Folks,

We have submitted a new draft on port number randomization. It's based on a document by M. Larsen that had been published in 2004. This document helps quite a lot in the case of the blind attacks that have been discussed in the TCPM WG.

The document is pretty general, and its proposal can be applied to any transport protocol.

The document is available at http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/port-randomization/draft-larsen-tsvwg-port-randomization-00.txt , and you can find it in other fancy formats at: http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/port-randomization/index.html . It will soon be available at the usual places.

Here's the abstract:
---- cut here ----
   Recently, awareness has been raised about a number of "blind" attacks
   that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
   and similar protocols.  The consequences of these attacks range from
   throughput-reduction to broken connections or corrupted data.  These
   attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the four-
   tuple (Source Address, Destination Address, Source port, Destination
   Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to be attacked.
   This document describes a simple and efficient method for random
   selection of the client port number, such that the possibility of an
   attacker guessing the exact value is reduced.  While this is not a
   replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number
   randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with
   very little effort and without any key management overhead.
---- cut here ----

We would highly appreciate any comments/suggestions you may have.

Thanks!

P.S.: While this message is being cross-posted to a few mailing-lists, we would like the discussion to happen in the tsvwg, as we think all transport protocols can benefit from the proposal in this draft.

Kindest regards,

--
Fernando Gont
e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] || [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1






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