On 21/07/16 11:42, Andrew Shadura wrote: > On 21/07/16 11:37, Andrew Shadura wrote: >> On 21/07/16 11:32, Adam D. Barratt wrote: >>>> I realise that none of the above are actually enabled in >>>> debian/patches/series, but that makes it even more confusing that >>>> they're in the diff. Please prepare and test a package that contains >>>> only the changes relating to fixing CVE-2016-4476 and CVE-2016-4477 and >>>> provide a debdiff of that.
I have redone the package, tested it and generated a debdiff. -- Cheers, Andrew
diff -Nru wpa-2.3/debian/changelog wpa-2.3/debian/changelog
--- wpa-2.3/debian/changelog 2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000 +0100
+++ wpa-2.3/debian/changelog 2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
+wpa (2.3-1+deb8u4) jessie-security; urgency=medium
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload.
+ * Add patches to address CVE-2016-4476 and CVE-2016-4477, thanks to
+ Salvatore Bonaccorso <car...@debian.org> (Closes: #823411):
+ - WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
+ - Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase character
+ - Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network output
+ - Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the string values
+ - Reject SET commands with newline characters in the string values
+ * Refresh patches to apply cleanly.
+
+ -- Andrew Shadura <andre...@debian.org> Thu, 21 Jul 2016 09:01:51 +0200
+
wpa (2.3-1+deb8u3) jessie-security; urgency=high
* Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team.
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
index f2b0926..a629437 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct
eap_pwd_data *data,
+@@ -301,6 +301,23 @@
BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
u16 offset;
u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+@@ -500,6 +517,18 @@
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct
eap_pwd_data *data,
+@@ -634,9 +634,21 @@
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
int res = 0;
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct
eap_pwd_data *data,
+@@ -752,6 +764,13 @@
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
index a629437..1d2079b 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct
eap_method_ret *ret,
+@@ -812,11 +812,23 @@
* if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
*priv,
+@@ -920,11 +920,21 @@
* the first fragment has a total length
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct
eap_method_ret *ret,
+@@ -914,6 +914,7 @@
/*
* we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
*/
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
+
+WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
+characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
+STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
+WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
+
+This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
+the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
+an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
+such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
+could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ src/utils/common.h | 1 +
+ src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/utils/common.c
++++ b/src/utils/common.c
+@@ -593,6 +593,18 @@ int find_first_bit(u32 value)
+ }
+
+
++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
++{
++ size_t i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
++ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
++ return 1;
++ }
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+ const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
+--- a/src/utils/common.h
++++ b/src/utils/common.h
+@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid
+
+ char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
+ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
+ int find_first_bit(u32 value);
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+--- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
++++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
+@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struc
+ cred->key_len--;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */
+ }
++
++
++ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
++ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
++ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
++ cred->key, cred->key_len);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase
+ character
+
+WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
+characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
+includes an invalid passphrase.
+
+This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
+configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
+interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
+accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
+an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
+does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
+wpa_supplicant.
+
+This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
+almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
+file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
+opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
+load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
+This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
+wpa_supplicant process privileges.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -318,6 +318,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const st
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
+ (u8 *) value, len);
++ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
++ line);
++ return -1;
++ }
+ if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
+ os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0)
+ return 0;
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Stewart <ps...@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network
+ output
+
+Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
+wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
+parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
+been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
+characters in the psk parameter.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <ps...@google.com>
+---
+ src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/utils/common.h | 1 +
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/utils/common.c
++++ b/src/utils/common.c
+@@ -605,6 +605,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t
+ }
+
+
++int has_newline(const char *str)
++{
++ while (*str) {
++ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r')
++ return 1;
++ str++;
++ }
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+ const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
+--- a/src/utils/common.h
++++ b/src/utils/common.h
+@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid
+ char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
+ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
+ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
++int has_newline(const char *str);
+ int find_first_bit(u32 value);
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -2375,8 +2375,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *s
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) {
+ const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i];
+- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0)
+- return field->writer(field, ssid);
++ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) {
++ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid);
++
++ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "Found newline in value for %s; not
returning it",
++ var);
++ os_free(ret);
++ ret = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return ret;
++ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the
+ string values
+
+Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
+filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
+unexpected configuration file data might be written.
+
+This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
+configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
+interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
+accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
+an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
+does not validate the credential value before passing it to
+wpa_supplicant.
+
+This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
+into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
+wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
+pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
+controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
+library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -2572,6 +2572,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred
+
+ if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 &&
+ os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) {
++ if (has_newline(value))
++ return -1;
+ str_clear_free(cred->password);
+ cred->password = os_strdup(value);
+ cred->ext_password = 1;
+@@ -2622,9 +2624,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred
+ }
+
+ val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len);
+- if (val == NULL) {
++ if (val == NULL ||
++ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 &&
++ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
++ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
++ has_newline(val))) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string "
+ "value '%s'.", line, var, value);
++ os_free(val);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
diff -Nru
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch
---
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the
+ string values
+
+Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
+without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
+value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
+
+This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
+configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
+interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
+accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
+an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
+does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
+wpa_supplicant.
+
+This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
+into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
+wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
+pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
+controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
+library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jo...@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -3418,6 +3418,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(c
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (has_newline(pos)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
++ line, data->name);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ tmp = os_strdup(pos);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return -1;
diff -Nru wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/psk-parameter-config-update.txt
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/psk-parameter-config-update.txt
--- wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/psk-parameter-config-update.txt
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ wpa-2.3/debian/patches/2016-1/psk-parameter-config-update.txt
2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+psk configuration parameter update allowing arbitrary data to be written
+
+Published: May 2, 2016
+Identifiers: CVE-2016-4476 and CVE-2016-4477
+ (CVE-2016-2447 is an instance of CVE-2016-4477 on Android)
+Latest version available from: http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/
+
+
+Vulnerability
+
+A vulnerability was found in how hostapd and wpa_supplicant writes the
+configuration file update for the WPA/WPA2 passphrase parameter. If this
+parameter has been updated to include control characters either through
+a WPS operation (CVE-2016-4476) or through local configuration change
+over the wpa_supplicant control interface (CVE-2016-4477), the resulting
+configuration file may prevent the hostapd and wpa_supplicant from
+starting when the updated file is used. In addition for wpa_supplicant,
+it may be possible to load a local library file and execute code from
+there with the same privileges under which the wpa_supplicant process
+runs.
+
+The WPS trigger for this requires local user action to authorize the WPS
+operation in which a new configuration would be received. The attacker
+would also need to be in radio range of the device or have access to the
+IP network to act as a WPS External Registrar. Such an attack could
+result in denial of service by not allowing hostapd or wpa_supplicant to
+start after they have been stopped.
+
+The local configuration update through the control interface SET_NETWORK
+command could allow privilege escalation for the local user to run code
+from a locally stored library file under the same privileges as the
+wpa_supplicant process has. The assumption here is that a not fully
+trusted user/application might have access through a connection manager
+to set network profile parameters like psk, but would not have access to
+set other configuration file parameters. If the connection manager in
+such a case does not filter out control characters from the psk value,
+it could have been possible to practically update the global parameters
+by embedding a newline character within the psk value. In addition, the
+untrusted user/application would need to be able to install a library
+file somewhere on the device from where the wpa_supplicant process has
+privileges to load the library.
+
+Similarly to the SET_NETWORK case, if a connection manager exposes
+access to the SET_CRED or SET commands, similar issue with newline
+characters can exist as those commands do not filter out control
+characters from the value.
+
+It should also be noted that providing unlimited access to the
+wpa_supplicant control interface would allow arbitrary SET commands to
+be issued. Such unlimited access should not be provided to untrusted
+users/applications.
+
+
+Vulnerable versions/configurations
+
+For the local control interface attack vector (CVE-2016-4477):
+
+wpa_supplicant v0.4.0-v2.5 with control interface enabled
+
+update_config=1 must have been enabled in the configuration file.
+
+
+For the WPS attack vector (CVE-2016-4476):
+
+wpa_supplicant v0.6.7-v2.5 with CONFIG_WPS build option enabled
+hostapd v0.6.7-v2.5 with CONFIG_WPS build option enabled
+
+WPS needs to be enabled in the runtime operation and the WPS operation
+needs to have been authorized by the local user over the control
+interface. For wpa_supplicant, update_config=1 must have been enabled in
+the configuration file.
+
+
+Acknowledgments
+
+Thanks to Google for reporting this issue and Imre Rad of SEARCH-LAB
+Ltd. discovering it.
+
+
+Possible mitigation steps
+
+- Merge the following commits to hostapd/wpa_supplicant and rebuild it:
+
+ CVE-2016-4476:
+ WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
+ CVE-2016-4477:
+ Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase character
+ Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the string values
+ Reject SET commands with newline characters in the string values
+ CVE-2016-4476 and CVE-2016-4477:
+ Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network output
+
+ These patches are available from http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/
+
+- Update to hostapd/wpa_supplicant v2.6 or newer, once available
+
+
+Change history
+
+May 3, 2016
+- Added CVE IDs
diff -Nru wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5314.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5314.patch
--- wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5314.patch 2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000
+0100
+++ wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5314.patch 2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000
+0200
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@
/*
* the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
*/
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
"attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
-@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+@@ -958,6 +958,8 @@
}
wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
data->in_frag_pos += len;
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
(int) len);
return;
-@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+@@ -967,8 +969,6 @@
* buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
*/
if (data->in_frag_pos) {
diff -Nru wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5315.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5315.patch
--- wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5315.patch 2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000
+0100
+++ wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5315.patch 2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000
+0200
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct
eap_method_ret *ret,
+@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@
/*
* buffer and ACK the fragment
*/
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
data->in_frag_pos += len;
if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
-@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct
eap_method_ret *ret,
+@@ -854,7 +854,8 @@
return NULL;
}
wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
-@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct
eap_method_ret *ret,
+@@ -868,10 +869,8 @@
* we're buffering and this is the last fragment
*/
if (data->in_frag_pos) {
diff -Nru wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5316.patch
wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5316.patch
--- wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5316.patch 2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000
+0100
+++ wpa-2.3/debian/patches/CVE-2015-5316.patch 2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000
+0200
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
index 75ceef1..892b590 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct
eap_pwd_data *data,
+@@ -713,7 +713,8 @@
wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
fin:
diff -Nru wpa-2.3/debian/patches/series wpa-2.3/debian/patches/series
--- wpa-2.3/debian/patches/series 2015-11-07 16:07:28.000000000 +0100
+++ wpa-2.3/debian/patches/series 2016-07-21 11:42:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@
CVE-2015-5314.patch
CVE-2015-5315.patch
CVE-2015-5316.patch
+2016-1/0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch
+2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
+2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
+2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
+2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch
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