March 31 TEXAS: State drops death penalty for Joe LaRue In a case that has already had enough twists and turns to require a road map, the capital murder trial of Joe LaRue changed course once again Wednesday when the jury was dismissed and the state removed its request to seek the death penalty. LaRue, 42, is charged with raping and killing co-worker Donna Pentecost, 33, at her Port Neches home in 1989. The defendant was originally indicted for the killing in 2001, but the charges were later dropped due to a lack of evidence. As DNA technology improved, LaRue was indicted again and a trial began in March 2003. At the time, prosecutors charged LaRue with capital murder and were seeking the death penalty after reviewing DNA evidence that they believed proved LaRue was the killer. That trial was halted when Judge Layne Walker ruled that the DNA evidence was not admissable because prosecutors did not release laboratory findings to LaRue's defense attorneys in a timely manner. The case was then in limbo for two years while the state appealed the judge's ruling. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals finally agreed to allow the DNA evidence and Monday the trial resumed in Walker's court with the same 12 jurors from the 2003 trial. Jurors heard two days of testimony focusing on the collection of evidence by the Port Neches Police Department and other investigators. Wednesday morning prosecutor Ramon Rodriguez began to question Port Neches Police Chief Gene Marsh, who was the lead detective at the time of the murder in 1989, about a polygraph test given to the victim's common law husband. Because polygraph evidence is not admissible in Texas courts, defense attorney Doug Barlow immediately objected and a recess was called. The mention of the polygraph could have given the defense grounds to ask for a mistrial, they instead agreed to let the jury be dismissed. Known as a "bench trial," Walker will now hear all the evidence and decide on LaRue's guilt or innocence and his punishment. Walker said this is only the 2nd time he has seen a defendent waive his right to a jury trial in this manner. At the same time, the state agreed not to seek the death penalty for LaRue. "No one wanted a mistrial," Barlow said. "My client wants to move forward." Without the death penalty, if found guilty of capital murder LaRue could face life in prison or he could be found guilty of lesser charges including murder, which carries a 5 to 99 year sentence, or even manslaughter, a charge with a 2 to 20-year sentence. The trial will resume Monday and Walker is expected to make a decision by Tuesday afternoon. (source: The News) PENNSYLVANIA: Death Penalty Sought In Case Of Girl Found Burned In Trash Can----Lamar Haymes Remains Mute When Asked For Plea A prosecutor said he would seek the death penalty for a man accused of the rape, murder and dismemberment of a 15-year-old girl in December. Lamar Haymes, 29, of Yeadon, was arraigned Wednesday in the death of Deanna Wright-McIntosh, 15, a Penn Wood High School sophomore whose charred remains were found Dec. 30 in a steel trash drum in a vacant lot in West Philadelphia. Deputy District Attorney John F.X. Reilly certified the killing as a capital crime. Haymes' charges included 1st-degree murder, rape, kidnapping and abuse of a corpse. When asked how he pleaded, defense attorney Raymond Williams said Haymes would remain mute. Common Pleas Judge Charles C. Keeler entered a routine plea of innocent for Haymes, who is scheduled for a pretrial hearing May 9. (source: Associated Press) MARYLAND: Prosecutors Seek Death Penalty For Anne Arundel County Murders Prosecutors in Anne Arundel County plan to seek the death penalty for a man already convicted in one murder and recently linked to 3 others. Thirty-five-year-old Alexander Watson is serving a life sentence for the 1994 stabbing death of a Forestville office manager. Last summer, he was linked by DNA to the murders of women who lived near him in 1986, 1988 and 1993. One of those cases, the 1988 rape and slaying of a Gambrills jogger, is eligible for the death sentence. Prosecutors will seek life sentences in the other 2 cases -- the 1986 rape and murder of a Gambrills mother of two and the 1993 slaying of a Glen Burnie teenager. County State's Attorney Frank Weathersbee says, in his words, "If the death penalty is for anyone, it is for Mr. Watson." (source: Associated Press) CALIFORNIA: Prejudging jurors -- In real world, stereotypes are factored in The Bay Area media are riveted on the death-penalty appeal of convicted murderer Fred Freeman, whose hearing has become a venue for charges, countercharges, character assassination and gossip. The issue is whether former Alameda County prosecutor Jack Quatman committed misconduct. Quatman, who now practices law in Montana, claimed that he illegally kept several potential jurors off the Freeman jury because of their Jewish-sounding surnames, adding that he did so on the advice of the trial judge, the late Stanley Golde (a practicing Jew). This was a sanctioned practice for jury selection in the Alameda County District Attorney's Office, Quatman maintained. Quatman must have known that his charges would ignite a firestorm. We've been reminded that he left the D.A.'s office embittered because of differences with his boss, Alameda County District Attorney Tom Orloff. I'll not enter that hornet's nest, except to observe that the credibility of Orloff, who has testified against Quatman on various points, is excellent. The public, however, needs some perspective. Here is a sketch of the legal landscape: The law forbids the use of "invidious" criteria like race and religion for almost all official decisions, which means that both are off limits in jury selection. Or are they? Enter the trial lawyers. California allows each side in a criminal case a number of peremptory challenges, which used to mean that "Mr. Smith, you are excused" was never explained. Under law, a pattern of peremptory challenges suggesting use of an invidious criterion is usually objected to. To meet the objection, the lawyer must come up with a set of noninvidious reasons. Trial lawyers quickly learn that certain human stereotypes are routinely used in jury selection because, bluntly put, they capture strong statistical tendencies. For example, some faiths tend to oppose the death penalty but don't condemn drinking, while others tend to oppose drinking but not capital punishment. Yes these are only generalizations; that's why they are stereotypes. But if you're trying a death-penalty case or a drunk-driving case, you need to know these things. Also, some prospective jurors "lie," in that they deny or conceal facts about themselves that make them look bad, things like "being unfair" or "not keeping an open mind." Even with a jury-selection expert at your side (few law offices can afford them), picking a good jury for your trial is a crapshoot. Not every prospective juror can be given the third degree, and not every answer can be trusted. So trial lawyers go with their educated intuitions. Do stereotypes get factored in? You bet. Stereotypes like the one mentioned in the Freeman imbroglio -- that a prospective juror's Jewish background points to death- penalty opposition -- would have been consonant with the late Judge Golde's experience as a former trial lawyer. But the real-world meaning of whatever Golde may or may not have told Quatman about this (because both knew the law) would have been to "pay attention." It would not have prompted a knee-jerk rejection of these potential jurors because they might be Jewish. The reports mention other legitimate factors about these jurors in the record sufficient to justify Quatman's peremptory challenges. This would normally put the issue to rest. Death-penalty cases present unusual problems in jury selection, however. The process can be improved, to a point. For example, after the challenges for cause have been ruled on, both sides would be required to submit an entire list of their proposed peremptory challenges to the trial judge. Each side could submit up to 4 more than the maximum number allowed. The judge would then review both lists, call the attorneys into chambers for mutual disclosure, on-the-record discussions and objections. The judge would then disqualify an equal number for each side (discarding up to four). This, too, is an imperfect solution, but would give the trial court much more control over the "invidious" challenge problem and would cut down on late-breaking allegations such as those in the Freeman case. (source: Jay B. Gaskill is an attorney and a former Alameda County public defender (1989-99); San Francisco Chronicle) ********************************* Prejudging jurors -- Exclusions for race or religion cannot be allowed Many of us assume that the courts are the primary defender of our civil rights. Allegations of improper jury selection in Alameda County, however, have left some wondering if the judicial system is protecting or violating our civil rights. Former Alameda County prosecutor, John Quatman, has claimed that he excluded Jews from serving on juries of death-penalty cases under the recommendation of the late Alameda County Superior Court Judge Stanley Golde. Quatman also claims that the Alameda County District Attorney's Office excluded African-American women from death-penalty juries. The alleged discrimination was based on stereotypes that these 2 groups are uniformly opposed to the death penalty. Attorneys in any case are entitled to exercise a number of challenges to strike potential jurors from serving due to concerns of individual bias. Unfortunately, this practice has the potential for misuse. Discrimination based on ethnicity or religion violates the Alameda County district attorney's own policies. Further, the California and U.S. supreme courts have held that discrimination in jury selection based on race, ethnicity and gender is unlawful. Strong language in the courts' opinions indicates that the justices would find religious discrimination unlawful as well. For many years, juries did not reflect the diversity of their communities. Individuals were dismissed from serving because of race, gender and religion. Entire segments of society were thus excluded from the judicial process. As a result, the accused were not guaranteed a jury of their peers. Often, this meant that justice was only partially served and only certain people's civil rights were protected. Our country has a long and shameful history of excluding women and minorities from exercising basic rights and privileges -- from hiring practices to voting. Fortunately, our courts have recently punished those who engage in such discrimination, be they in the public or private sector. Consequently, many thought the days of institutional discrimination by government entities were over. The truth is, laws alone cannot completely change behaviors. The practice of eliminating jurors based on racial, ethnic and religious background is possibly widespread. There are reported allegations that black jurors were excluded from participating on death-penalty juries in Los Angeles and Contra Costa counties, as well as other allegations that Native American jurors were excluded in Humboldt County. The alleged practice of juror discrimination means that people in these groups are not allowed to participate in one of the most significant decisions we must make as a society: whether to impose the ultimate punishment of death. If discrimination is practiced, the accused does not receive a fair hearing from a jury that reflects the diversity of the community. Much needs to be done to correct this practice. First and foremost, the jury-selection process must be extensively investigated. Because there are allegations spreading beyond Alameda County, the investigation should occur throughout California, led by the California Attorney General's Office or a specially appointed commission. Once the investigation concludes, individuals who have engaged in discrimination must be appropriately disciplined. There must be serious consequences if we expect real change. In those cases in which the jury selection was prejudicially tainted, the defendants should be retried to guarantee that justice is served, even if severely delayed. Finally, we can also encourage a positive change in behavior through training. District attorney's offices should be required to attend sensitivity and diversity training to better understand the negative impact of juror discrimination on the community as well as the value of a diverse jury. In addition, the California State Bar should mandate continuing education on eliminating discrimination in jury selection for all prosecutors. We can do our part to help government include people of all backgrounds in every important civic function by demanding that elected officials order these remedies. Otherwise, we run the risk of turning back the clock to a time when juries did not represent the diversity of their communities. (source: Jonathan Bernstein is Central Pacific regional director of the Anti-Defamation League; San Francisco Chronicle)
