed, 25 Mar 2015, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > Attacks will just take out the oracle to induce plaintext, or will > > spoof causing a lockout of real clients inducing those end up using > > plaintext. > > Taking out the oracle will not induce plaintext any more than > performing the same attack on the authoritative DNS server for the > domain. User keys would have very short TTLs (positive and negative, > to address cache explosion), so a large fraction of queries will > go end-to-end from the MUA to the authoritative server.
Not only that, but it will be easier for MUAs to give the user feedback as to what went wrong in such a protocol than in DNS. > > Recursors and Authoritative servers supporting OPENPGPKEY or SMIME could > > rate limit the sending of NSEC3 chains if there are too [many] requests for > > non-existing records - causing them to need to go back to the current > > RCPT TO practise. Not having to worry about zone walking for this is a plus. Nico -- _______________________________________________ dane mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
