On Tue, 12 May 2015, Kyle Rose wrote:
If the DANE-EE entry has a SubjectPublicKeyInfo hash, then the metadata within the certificate can be trusted only if the certificate signature is validated against a trust anchor: a self-signed certificate is sufficient (and probably ideal) here, since the client has already trusted the public key via DANE.
None of the meta-data would be used and does not need to be trusted.
Absent signature verification, the client should probably throw away the rest of the certificate to avoid the temptation of trusting any of it: it's simply unclear to me what are the security implications to the universe of clients of having unauthenticated data present in the certificate or associated client context. What I mean is, what data from certificates other than the public key modify clients' behaviors? It may be "nothing" (i.e., that "the only item of interest in the certificate is the public key part"), but it's not clear to me that this is the case.
Right. It should not be used and software needs to be updated to not use or display any of that information not covered by any assurance of PKIX or DANE. Paul _______________________________________________ dane mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
