Your message dated Sat, 16 Oct 2010 19:25:41 +0100
with message-id <[email protected]>
and subject line Re: [pkg-cli-apps-team] Bug#598286: cowbell: CVE-2010-3353:
insecure library loading (possibly false positive)
has caused the Debian Bug report #598286,
regarding cowbell: CVE-2010-3353: insecure library loading
to be marked as done.
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If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.
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598286: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=598286
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--- Begin Message ---
Package: cowbell
Version: 0.2.7.1-5
Severity: grave
Tags: security
User: [email protected]
Usertags: ldpath
Hello,
During a review of the Debian archive, I've found your package to
contain a script that can be abused by an attacker to execute arbitrary
code.
The vulnerability is introduced by an insecure change to
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and environment variable used by ld.so(8) to look for
libraries on a directory other than the standard paths.
Vulnerable code follows:
/usr/bin/cowbell line 4:
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${libdir}${LD_LIBRARY_PATH+:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
When there's an empty item on the colon-separated list of
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ld.so treats it as '.' (i.e. CWD/$PWD.)
If the given script is executed from a directory where a potential,
local, attacker can write files to, there's a chance to exploit this
bug.
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE id CVE-2010-3353. Please make sure
you mention it when forwarding this report to upstream and when fixing
this bug (everywhere: upstream and here at Debian.)
[0] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3353
[1] http://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2010-3353
Sincerely,
Raphael Geissert
--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Version: 0.2.7.1-5
On Sat, Oct 16, 2010 at 07:16:11PM +0300, Jari Aalto wrote:
> [Raphael Geissert] Vulnerable code follows:
>
> /usr/bin/cowbell line 4:
> export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${libdir}${LD_LIBRARY_PATH+:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
[Etienne]
The second part only adds a colon if LD_LIBRARY_PATH is empty, so this
whole line is insecure only if ${libdir} is empty (and in that case
LD_LIBRARY_PATH will start with a colon). However, the previous line
is :
> libdir="@prefix@/lib/cowbell"
So, I believe that this use is safe.
The full code of ./cowbell.in reads:
1 #!/bin/sh
2
3 libdir="@prefix@/lib/cowbell"
4 export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${libdir}${LD_LIBRARY_PATH+:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
5
6 if [ -e ./@dll@ ] && [ -e ./Makefile.am ]; then
7 echo "*** Running uninstalled @dll@ ***"
8 ARGS="--debug"
9 THIS_EXE="./@dll@"
10 else
11 THIS_EXE="${libdir}/@dll@"
12 fi
13
14 exec @runtime@ --debug $THIS_EXE $ARGS "$@"
I concur with Etienne.
Jo, or Raphael: do you agree that this can be closed?
I do. Thanks for the analysis.
Cheers,
Iain
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