Oct. 26
USA:
UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE--Cardinal Opposes Expanding
Death Penalty For Terrorists
Cardinal Theodore E. McCarrick has urged House and Senate conferees
working on legislation concerning intelligence reform and 9/11
recommendations to report out a final bill without the expansion of the
death penalty for terrorists.
Cardinal McCarrick, Archbishop of Washington, is Chairman of the Domestic
Policy Committee, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).
The Cardinal's letter to conferees concerned the National Intelligence
Reform Act (S. 2845) and the House-passed version of S. 2845, the 9/11
Recommendations Implementation Act. The Senate version of the bill does
not contain any death penalty provisions.
"The cowardly acts of September 11 and their tragic human costs still
haunt our nation," Cardinal McCarrick said. "There can be no diminishing
the horror of terrorism or the responsibility of those who employ wanton
violence on the innocent."
"Based on our Catholic teaching, however, we oppose expanding the death
penalty even for terrorists," the Cardinal continued. "As you know, the
bishops of the United States oppose the use of the death penalty in any
instance.
Catholic teaching on capital punishment is clear: If bloodless means are
sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect
public order and the safety of persons, public authority should limit
itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete
conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of
the human person (Catechism of the Catholic Church)."
Besides Catholic teaching on the death penalty, Cardinal McCarrick cited
other considerations. He noted that expansion of the death penalty was not
included in the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. "Congress need not
go any further," he said.
"Secondly, we feel strongly that suicidal terrorists are not going to be
deterred by the death penalty. "In fact, many terrorists believe that if
they die committing an act of terrorism they will become martyrs. At the
very least, it would seem that executing terrorists could make them heroes
in the minds of other like-minded advocates of terror."
"As pastors, we believe that the use of the death penalty under any
circumstances diminishes us as human beings," Cardinal McCarrick stated.
"As we said in Confronting a Culture of Violence: "We cannot teach that
killing is wrong by killing.'"
Earlier, the USCCB wrote to conferees on issues impacting immigration
within the House-passed version of the Senate bill.
(source: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops)
***************************
Prof's research finds way into Supreme Court brief
A Dartmouth psychology professor's research is playing an important role
in a case on juvenile capital punishment currently before the Supreme
Court.
Professor Abigail Baird's research, which shows that cognitive development
continues well past the age of legal adulthood, has been cited in amicus
briefs submitted to the Court by the American Medical Association in the
case of Roper v. Simmons.
The brief argues that the defendant, who was 17 at the time of crime, has
a compromised mental state because of his young age and should not be
executed for his role in the grisly murder of a woman.
The brief also seeks to draw parallels with previous court precedent. The
Supreme Court ruled more than a decade ago that states cannot execute
mentally retarded people, because it qualifies as cruel and unusual
punishment. Those with Down's syndrome and others with compromised level
of cognitive development are exempted from capital punishment.
Baird's research supports these claims. Her studies, and those of her
colleagues, have shown that the brain continues maturing until about age
25. This continual progress affects teen male cognitive function, Baird
said.
"Brain growth doesn't force anyone to do anything, but it does make
certain behaviors more or less likely," she said.
Baird completed a study commonly known as the Good Idea, Bad Idea test.
She created a list of actions, and requested that subjects press one
button if they believed the behavior to be a good idea, and a second if
they believed it to be bad. When monitoring brain activity during these
decisions, Baird found that adults had a nearly thoughtless, knee-jerk
reaction to potentially dangerous activities.
Teens, especially males, did not have this visceral reaction. Instead,
they considered the pros and cons of activities immediately shunned by
their elders, like riding a bicycle down a set of stairs.
Because of these cognitive disparities, those appealing Simmons'
conviction believe that teenage criminals should not be punished
identically to adult criminals.
Baird said she doesn't advocate relieving teen criminals from all
responsibility for their actions, but emphasized that the brain structure
differences between a typical 18-year-old and that of a 25-year-old are
enough to grant them the same break U.S. laws have given to others with
compromised brain function.
While Baird expressed excitement that her work was being used and cited so
extensively, she also expressed concern.
"There is plenty of history of this type of informing science leading to
agenda driven science, bad science," she cautioned.
Despite her worries, Baird nevertheless said that her findings have
valuable implications.
"If the age [for execution] is moved up, we'll make fewer mistakes in
sentencing kids to a punishment that we can't take back," she said.
(source: The Dartmouth Online)
*******************
The transcript in the Supreme Court oral arguments is now avaialable at:
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-633.pdf
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Can the Sciences Help Us to Make Wise Ethical Judgments?----Scientific
knowledge has a vital, if limited, role to play in shaping our moral
values and helping us to frame wiser judgments. Ethical values are natural
and open to examination in the light of evidence and reason.
I.
Can science and reason be used to develop ethical judgments? Many theists
claim that without religious foundations, "anything goes," and social
chaos will ensue. Scientific naturalists believe that secular societies
already have developed responsible ethical norms and that science and
reason have helped us to solve moral dilemmas. How and in what sense this
occurs are vital issues that need to be discussed in contemporary society,
for this may very well be the hottest issue of the 21st century.
Dramatic breakthroughs on the frontiers of science provide new powers to
humans, but they also pose perplexing moral quandaries. Should we use or
limit these scientific discoveries, such as the cloning of humans? Much of
this research is banned in the United States and restricted in Canada.
Should scientists be permitted to reproduce humans by cloning (as we now
do with animals), or is this too dangerous? Should we be allowed to make
"designer babies?" Many theologians and politicians are horrified by this;
many scientists and philosophers believe that it is not only inevitable
but justifiable under certain conditions. There were loud cries against in
vitro fertilization, or artificial insemination, only 2 generations ago,
but the procedure proved to be a great boon to childless couples. Many
religious conservatives are opposed to therapeutic stem-cell research on
fetal tissues, because they think that "ensoulment" occurs with the first
division of cells. Scientists are appalled by this censorship of scien
tific research, since the research has the potential to cure many
illnesses; they believe those who oppose it have ignored the welfare of
countless numbers of human beings. There are other equally controversial
issues on the frontiers of science: Organ transplants-who should get them
and why? Is the use of animal organs to supply parts for human bodies
wrong? Is transhumanism reforming what it means to be human? How shall we
control AIDS-is it wicked to use condoms, as some religious conservatives
think, or should this be a high priority in Africa and elsewhere? Does
global warming mean we need a radical transformation of industry in
affluent countries? Is homosexuality genetic, and if so, is the denial of
same-sex marriage morally wrong? How can we decide such questions? What
criteria may we draw upon?
II.
Many adhere today to the view that ethical choices are merely relativistic
and subjective, expressing tastes; and you cannot disputes tastes (de
gustibus non disputandum est). If they are emotive at root, no set of
values is better than any other. If there is a conflict, then the best
option is to persuade others to accept our moral attitudes, to convert
them to our moral feelings, or, if this fails, to resort to force.
Classical skeptics denied the validity of all knowledge, including ethical
knowledge. The logical positivists earlier in the 20th century made a
distinction between fact, the appropriate realm of science, and value, the
realm of expressive discourse and imperatives, claiming that though we can
resolve descriptive and theoretical questions by using the methods of
science, we cannot use science to adjudicate moral disputes. Most
recently, postmodernists, following the German philosopher Heidegger and
his French followers, have gone further in their skepticism, denying that
there is any special validity to humanistic ethics or indeed to science
itself. They say that science is merely one mythological construct among
others. They insist that there are no objective epistemological standards;
that gender, race, class, or cultural biases likewise infect our ethical
programs and any narratives of social emancipation that we may propose.
Who is to say that one normative viewpoint is any better than any other,
they demand. Thus have many disciples of multicultural relativism and
subjectivism often given up in despair, becoming nihilists or cynics.
Interestingly, most of these well-intentioned folk hold passionate moral
and political convictions, but when pushed to the wall, will they concede
that their own epistemological and moral recommendations likewise express
only their own personal preferences?
The problem with this position is apparent, for it is impaled on one horn
of a dilemma, and the consequence of this option is difficult to accept.
If it is the case that there are no ethical standards, then who can say
that the Nazi Holocaust and the Rwandan, Cambodian, or Armenian genocides
are evil? Is it only a question of taste that divides sadists and
masochists on one side from all the rest on the other? Are slavery, the
repression of women, the degradation of the environment by profit-hungry
corporations, or the killing of handicapped people morally impermissible,
if there are no reliable normative standards? If we accept cultural
relativity as our guide, then we have no grounds to object to Muslim law
(sharia), which condones the stoning to death of adulteresses.
III.
What is the position of those who wish to draw upon science and reason to
formulate ethical judgment? Is it possible to bridge the gap and recognize
that values are relative to human interests yet allow that they are open
to some objective criticisms? I submit that it is, and that upon
reflection, most educated people would accept them. I choose to call this
third position "objective relativism" or "objective contextualism";
namely, values are related to human interests, needs, desires, and
passions-whether individual or socio-cultural-but they are nonetheless
open to scientific evaluation. By this, I mean a form of reflective
intelligence that applies to questions of principles and values and that
is open to modification of them in the light of criticism. In other words,
there is a Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, which bears fruit, and
which, if eaten and digested, can impart to us moral knowledge and wisdom.
In what sense can scientific inquiry help us to make moral choices? My
answer to that is it does so all the time. This is especially the case
with the applied sciences: medicine, dentistry, nursing, pharmacology,
psychiatry, and social psychology; and also in the policy sciences:
economics, education, political science; and such interdisciplinary fields
as criminology, gerontology, etc. Modern society could not function
without the advice drawn from these fields of knowledge, which make
evaluative judgments and recommend prescriptions. They advise what we
ought to do on a contextual basis.
Nonetheless, there are the skeptical critics of this position, who deny
that science per se can help us or that naturalistic ethics is possible. I
think that those critics are likewise mistaken and that naturalism is
directly relevant to ethics. My thesis is that an increase in knowledge
can help us to make wiser decisions. By knowledge, I do not refer simply
to philosophical analysis but scientific evidence. It would answer both
the religionist, who insists that you cannot be moral unless you are
religious, and the subjectivist, who denies there is any such thing as
ethical knowledge or wisdom.
Before I outline this position, let me concede that the skeptical
philosophical objections to deriving ethics from science have some merit.
Basically, what are they? The critics assert that we cannot deduce ethics
from science, i.e., what ought to be the case from what is the case. A
whole series of philosophers from David Hume to the emotivists have
pointed out this fallacy. G.E. Moore, at the beginning of the twentieth
century, characterized this as "the naturalistic fallacy" [1] (mistakenly,
I think).
But they are essentially correct. The fact that science discovers that
something is the case factually does not make it ipso facto good or right.
To illustrate: (a) Charles Darwin noted the role of natural selection and
the struggle for survival as key ingredients in the evolution of species.
Should we conclude, therefore, as Herbert Spencer did, that laissez-faire
doctrines ought to apply, that we ought to allow nature to take its course
and not help the handicapped or the poorer classes? (b) Eugenicists
concluded earlier in the century that some people are brighter and more
talented than others. Does this justify an elitist hierarchical society in
which only the best rule or eugenic methods of reproduction be followed?
This was widely held by many liberals until the fascists began applying it
in Germany with dire consequences.
There have been abundant illustrations of pseudoscientific
theories-monocausal theories of human behavior that were hailed as
"scientific"-that have been applied with disastrous results. Examples: (a)
The racial theories of Chamberlain and Gobineau alleging Aryan superiority
led to genocide by the Nazis. (b) Many racists today point to IQ to
justify a menial role for blacks in society and their opposition to
affirmative action. (c) The dialectical interpretation of history was
taken as "scientific" by Marxists and used to justify class warfare. (d)
Environmentalists decried genetics as "racist" and thought that changes in
species should only be induced by modifications of the environment. Thus,
one has to be cautious about applying the latest scientific fad to social
policy.
We ought not to consider scientific specialists to be especially gifted or
possessed with ethical knowledge nor empower them to apply this knowledge
to society-as B.F. Skinner in Walden II and other utopianists have
attempted to do. Neither scientist-kings nor philosopher-kings should be
entrusted to design a better world. We have learned the risks and dangers
of abandoning democracy to those wishing to create a Brave New World.
Alas, all humans-including scientists-are fallible, and excessive power
may corrupt human judgment. Given these caveats, I nevertheless hold that
scientific knowledge has a vital, if limited, role to play in shaping our
moral values and helping us to frame wiser judgments of practice--surely
more, I would add, than our current reliance on theologians, politicians,
military pundits, corporate CEOs, and celebrities!
IV.
How and in what sense can scientific inquiry help us?
I wish to present a modified form of naturalistic ethics. By this, I mean
that ethical values are natural; they grow out of and fulfill human
purposes, interests, desires, and needs. They are forms of preferential
behavior evinced in human life. "Good," "bad," "right," and "wrong" relate
to sentient beings, whether human or otherwise. These values do not reside
in a far-off heaven, nor are they deeply embedded in the hidden recesses
of reality; they are empirical phenomena.
The principle of naturalism is based on a key methodological criterion: We
ought to consider our moral principles and values, like other beliefs,
open to examination in the light of evidence and reason and hence amenable
to modification.
We are all born into a sociocultural context; and we imbibe the values
passed on to us, inculcated by our peers, parents, teachers, leaders, and
colleagues in the community.
I submit that ethical values should be amenable to inquiry. We need to
ask, are they reliable? How do they stack up comparatively? Have they been
tested in practice? Are they consistent? Many people seek to protect them
as inviolable truths, immune to inquiry. This is particularly true of
transcendental values based on religious faith and supported by custom and
tradition. In this sense, ethical inquiry is similar to other forms of
scientific inquiry. We should not presuppose that what we have inherited
is true and beyond question. But where do we begin our inquiry? My
response is, in the midst of life itself, focused on the practical
problems, the concrete dilemmas, and contextual quandaries that we
confront.
Let me illustrate by refer to three dilemmas. I do so not in order to
solve them but to point out a method of inquiry in ethics. First, should
we exact the death penalty for people convicted of murder? The United
States is the only major democracy that still demands capital punishment.
What is the argument for the death penalty? It rests on two basic
premises: (a) A factual question is at issue: capital punishment is
effective in deterring crime, especially murder; and (b) the principle of
justice that applies is retributive. As the Old Testament adage reads,
"Whatever hurt is done, you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth
for tooth. . . ." [2]
The first factual premise can be resolved by sociological studies, by
comparing the incidence of murder in those states and nations that have
the death penalty in force and those that do not and by states and nations
before and after the enactment or abrogation of the death penalty. We ask,
has there been an increase or a decrease in murder? If, as a matter of
fact, the death penalty does not restrain or inhibit murder, would a
person still hold his view that the death penalty ought to be retained?
The evidence suggests that the death penalty does not to any significant
extent reduce the murder rate, especially since most acts of murder are
not deliberate but due to passion or are an unexpected result of another
crime, such as robbery. Thus, if one bases his or her belief in capital
punishment primarily on the deterrence factor, and it does not deter,
would one change one's belief? The same consideration should apply to
those who are opposed to the death penalty: Would they change their belief
if they thought it would deter excessive murder rates? These are empirical
questions at issue. And the test of a policy are its consequences in the
real world. Does it achieve what it sets out to do?
There are, of course, other factual considerations, such as: Are many
innocent people convicted of crimes they did not commit (as was recently
concluded in the State of Illinois)? Is capital punishment unfairly
applied primarily to minorities? This points to the fact that belief in
capital punishment is, to some extent, a function of scientific knowledge
concerning the facts of the case. This often means that such measures
should not be left to politicians or jurors alone to decide; the
scientific facts of the case are directly relevant.
The second moral principle of retributive justice is far more difficult to
deal with, for this may be rooted in religious conviction or in a
deep-seated tribal sense of retaliation. If you injure my kin, it is said,
I can injure yours; and this is not purely a factual issue. There are
other principles of justice that are immediately thrown into
consideration. Those opposed to the death penalty say that society "should
set a humane tone and not itself resort to killing." Or again, the purpose
of justice should be to protect the community from future crimes, and
alternative forms of punishment, perhaps lifetime imprisonment without the
right of parole, might suffice to deter crime. Still another principle of
justice is relevant: Should we attempt, where possible, to rehabilitate
the offender? All of the above principles are open to debate. The point
is, we should not block inquiry; we should not say that some moral
principles are beyond any kind of re-evaluation or modification. Here, a
process of deliberation enters in, and a kind of moral knowledge emerges
about what is comparatively the best policy to adopt.
Another example of the methods of resolving moral disputes is the argument
for assisted suicide in terminal cases, in which people are suffering
intolerable pain. This has become a central issue in the field of medical
ethics, where medical science is able to keep people alive who might
normally die. I first saw the emergence of this field 30 years ago, when I
sponsored a conference in biomedical ethics at my university and could
find very few, if any, scholars or scientists who had thought about the
questions or were qualified experts. Today, it is an essential area in
medicine. The doctor is no longer taken as a patriarchal figure. His or
her judgments need to be critically examined, and others within the
community, especially patients, need to be consulted. There are here, of
course, many factual questions at issue: Is the illness genuinely
terminal? Is there great suffering? Is the patient competent in expressing
his or her long-standing convictions regarding his or her right to die
with dignity? Are there medical and legal safeguards to protect this
system against abuse?
Our decision depends on several further ethical principles: (a) the
informed consent of patients in deciding whether they wish treatment to
continue; (b) the right of privacy, including the right of individuals to
have control of their own bodies and health; and (c) the criterion of the
quality of life.
One problem we encounter in this area is the role, again, of
transcendental principles. Some people insist, "God alone should decide
life-and-death questions, not humans." This principle, when invoked, is
beyond examination, and for many people it is final. Passive euthanasia
means that we will not use extraordinary methods to keep a person alive,
where there is a longstanding intent expressed in a living will not to do
so. Active euthanasia will, under certain conditions, allow the patient,
in consultation with his physician, to hasten the dying process (as
practiced in Oregon and the Netherlands). The point is, there is an
interweaving of factual considerations with ethical principles, and these
may be modified in the light of inquiry, by comparing alternatives and
examining consequences in each concrete case.
I wish to illustrate this process again by referring to another issue that
is hotly debated today: Should all cloning research be banned? The
Canadian legislature, in March 2004, passed legislation that will put
severe restrictions on such scientific research. The bill is called "An
Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction" (known as C-56), and it makes
it a criminal offense to engage in therapeutic cloning, to maintain an
embryo outside a woman's body for more than 14 days, to genetically
manipulate embryos, to choose the gender of offspring, to sell human eggs
and sperm, or to engage in commercial surrogacy. It also requires that in
vitro embryos be created only for the purpose of creating human beings or
for improving assisted human-reproductive procedures. Similar legislation
was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and is before the Senate.
It is still being heatedly debated. It includes the prohibition of
reproductive cloning as well as therapeutic stem-cell research. Two
arguments against reproductive cloning are as follows: (a) It may be
unsafe (at the present stage of medical technology) and infants born may
be defective. This factual objection has some merit. (b) There is also a
moral objection saying that we should not seek to design children. Yet we
do so all the time, with artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization,
and surrogate motherhood. We already are involved in "designer-baby"
technology, with amniocentesis, pre-implantation, genetic testing, and
chorionic villus sampling (the avoiding of unwanted genes by aborting
fetuses and implanting desirable embryos).
If it were to become safe, would reproductive cloning become permissible?
I can think of situations where we might find it acceptable-for example,
if couples are unable to conceive by normal methods.
It is the second area I mentioned above that is especially telling-the
opposition to any forms of embryonic stem-cell research. Proponents
maintain that this line of research may lead to enormous benefits by
curing a wide range of diseases such as Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's,
or juvenile diabetes. Adult stem cells are now being used, but embryonic
stem cells may provide important new materials. The criterion here is
consequential: that positive outcomes may result. Opponents maintain that
this type of research is "immoral" because it is tampering with human
persons possessed of souls. Under this interpretation, "ensoulment" occurs
at the moment of conception. This is said to apply to embryos, many of
which, however, are products of miscarriages or abortions. Does it also
apply once the division of stem cells occurs? Surely a small collection of
cells, which is called a blastocyst, is not a person, a sentient being, or
a moral agent prior to implantation. Leon Kass, chair of President Bush's
Council on Bioethics, believes that human life cannot be treated as a
commodity and it is evil to manufacture life. He maintains that all human
life, including a cloned embryo, has the same moral status and dignity as
a person from the moment of conception.
This controversy pits two opposing moral claims: (a) the view that
stem-cell research may be beneficent because of its possible contributions
to human health (i.e., it might eliminate debilitating diseases) versus
(b) an ethic of revulsion against tampering with natural reproductive
processes. At issue here are the questions of whether ensoulment makes any
sense in biology and whether personhood can be said to have begun at such
an early stage, basically a transcendental claim that naturalists object
to on empirical grounds. These arguments are familiar in the abortion
debate; it would be unfortunate if they could be used to censor scientific
stem-cell research.
This issue is especially relevant today, for transhumanists say that we
are discovering new powers every day that modify human nature, enhance
human capacities, and extend life spans. We may be able to extend memory
and increase human perception and intelligence dramatically by silicon
implants. Traditionalists recoil in horror, saying that post-humanists
would have us transgress human nature. We would become cyborgs.
But we already are, to some extent: we wear false teeth, eyeglasses, and
hearing aids; we have hair grafts, pacemakers, organ transplants,
artificial limbs, and sex-change/sexual reassignment operations and
injections; we use Viagra to enhance sexual potency or mega-vitamins and
hormone therapy. Why not go further? Each advance raises ethical issues:
Do we have the reproductive freedom and responsibility to design our
children by knowing possible genetic disorders and correcting them before
reproduction or birth?
V.
This leads to an important distinction between two kinds of values within
human experience. Let me suggest two possible sources: (a) values rooted
in unexamined feelings, faith, custom, or authority, held as deep-seated
convictions beyond question, and (b) values that are influenced by
cognition and informed by rational inquiry.
Naturalists say that scientific inquiry enables us to revise our values,
if need be, and to develop, where appropriate, new ones. We already
possess a body of prescriptive judgments that have been tested in practice
in the applied sciences of medicine, psychiatry, engineering, educational
counseling, and other fields. Similarly, I submit that there is a body of
prescriptive ethical judgments that has been tested in practice and that
constitutes normative knowledge; and new normative prescriptions are
introduced all the time as the sciences progress.
The question is thus raised, what criteria should we use to make ethical
choices? This issue is especially pertinent today for those living in
pluralistic societies such as ours, where there is diversity of values and
principles.
In formulating ethical judgments, we need to refer to what I have called a
"valuational base." [3] Packed into this referent are the pre-existing de
facto values and principles that we are committed to; but we also need to
consider empirical data, means-ends relationships, causal knowledge, and
the consequences of various courses of action. It is inquiry that is the
instrument by which we decide what we ought to do and that we should
develop in the young. We need to focus on moral education for children; we
wish to structure positive traits of character and also the capacity for
making reflective decisions. There are no easy recipes or simple formulae
that we can appeal to, telling us what we ought to do in every case. There
are, however, what W.D. Ross called prima facie general principles of
right conduct, the common moral decencies, a list of virtues, precepts,
and prescriptions, ethical excellences, obligations, and responsibilities,
which are intrinsic to our social roles. But how they work out in pract
ice depends on the context at hand, and the most reliable guide for mature
persons is cognitive inquiry and deliberation.
Conservative theists have often objected to this approach to morality as
dangerous, given to "debauchery" and "immorality." Here, there is a
contrast between two different senses of morality: (a) the
obedience/authoritarian model, in which humans are expected to follow
moral absolutes derived from ancient creeds, and (b) the encouragement of
moral growth, implying that there are within the human species potential
moral tendencies and cognitive capacities that can help us to frame
judgments.
For a naturalistic approach, in the last analysis, ethics is a product of
a long evolutionary process. Evolutionary psychology has pointed out that
moral rules have enabled human communities to adapt to threats to their
survival. This Darwinian interpretation implies a biological basis for
reciprocal behavior- epigenetic rules-according to E.O. Wilson (1998). [4]
The social groups that possessed these rules transmitted them to their
offspring. Such moral behavior provides a selective advantage. There is
accordingly an inward propensity for moral behavior, moral sentiments,
empathy, and altruism within the species.
This does not deny that there are at the same time impulses for selfish
and aggressive tendencies. It is a mistake, however, to read in a doctrine
of "original sin" and to say that human beings are by nature sinful and
corrupt. I grant that there are individuals who lack moral empathy; they
are morally handicapped. Some may even be sociopaths. The salient point is
that there are genetic potentialities for good and evil; but how they work
out and whether beneficent behavior prevails is dependent on cultural
conditions. Both our genes (genetics) and memes (social patterns of
enculturation) are factors that determine how and why we behave the way we
do. We cannot simply deduce from the evolutionary process what we ought to
do. What we do depends in part upon the choices we make. Thus, we still
have some capacity for free choice. Though we are conditioned by
environmental and biogenetic determinants, we are still capable of
cognitive processes of selection, and rationality and intentionality play
a causative role. (Note: There is a considerable scientific literature
that supports this evolutionary view. See Daniel Dennett, Freedom Evolves
[New York: Viking, 2003] and Darwin's Dangerous Idea [New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995]; Brian Skyrm, Evolution of the Social Contract [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996], Robert Wright, The Moral Animal [New
York: Pantheon Books, 1994] and Nonzero [New York: Vintage Books, 2001],
Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue [New York: Viking, 1996], and Elliott
Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others [Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1998].)
Ethical precepts need not be based upon transcendental grounds or
dependent upon religious faith. Undoubtedly, the belief that they are
sacred may strengthen moral duties for many persons, but it is not
necessary for everyone.
I submit that it is time for scientists to recognize that they have an
opportunity to contribute to naturalistic ethics. We stand at an
interesting time in human history. We have great power to ameliorate the
human condition. Biogenetic engineering, nanotechnology, and space
research open new opportunities for humankind to create a better world.
Yet there are those today who wish to abandon human reason and freedom and
return to mythological legends of our premodern existence, including their
impulses of aggres- sion and self-righteous vengeance. I submit that the
Enlightenment is a beacon whose promise has not been fulfilled and that
humankind needs to accept the responsibility for its own future.
Conclusion
A caveat is in order. In the last analysis, some degree of skepticism is a
necessary antidote to all forms of moral dogmatism. We are continually
surrounded by self-righteous moralists who claim that they have the
Absolute Truth, Moral Virtue, or Piety or know the secret path to
salvation and wish to impose their convictions on all others. They are
puffed up with an inflated sense of their own rectitude as they rail
against unbenighted immoral sinners who lack their moral faith. These
moral zealots are willing to repress or even sacrifice anyone who stands
in their way. They have in the past unleashed conquering armies in the
name of God, the Dialectic, Racial Superiority, Posterity, or Imperial
Design. Skepticism needs to be applied not only to religious and
paranormal fantasies but to other forms of moral and political illusions.
These dogmas become especially dangerous when they are appealed to in
order to legislate morality and are used by powerful social institutions,
such as a state or church or corporation, to enforce a particular brand of
moral virtue. Hell hath no fury like the self-righteous moral fanatic
scorned.
The best antidote for this is some skepticism and a willingness to engage
in ethical inquiry, not only about others' moral zeal, but about our own,
especially if we are tempted to translate the results of our own ethical
inquiries into commandments. The epistemological theory that I propose is
based upon methodological principles of skeptical scientific inquiry, and
it has important moral implications. For in recognizing our own
fallibility, we thereby can learn to tolerate other human beings and to
appreciate their diversity and the plurality of lifestyles. If we are
prepared to engage in cooperative ethical inquiry, then perhaps we are
better prepared to allow other individuals and groups some measure of
liberty to pursue their own preferred lifestyles. If we are able to live
and let live, then this can best be achieved in a free and open democratic
society. Where we differ, we should try to negotiate our divergent views
and perhaps reach common ground; and if this is impractical, we should at
least attempt to compromise for the sake of our common interests. The
method of ethical inquiry requires some intelligent and informed
examination of our own values as well as the values of others. Here we can
attempt to modify attitudes by an appeal to cognitive beliefs and to
reconstruct them by an examination of the relevant scientific evidence.
Such a give-and-take of constructive criticism is essential for a
harmonious society. In learning to appreciate different conceptions of the
good life, we are able to expand our own dimensions of moral awareness;
and this is more apt to lead to a peaceful world.
By this, I surely do not mean to imply that anything and everything can or
should be tolerated or that one thing is as good as the next. We should be
prepared to criticize moral nonsense parading as virtue. We should not
tolerate the intolerable. We have a right to strongly object, if need be,
to those values or practices that we think are based on miscalculation,
misconception, or that are patently false or harmful. Nonetheless, we
might live in a better world if inquiry were to replace faith;
deliberation, passionate commitment; and education and persuasion, force
and war. We should be aware of the powers of intelligent behavior, but
also of the limitations of the human animal and of the need to mitigate
the cold, indifferent intellect with the compassionate and empathic heart.
Thus, I conclude that within the ethical life, we are capable of
developing a body of melioristic principles and values and a method of
coping with problems intelligently. When our ethical judgments are based
on rational and scientific inquiry, they are more apt to express the
highest reaches of excellence and nobility and of civilized human conduct.
We are in sore need of that today.
Notes
1. G.E. Moore. Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1903).
2. See Exodus 21.
3. Kurtz, Paul (ed.). The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge
(Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 1992), chapter 9.
4. Wilson, E.O. Consilience (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998).
(ource : The Skeptical Inquirer (About the Author: Paul Kurtz is a
professor emeritus at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and
chairman of the Center for Inquiry - Transnational. This article is a
portion of the keynote address delivered at the conference on "Science and
Ethics" sponsored by the Center for Inquiry in Toronto, Ontario, on May
13, 2004)
PENNSYLVANIA:
Death Row Inmate Seeking Pen Pals
He's on death row at a state prison in Greene County for killing 5 people
and paralyzing a sixth during a racially-motivated shooting rampage; but
Richard Baumhammers is also looking for pen pals.
Baumhammers has a personal ad in the November 11th issue of Rolling Stone
magazine that says:
"Prisoner seeks pen pals. Have graduate degrees. Like classic rock and
80's music."
In addition to the ad, the convicted killer also has his own webpage
describing his interests, his past and academic studies. Baumhammers also
puts out the call for pen pals online.
So how can a death row inmate have so much access and communication with
the outside world? KDKA has not yet been able to get an answer from the
Department of Corrections; but this isn't the 1st time the issue has come
up with Baumhammers.
Two years ago, Baumhammers' parents reportedly put a personal ad in the
International Herald Tribune asking people to send letters to a "Latvian
American Male, Age 37" in care of his parents, Drs. Andrejs and Inese
Baumhammers. That ad failed to mention that Baumhammers is on death row.
A victim's relative, who saw the 2002 ad, was outraged and called for the
district attorney to investigate.
At the time, officials said that while prisoners are not permitted to
place ads for themselves, someone outside can do so for them.
(source: KDKA News)
