The following errata report has been rejected for RFC6698, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA".
-------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6698&eid=3594 -------------------------------------- Status: Rejected Type: Technical Reported by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1d...@dukhovni.org> Date Reported: 2013-04-16 Rejected by: Stephen Farrell (IESG) Section: 2.1.1 Original Text ------------- 2 -- Certificate usage 2 is used to specify a certificate, or the public key of such a certificate, that MUST be used as the trust anchor when validating the end entity certificate given by the server in TLS. This certificate usage is sometimes referred to as "trust anchor assertion" and allows a domain name administrator to specify a new trust anchor -- for example, if the domain issues its own certificates under its own CA that is not expected to be in the end users' collection of trust anchors. The target certificate MUST pass PKIX certification path validation, with any certificate matching the TLSA record considered to be a trust anchor for this certification path validation. Corrected Text -------------- 2 -- Certificate usage 2 is used to specify a certificate, or the public key of such a certificate, that MUST be used as the trust anchor when validating the end entity certificate given by the server in TLS. This certificate usage is sometimes referred to as "trust anchor assertion" and allows a domain name administrator to specify a new trust anchor -- for example, if the domain issues its own certificates under its own CA that is not expected to be in the end users' collection of trust anchors. The target certificate MUST pass PKIX certification path validation, with any certificate matching the TLSA record considered to be a trust anchor for this certification path validation. Since clients cannot be presumed to have their own copy of the trust-anchor certificate, when the TLSA association specifies a certificate digest, the TLS server MUST be configured to provide the trust-anchor certificate in its "certificate_list" TLS handshake message. Notes ----- As per discussion on the DANE WG list, this was overtaken by events and so is rejected. This is critical for interoperability between clients and servers. A client that commits to verify TLSA RR certificate associations will fail if it can't obtain the required certificates. With usage "2" there is no presumption that these are available to the client. If servers are not obligated to provide them the protocol will consistently fail. With non-interactive protocols where there is no user to "click OK", such as SMTP, there is no good work-around and both client and server owners suffer. --VERIFIER NOTES-- As per discussion on the DANE WG list, this was overtaken by events and so is rejected. -------------------------------------- RFC6698 (draft-ietf-dane-protocol-23) -------------------------------------- Title : The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA Publication Date : August 2012 Author(s) : P. Hoffman, J. Schlyter Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities Area : Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG _______________________________________________ dane mailing list dane@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
